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Publishable Executive Summary 
The purpose of this deliverable is to provide a single point of reference on the safety, regulatory and 
liability issues for operating robots in the European Union. The deliverable describes a state of the 
art and the well-known normative frameworks for assuring safety on the one hand and examines the 
regulatory and legal liability issues related to operating robots on the other. 
We organised the report based on the required structure of the deliverable with taking into 
consideration the different robots technologies, as recognised at the European Union and 
international level.  
This deliverable is closely related to other deliverables which describe the current state of the arts 
and normative framework from a different point of view.  This review report is intended as a guiding 
document to be used by all project partners. 
There is currently no single framework to regulate robotics technology in Europe. Different types of 
robots, depending on where they operate—which Member State and in the air, on land, or in the 
waters—may be subject to various existing laws or regulations on the international, European Union, 
Member State levels. The regulations include legal standards and industry guidelines on the robot 
technologies themselves and on the developers, manufacturers, suppliers, and operators that must 
be met before these new technologies can be legally and safely deployed. Specific types of robots 
are subject to different regulatory regimes, and depending on the type of the robot, the applicable 
regulations may be harmonised across Europe or differ in each Member State. 
Current liability regimes on the EU and Member State levels govern the situations in which the 
humans associated with the robots are civilly liable for the damage they cause to property or injuries 
to persons. The appropriate legal regime could be fault-based, strict liability, or product liability 
depending on the particular circumstances. While existing laws are sufficient to address liability 
issues given the current state of the technology, further scientific advances that lead to increasingly 
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Introduction 
RIMA network’s domains of application are safety-critical because of both the things inspected and 
maintained (such as drinking water pipes, rail tunnels, and offshore platforms) and the things that 
are proposed to inspect and maintain them (such as drones, crawlers, and manipulator arms). 
Organisations developing technology in this domain will need to make rigorous efforts to ensure and 
assure its safety, to comply with relevant legislation, and to adequately manage the liability they 
have should something go wrong. 
This report reviews legal frameworks for robotic infrastructure I&M, along with relevant standards 
and best practices in development, verification and assurance. It is an attempt to capture the best 
practices for achieving safety assurance, meeting existing regulatory standards, addressing legal 
risks, as well as dealing with potential liability issues. Within RIMA, it is delivered under Task 7.3 
“Standardisation, assurance and certification; legislation and policy” in Work Package 7 – “Normative 
framework”. 
There are several challenges that need to be addressed when developing safety, assurance and 
regulation guidance for RIMA network of DIH: 
 Standards and regulations can differ in diverse ways between different Member States. 
 There is a great deal of existing knowledge on safety even before considering the knowledge 
specific to RIMA’s domains. In this report we assume that the reader (or, at least, their 
organisation) is able to carry out basic safety assessments.  
 The main issues which apply to industrial bodies concern the ability to the assure novel-use, 
novel-technology applications associated with new robotic solutions in RIMA’s domains. This 
is especially important when robots are operated with a high level of autonomy. Based on 
the previous concepts, we urgently require new types of approaches that do not (solely) rely 
on this basic assumption (everything is defined at design time).   
Naturally, there is a strong relationship between the safety standards that apply to robotics 
technology and the law. More specifically, this relates to regulations regarding safety standards, as 
well as potential liability issues that may arise in the event that robotic technology causes damage to 
property, humans, or both. The aim of this report is to outline the safety requirements that are 
currently in place. This is done with the intention of providing guidance on how to deal effectively 
with each step of the robot development process. This will allow for safe operation by limiting the 
potential for harm to be caused. The regulations that are discussed provide evidence of existing 
regimes which apply to robotic technology, as well as highlight gaps in the law as it is presently 
constituted.  
The understanding of the existing regulatory framework is necessary in order to determine what are 
the next steps necessary to address the need for best practices and regulations specific to robotics in 
Inspection and Maintenance of Infrastructures. Robots operating in the RIMA domains raise specific 
issues and have particular risks that may not be relevant to robotics in general. Achieving safety, 
both through safety standards and regulatory standards, and understanding the allocation of 
liabilities specifically for RIMA application domains will facilitate regulatory and legal certainty. 
In this report, we present our initial findings on the best practices for standardisation, assurance and 
certification, legislation, and policy for robots in RIMA application domains. Focus is placed on 
outlining best practices for robotic technologies which can operate in the air, on land, and at sea. For 
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each of these forms of technology we have sought to provide the reader with useful information 
regarding safety, regulatory, and liability issues with a focus on RIMA application domains.  
 
 
1 General Concepts 
This section introduces the general concepts of regulation and legal liability. It first discusses the 
various ways the development and operation of robotics technology can be regulated to ensure 
safety standards are met. It then focuses on the liability regimes that can compensate victims of 
unsafe or malfunctioning robotics technology who suffer injury or property damage. The main types 
of liability regimes available in the Member States are fault-based and strict liability, with the 
product liability regime being a special type of strict liability. 
1.1 Methods of Regulation 
Regulations for robotics used for Inspection and Maintenance of infrastructures will ensure that 
robot technologies meet minimum requirements before they are deployed and used in society and 
also ensure that the individuals responsible for accidents resulting from the use of technology would 
be legally responsible for any damages caused.1 These regulations will make certain that robots can 
operate safely for the sake of the individuals directly involved and also society as a whole that should 
not be forced to pay for the wrongdoings of the robotics companies, insofar as that is possible given 
the rapid pace of technological development.2 While there may be numerous reasons for why 
regulations may be necessary, at this stage of the development of robotics technology for RIMA 
network, the overwhelming concern is likely the assurance that robots will work properly in the ways 
they are supposed to and people’s safety are not unduly threatened for the sake of advances in 
technology.3 Having a sound regulatory framework would instil confidence in the technologies and 
facilitate the further development and expansion of the use of robotic technologies for Inspection 
and Maintenance of Infrastructure.4 
From a legal perspective, the two main ways to regulate technologies used for Inspection and 
Maintenance of Infrastructures addressed in RIMA network5 are direct and indirect regulation. Direct 
legal regulation involves the robotic technologies meeting the approval requirements to be able to 
be used, whether in testing environments or in real life settings. Indirect legal regulation is 
effectuated through criminal and civil liabilities, the latter either being laws specifically designed for 
                                                          
1
 For suggested principles for the regulation of robots, see generally Margaret Boden, ‘Principles of Robotics: 
Regulating Robots in the Real World’ (2017) 29 Connection Science 124; Ronald Leenes et al, ‘Regulatory 
Challenges of Robotics: Some Guidelines for Addressing Legal and Ethical Issues’ (2017) 9 Law, Innovation and 
Technology 1; Michael Nagenborg et al, ‘Ethical Regulations on Robotics in Europe’ (2008) 22 AI & Society 349; 
Jacob Turner, Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). 
2
 See generally Mark Fenwick, Wulf A Kaal and Erik PM Vermeulen, ‘Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens 
When Technology Is Faster than the Law’ (2017) 6 Am U Bus L Rev 561; Wulf A Kaal and Erik PM Vermeulen, 
'How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data' (2017) 57 Jurimetrics 169. 
3
 Other reasons include protecting vulnerable populations, allocating scarce resources, ensuring costs are 
borne by certain parties and not society as a whole, discouraging anti-competitive behaviour, and ensuring the 
continuance of basic, essential services. Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding 




 Referred to as RIMA technologies in the rest of the document  
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the particular technology, or tort law or delict, which may incorporate or refer to industry standards 
and soft law such as the ISO or IEEE standards.6 These laws can be passed by legislatures or be judge-
made.7 
Direct regulation of technologies used in I&M generally works by preventing accidents from 
occurring in the first place. Robots would have to meet requirements in order to be designed and 
used, including specifications of the technology and the qualifications of the operators. If an entity 
building the robot fails to meet the standards, it would be forbidden from putting the robot in 
operation. These regulatory measures may also have a post hoc effect where the operators or 
manufacturers may be sanctioned if it were determined that they deployed the robots without 
undergoing the approval process or received approval through providing erroneous information or 
otherwise did not meet the requisite standards. Depending on the country and specific regulatory 
framework, penalties could include monetary fines or reputational sanctions where the regulatory 
breaches are made public.8 
Indirect regulations through criminal and civil liabilities would only come into play if an accident 
were to occur and it becomes necessary to determine whether the potential wrongdoer would be 
subject to any criminal or civil liability. Because the applicable laws are specific to each country, the 
details would differ for each situation. In general, the applicable law would be that of the jurisdiction 
in which the accident occurs, though it may also be possible for individuals to be charged in the 
jurisdiction in which they live. The potential criminal charges would also be different and depend on 
whether property was damaged, and if so, the amount of damage, and whether people were injured 
or killed. Depending on the particular circumstances, not only could the operator be subject to 
criminal liability, the designer, owner, or other individuals involved in the process of making the 
robotic technology a reality may also be potentially criminally liable. In general, for criminal liability 
to be found by the courts, there would probably have to be some type of maliciousness involved 
where the actions that led to the damage or injuries were the result of intentional acts or were due 
to the person’s recklessness or gross negligence. In other words, the act must have resulted both 
from a criminal act and a mental state to commit that act.9 
Civil liabilities have a much lower legal standard. If an accident were to occur whilst using the 
robotics technology, the operator, designer, owner, or other individuals involved in leading to the 
robot being deployed could be subject to civil liability if it were found that the technology did not 
meet the specific requirements to which they were subject, such as the training requirements for a 
drone operator. There could also be civil liabilities if it were found that the accident occurred due to 
negligence. In general, to show negligence, the court would have to find that the person did not 
meet the requisite standard of care, or duty. This standard of care is usually what a reasonable 
person in the particular situation would be expected to maintain, and in the realm of robots used in 
I&M, this standard could be industry guidance or best practices that are not independently binding.10 
These guidelines and best practices are usually called soft law, which, unlike legislation or case law, 
                                                          
6
 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (European Union 2019) 
<ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 23. 
7
 Marta Katarzyna Kolacz, Alberto Quintavalla and Orlin Yalnazov, ‘Who Should Regulate Disruptive Technology 
(2019) 10 Eur J Risk Reg 4. 
8
 See John Armour et al, ‘Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets’ (2017) 52 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1429. 
9
 For criminal liability issues, see generally Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (OUP 9th edn 
2019); Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Hart 2008); Markus D Dubber and Tatjana 
Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014).  
10
 https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-the-relevance-of-industry-standards-under-the-law-36794 
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do not have any regulatory effect on their own because they are not laws made by state parties.11 
They nevertheless lead to compliance with certain standards because they ‘create expectations 
about future conduct’12 or acquire legally-binding force ‘through acceptance as market 
requirements’13 These soft law standards can be found by the court to be applicable in a case to 
determine civil liability, but they could also be incorporated into a contract, such as the one between 
the manufacturer of the robot and the user, and become an issue in a contractual dispute. 
While it is unclear so far, it may be possible for courts or legislative bodies to determine that for 
robots for I&M, strict liability would be the standard for the determination of civil liabilities. For strict 
liability, negligence by the operator or manufacturer would not need to be shown as long as there is 
a defect with the robot and the defect caused the damage.14 Determining whether there is a defect, 
again, could be aided by assessing whether industry standards were met, though this is not 
dispositive.15 This means that the entities or individuals within them could be liable for monetary 
compensation even in the absence of fault. Product liability is a special case of strict liability. While 
criminal liability, fault-based civil liability, and strict liability laws may differ depending on the EU 
Member State, the EU Product Liability Directive 1985 harmonised the law on product liability 
throughout the EU. 
Another way RIMA technologies could be regulated is through private regulation, especially through 
insurance contracts.16 When an entity purchases insurance to cover risks arising from the trial and 
use of these technologies, the insurer is incentivised to reduce the risk because minimising losses 
would benefit both the insurer and the policyholder. Insurance, thus, plays the role of regulators of 
corporate behaviour by ensuring that basic safety standards are met.17 In this regard, ‘insurance 
policies are quite similar to statutes regulating the activity, expectations, and conceptions of insurers 
and policyholders’.18 Some even argue that insurance companies are better regulators than the 
government because of their close working relationship with the insured.19 Entities operating drones 
and trialling autonomous vehicles are required to purchase insurance to cover any losses, and 
through these insurance contracts, the insurer may require the companies to show evidence that all 
relevant regulations are met, or even to impose stricter standards of their own. Entities would abide 
by these contractual terms because failure to do so would mean they would not have insurance 
cover and consequently not be allowed to operate the robots. 
1.2 European Union Directives 
Various European Union Directives may be applicable to robots for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance. The Directives all have different scopes, exclude different types of products or 
equipment, and have different purposes.  This section introduces the Machinery Directive, the Radio 
Equipment Directive, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive because all three are likely to 
                                                          
11
 Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees and Adam Thierer, ‘Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance 
of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future’ (2018) 17 Colo Tech LJ 37. 46-49. 
12
 Andrew T Guzman and Timothy L Meyer, ‘International Soft Law’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis 171, 174. 
13
 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘“Soft Law” in a “Hybrid” Organization: The International Organization for 
Standardization’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford University Press 2000) 263–64. 
14




 For a general discussion of private regulation of artificial intelligence, see Sonia K Katyal, ‘Private 
Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’ (2019) 66 UCLA L Rev 54. 
17
 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D Logue, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard’ (2012) 
111 Michigan Law Review 197, 217–28. 
18
 Jeffrey W Stempel, ‘The Insurance Policy as Statute’ (2010) 41 McGeorge Law Review 203, 205-06. 
19
 Jeffrey W Stempel, ‘The Insurance Policy as Statute’ (2010) 41 McGeorge Law Review 203, 228, 235–38. 
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be applicable to many different types of robotics technology, though it is important to remember 
that existing Directives may not be able to account for the rapid pace of technological 
advancements, and some robots may be excluded given the definitions used in the various 
Directives. Two more Directives, the Product Safety Directive and the Product Liability Directive, will 
be discussed in a later section.20 It is unlikely they would apply as is in the commercial settings in 
which infrastructure inspection and maintenance robots operate given their focus on consumer 
protection. However, they are discussed because they offer safety standards and a liability regime 
for victim compensation that may be useful for robotics technology in general. They can serve as 
guidance and possible roadmaps for legal reform in the future to make similar measures applicable 
in the commercial robotics setting. 
 
1.2.1 Machinery Directive 
 
In general, robotics technology is likely to be regulated by the provisions of the Machinery Directive 
2006/42/EC, which was first published in June 2006 and came into effect in December 2009. The 
purpose of the Directive is to protect the health and safety of persons in the EU from risks that may 
arise from the use of machinery.21 The risks associated with machinery are usually high because of 
the ability of industrial robots to inflict serious injuries.22 The Directive also guarantees the freedom 
of movement of products within the EU, as once a machinery is determined to be in conformity with 
the Directive, it can be put in the market or placed in service in any Member State without further 
restrictions.23 This Directive is only applicable to machinery that are being placed in the EU for the 
first time.24 
 
 Scope of Directive 
 
According to the Directive, machinery is defined as: 
 
— an assembly, fitted with or intended to be fitted with a drive system other than 
directly applied human or animal effort, consisting of linked parts or components, at 
least one of which moves, and which are joined together for a specific application, 
— an assembly referred to in the first indent, missing only the components to connect 
it on site or to sources of energy and motion, 
— an assembly referred to in the first and second indents, ready to be installed and 
able to function as it stands only if mounted on a means of transport, or installed in a 
building or a structure, 
— assemblies of machinery referred to in the first, second and third indents or partly 
completed machinery referred to in point (g) which, in order to achieve the same end, 
are arranged and controlled so that they function as an integral whole, 
— an assembly of linked parts or components, at least one of which moves and which 
are joined together, intended for lifting loads and whose only power source is directly 
applied human effort;25 
 
                                                          
20
 See Section 1.4. 
21
 Machinery Directive Article 4(1). The Directive’s health and safety requirements are also meant to protect 
animals and the environment in certain cases. 
22
  SP Gaskill and SRG Went, ‘Safety Issues in Modern Applications of Robots’ (1996) 53 Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety 301, 301. 
23
 Machinery Directive Article 6. 
24
 George A Ballas and Theodore J Konstantakopoulos, ‘Greece Chapter’ in Alain Bensoussan, et al (eds) 
Comparative Handbook: Robotic Technologies Law (Éditions Larcier, 2016) 161. 
25
 Machinery Directive Article 2(a). 
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Partly completed machinery are also governed by the Directive.26 Partly completed machinery: 
 
means an assembly which is almost machinery but which cannot in itself perform a 
specific application. A drive system is partly completed machinery. Partly completed 
machinery is only intended to be incorporated into or assembled with other machinery 
or other partly completed machinery or equipment, thereby forming machinery to 
which this Directive applies.27 
 
The Directive excludes its application to many products or equipment.28 For example, the following 
are not within the purview of the Directive: ‘safety components intended to be used as spare parts 
to replace identical components and supplied by the manufacturer of the original machinery’, and 
‘machinery specially designed or put into service for nuclear purposes which, in the event of failure, 
may result in an emission of radioactivity’.29 
 
More pertinent to robotics for infrastructure inspection and maintenance, it is generally agreed that 
robots in general are considered machinery.30 There is little doubt that current industrial robots fall 
under the purview of the Machinery Directive. This is despite the fact that the word ‘robot’ does not 
appear in the Directive.31 However, the Directive does explicitly exclude various forms of 
transportation that may impact its applicability to future robotics technology. The exclusions include 
agricultural and forestry tractors, four-wheeled vehicles designed for road use, two and three-
wheeled vehicles, ‘means of transport by air, on water and on rail networks’ and ‘seagoing vessels 
and mobile offshore units’.32 The shared characteristic that leads to the exclusion of these systems is 
that they are designed to transport goods or people.33 
 
As a result, ‘*m+achinery intended for use on rail networks that is not intended for the transport of 
persons and/or goods such as, for example, railbound machinery for the construction, maintenance 
and inspection of the rail track and structures, is also in the scope of the Machinery Directive’.34 One 
scholar was initially unsure whether the Directive would apply to aerial drones but clearly advocated 
for its inclusion.35 The Guide to Application of the Machinery Directive later suggested that drones 
that are not considered ‘means of transport’ are still covered by the Directive.36 As will be discussed 
                                                          
26
 Machinery Directive Article 1(g). The Directive also applies to interchangeable equipment; safety 
components; lifting accessories; chains, ropes and webbing; removable mechanical transmission devices are 
also under the purview of the Machinery Directive. For definitions of these products, see Machinery Directive 
Article 2. 
27
 Machinery Directive Article 2(g).  
28
 Machinery Directive Article 1(2). 
29
 Machinery Directive Article 1(2)(a)-(c). 
30
 A Santosuosso, C Boscarato, F Caroleo, R Labruto and C Leroux, ‘Robots, Market and Civil Liability: A 
European Perspective’ (2012) IEEE RO-MAN: The 21st IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human 
Interactive Communication 1051, 1052. 
31
 Marc Gallardo, ‘Spain Chapter’ in Alain Bensoussan, et al (eds) Comparative Handbook: Robotic Technologies 
Law (Éditions Larcier, 2016) 308. 
32
 Machinery Directive Article 1(2)(e)-(f). 
33
 European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Guide 
to Application of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC (2.2 edn, October 2019) 67-57. 
34
 European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Guide 
to Application of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC (2.2 edn, October 2019) 57. 
35
 Guido Noto La Diega, 'Machine Rules. Of Drones, Robots, and the Info-Capitalist 
Society' (2016) 2 Italian LJ 367, 397. 
36
 European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Guide 
to Application of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC (2.2 edn, October 2019) 56-57. 
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later, aerial drones are also subject to Commission regulations specifically on drones.37 The 
Machinery Directive’s requirements on health and safety are generally applicable, but ‘[w]here those 
health and safety requirements are intrinsically linked to the safety of the flight’, only the drone 
regulation would apply.38 
 
Tractors that are covered by the Tractor Directive 2007/37/EC, which include wheeled tractors, 
track-laying tractors, trailers, and interchangeable towed equipment, are excluded from the 
Machinery Directive.39 At the time the Machine Directive was first passed, it covered some risks 
related to tractors, but Regulation 167/2013 made it clear that tractors ‘are completely excluded 
from the Machinery Directive’.40 The machinery mounted or semi-mounted on tractors remain under 
the purview of the Machinery Directive.41 It must also be noted that if the ‘“vehicle” is primarily 
designed for a task such that it does not meet the definition of an agricultural vehicle in Regulation 
(EU) No 167/2013’, then the Machinery Directive still applies. Consequently, care must be taken to 
determine whether specific designs and models in the future are covered by the Machinery Directive 
or the Tractor Directive should they deviate from the industrial robots used today. 
 
For cars and motorcycles, the exclusion is only applied to those that are designed to travel on roads, 
so off-road vehicles would still be subject to the Machinery Directive.42 Vehicles used for an ‘intra-
enterprise setting’ are also generally covered by the Directive.43 With the exception of seagoing 
vessels and offshore units, the machinery on the vehicles must still abide by the Directive.44 Such 
machinery includes ‘loader cranes, tail-lifts, vehicle or trailer-mounted compressors, vehicle-
mounted compaction systems, vehicle mounted concrete mixers, skip loaders, powered winches, 
tipper bodies and vehicle or trailer-mounted mobile elevating work platforms’.45 The machinery 
installed on seagoing vessels and offshore units are not within the scope of the Directive because 
they are subject to international conventions.46 
 
Due to the various exclusions, whether the Machinery Directive would be applicable to robots for 
infrastructure inspection and maintenance is a question without an overarching answer. The same 
water-borne robot that inspects bridges would be covered by the Machinery Directive if it is in a 
Member State’s internal waters but would be excluded if it were operating in international waters. 
Aerial drones for infrastructure inspection and maintenance would likely be included in the Directive 
so long as they are not meant to transport goods or people and the health and safety requirements 
are not intrinsic to flight safety requirements. Land-based robots may or may not be subject to the 
Directive depending on how they are designed. If it moves on rails and is not meant for the 
transportation of people or goods, the Directive would apply. If it has wheels but is designed strictly 
to travel on roads and transport people or goods, it would not be within the Directive’s scope, as 
                                                          
37
 See Section 2.1. 
38
 COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and 
on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems Recital (6). 
39
 Thomas Klindt et al, The New EC Machinery Directive 2006 (Beuth Verlag 2007) 24. 
40
 European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Guide 
to Application of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC (2.2 edn, October 2019) 53. 
41
 European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Guide 
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other EU legislation, Council Directive 70/156/EEC or Directive 2002/24/EC, would apply. As for 
machinery mounted on top of such vehicles, with technological advancements, whether something is 
considered an integral part of the vehicle or mounted equipment could become hard to determine, 
making the applicability of the Directive less certain. 
 
 Obligations of Member States and Manufacturers 
 
The Directive requires Member States to ensure that machinery that are ‘placed on the market 
and/or put into service’ meet the requirements set forth in the Directive and ‘does not endanger the 
health and safety of persons…when properly installed and maintained and used for its intended 
purpose or under reasonably foreseeable conditions’.47 Annex I of the Directive contains the 
‘*e+ssential health and safety requirements relating to the…design and construction of machinery’ 
that manufacturers must meet.48 These are mandatory provisions that must be followed.49 
 
Annex I requires that ‘[m]achinery must be designed and constructed so that it is fitted for its 
function, and can be operated, adjusted and maintained without putting persons at risk’ for the 
machinery’s normal functions and misuse that is reasonably foreseeable.50 Manufacturers must 
ensure that the machinery is designed and manufactured in ways that prevent abnormal use that 
could lead to danger.51 The risk elimination must be for the machinery’s lifetime, including ‘the 
phases of transport, assembly, dismantling, disabling and scrapping’.52 In taking measures to prevent 
risks, the following steps must be followed: 
 
— eliminate or reduce risks as far as possible (inherently safe machinery design and 
construction), 
— take the necessary protective measures in relation to risks that cannot be 
eliminated, 
— inform users of the residual risks due to any shortcomings of the protective 
measures adopted, indicate whether any particular training is required and specify any 
need to provide personal protective equipment.53 
 
Manufacturers must use materials that would not endanger the health and safety of people when 
constructing the machinery, and there must be internal and external lighting as appropriate to 
ensure safe operations, inspections, and maintenance.54 The machinery must be made to be safely 
handled and transported, including being affixed with attachments for or shaped in ways compatible 
with lifting gear.55 The health and safety of the person operating the machinery must also be 
considered. This includes ergonomic designs that minimise ‘physical and psychological stress’, 
ensuring the position of the operator is not subject to undue hazards such as exhaust gases, and 
stable seating for the operator if appropriate for the machinery.56 
 
There are also health and safety requirements for the machinery’s control systems, which should be 
designed and constructed so that: 
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— they can withstand the intended operating stresses and external influences, 
— a fault in the hardware or the software of the control system does not lead to 
hazardous situations, 
— errors in the control system logic do not lead to hazardous situations, 
— reasonably foreseeable human error during operation does not lead to hazardous 
situations.57 
Additionally, control devices are to be: 
— clearly visible and identifiable, using pictograms where appropriate, 
— positioned in such a way as to be safely operated without hesitation or loss of time 
and without ambiguity, 
— designed in such a way that the movement of the control device is consistent with 
its effect, 
— located outside the danger zones, except where necessary for certain control 
devices such as an emergency stop or a teach pendant, 
— positioned in such a way that their operation cannot cause additional risk, 
— designed or protected in such a way that the desired effect, where a hazard is 
involved, can only be achieved by a deliberate action, 
— made in such a way as to withstand foreseeable forces; particular attention must be 
paid to emergency stop devices liable to be subjected to considerable forces.58 
 
The machinery also must be made in ways that would minimise the ‘*r+isk of loss of stability’, ‘*r+isk 
of break-up during operation’, ‘*r+isks due to falling or ejected objects’, ‘*r+isks due to surfaces, edges 
or angles’, ‘*r+isks related to combined machinery’, ‘*r+isks related to variations in operating 
conditions’, and ‘*r+isks related to moving parts’.59 The ‘protection against risks arising from moving 
parts’ ‘must be selected on the basis of the type of risk’, and when the machinery is stopped, 
uncontrolled movement ‘must be prevented or must be such that it does not present a hazard’.60 
Risks from other hazards such as the electric supply, static electricity, errors of fitting, extreme 
temperatures, fire, noise and radiation, must also be prevented.61 The above are essential for all 
machinery, and Annex I also includes health and safety requirements for certain categories of 
machinery,62 health and safety requirements associated with machinery mobility,63 health and safety 
requirements to prevent ‘hazards due to lifting operations’,64 health and safety requirements for 
machinery intended for underground work,65 and health and safety requirements to guards against 
‘hazards due to the lifting of persons’.66 
 
The Directive takes a risk-based approach rather than ‘test*ing+ for all possible dangerous faults’.67 
Consequently, a risk assessment as stipulated in Annex I must be performed by the manufacturer, 
and the design and construction must take into account this risk assessment.68 The risk assessment 
and resulting actions must: 
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— determine the limits of the machinery, which include the intended use and any 
reasonably foreseeable misuse thereof, 
— identify the hazards that can be generated by the machinery and the associated 
hazardous situations, 
— estimate the risks, taking into account the severity of the possible injury or damage 
to health and the probability of its occurrence, 
— evaluate the risks, with a view to determining whether risk reduction is required, in 
accordance with the objective of this Directive, 
— eliminate the hazards or reduce the risks associated with these hazards by 
application of protective measures, in the order of priority established in section 
1.1.2(b).69 
 
Though it is not a requirement to satisfy the requirements of the risk assessment, the UK 
government suggests that: 
 
the harmonised standard BS EN ISO 12100:2010 Safety of machinery - General 
principles for design - Risk assessment and risk reduction...provides fundamental 
guidance and an overall framework for designers making decisions during the 
development of machinery to enable them to design machines that are safe for their 
intended use.70 
 
Conducting a risk assessment and reducing risks do not mean that all risks must be eliminated, so 
residual risk can be acceptable if the circumstances call for it.71 Some machines are simply inherently 
dangerous.72 Residual risks are risks ‘to be controlled by the user based on information from the 
manufacturer contrary to the risks which have been eliminated by design measures and/or 
prevented based on safeguarding’.73 The protective measures the user needs to take, which can be, 
for example, additional screens, protective gear, or operational restrictions to certain personnel, 
must be provided by the manufacturer.74 
 
Manufacturers have the obligation to ensure the machinery is safe before putting it on the market or 
into service. First, it must ‘ensure that it satisfies the relevant essential health and safety 
requirements set out in Annex I’.75 So long as the machinery is ‘manufactured in conformity with a 
harmonised standard, the references to which have been published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, [it] shall be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety requirements 
covered by such a harmonised standard’.76 These harmonised standards are developed by European 
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Standardisation Organisations.77 The standards are highly technical and usually left to the private 
actors without intervention from Member States or the Commission.78 The harmonised standards 
are divided into three types. ‘A-type standards specify basic concepts, terminology and design 
principles applicable to all categories of machinery, and following these standards alone is ‘not 
sufficient to ensure conformity with the relevant essential health and safety requirements of the 
Directive and therefore does not give a full presumption of conformity’.79 ‘B-type standards deal with 
specific aspects of machinery safety or specific types of safeguard that can be used across a wide 
range of categories of machinery’ and its application confers a presumption of conformity if ‘a 
technical solution specified by the B-type standard is adequate for the particular category or model 
of machinery concerned’ or if it is for safety components placed on the market independently.80 ‘C-
type standards provide specifications for a given category of machinery’ and following the standard 
gives rise to a presumption of conformity.81 
 
Examples of the standards that could be applicable to robots for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance include: 
 
 EN ISO 10218-1:2011: Robots and robotic devices - Safety requirements for industrial 
robots - Part 1: Robots (ISO 10218-1:2011) 
 EN ISO 10218-2:2011: Robots and robotic devices - Safety requirements for industrial 
robots - Part 2: Robot systems and integration (ISO 10218- 2:2011). 
 EN ISO 1525:1997 Safety of industrial trucks. Driverless trucks and their systems. 
(under revision, project published in 2018 as PR EN ISO 3691-4) 
 EN 13020:2015: Road surface treatment machines - Safety requirements 
 EN 13524:2003+A2:2014: Highway maintenance machines - Safety requirements 
EN 15997:2011/AC:2012: All terrain vehicles (ATVs - Quads) - Safety requirements and 
test methods82 
 
Manufacturers can also choose to conform to the requirements without referring to these 
harmonised standards or only parts of them, but they must be able to show that their own standard 
‘provides a level of safety that is at least equivalent to that afforded by application of the 
specifications of the harmonised standard’.83 The presumption provided by the private harmonised 
standards offers a level of certainty to the manufacturer.84 However, it is rebuttable and can always 
be challenged should disputes arise.85 This was confirmed in a 2007 European Court of Justice case.86 
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Second, manufacturers must compile and make available a technical file that ‘demonstrate*s+ that 
the machinery complies with the requirements’ of the Machine Directive.87 The technical file is 
meant to include all the documentation, most importantly the risk assessment, so they can be 
assessed by the national authority.88 Third, the manufacturer must provide necessary information 
such as instructions.89 These instructions are required to include information on health and safety.90 
They should also be ‘accessible and readily understood’ in order to be useful and effective.91 Fourth, 
they must ‘carry out the appropriate procedures for assessing conformity’.92 To satisfy this 
requirement: 
 
the person carrying out the conformity assessment must have, or have access to the 
necessary means to verify the conformity of the machinery with the applicable health 
and safety requirements. The means may include, for example, access to the necessary 
qualified personnel who have knowledge of both the Machinery Directive and relevant 
standards, access to the necessary information, the competency and the equipment 
needed to carry out the necessary design checks, calculations, measurements, 
functional tests, strength tests, visual inspections and checks on information and 
instructions to ensure the conformity of the machinery with the relevant essential 
health and safety requirements.93 
 
Fifth, manufacturers are required to ‘draw up the EC declaration of conformity...and ensure that it 
accompanies the machinery’,94 and finally, manufacturers must ‘affix the CE marking’ as specified in 
the Machinery Directive.95 The CE marking denotes that the manufacturer has ensured the 
machinery conforms to health and safety standards.96 The marking ‘shall consist of the initials “CE”’ 
and ‘shall be affixed to the machinery visibly, legibly and indelibly’.97 In addition to the CE marking, 
the machinery must include other marking with the appropriate information ‘usually specified in the 
relevant harmonised standards’.98 All five of these steps are mandatory provisions that 
manufacturers must follow.99 
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Member State authorities have the obligation of market surveillance to ensure that products are safe 
when or after they have entered the market.100 This can be performed ‘at any stage after the 
construction of the machinery is complete’ and can be completed at ‘the premises of manufacturers, 
importers, distributors, rental companies, in transit or at the external borders of the EU’.101 While 
machinery with ‘CE marking and accompanied by the EC declaration of conformity’ is presumed to 
have conformed to the Directive, the power of market surveillance is an external check to the 
manufacturer’s self-assessment and regulation.102 If non-conformity is found, the national authority 
may order corrective measures be taken or forbid the use of the machinery altogether.103  
 
The market surveillance must take into account the state of the art, meaning that although it may 
not ‘be possible to meet the objectives set by *the Directive+…the machinery must, as far as possible, 
be designed and constructed with the purpose of approaching these objectives’.104 When making this 
assessment, the authority must also take into account the intended use of the machinery and the 
reasonably foreseeable misuse, as ‘certain kinds of misuse, whether intentional or unintentional, are 
predictable on the basis of experience of past use of the same type of machinery or of similar 
machinery, accident investigations and knowledge about human behaviour’.105 Examples of misuse 
include ‘loss of control of the machine by the operator’ and ‘behaviour resulting from pressures to 
keep machinery running in all circumstances’.106 In addition to the market surveillance obligations of 
the Machinery Directive, Member States must also follow the market surveillance rules in Chapter III 
of the Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 if the former is silent on the issue.107 Manufacturers of robotics 
technology should be aware of the measures Member State authorities can take in both the 
Directive and this regulation. 
 
Member States have the ability to ensure that the machinery is made unavailable should there be 
violations of the Directive: 
 
Where a Member State ascertains that machinery covered by this Directive, bearing the 
CE marking, accompanied by the EC declaration of conformity and used in accordance 
with its intended purpose or under reasonably foreseeable conditions, is liable to 
endanger the health or safety of persons or, where appropriate, domestic animals or 
property or, where applicable, the environment, it shall take all appropriate measures to 
withdraw such machinery from the market, to prohibit the placing on the market and/or 
putting into service of such machinery or to restrict the free movement thereof.108 
 
The Member State that takes this action must then inform the European Commission and other 
Member States the reason for the measure it has taken.109 
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 Applicability to New Technologies 
 
Whether the Machinery Directive is fit for purpose to regulate the health and safety of robotics for 
infrastructure maintenance and inspection is an open question, though it must be able to do so to 
fulfil its original and fundamental purpose.110 It has been suggested that the Directive was meant to 
regulate health and safety in ‘relatively well structured’ industrial environments where the risks are 
able to be easily controlled.111 With new and more complex technologies operating in ‘less 
structured environments’, the Directive may need to be amended.112 The Directive’s approach of 
minimising interactions between the machine and humans to reduce casualty is also one that may 
not be appropriate for artificial intelligence or robots for infrastructure inspection and maintenance 
that may necessarily encounter humans and operate in outdoor, uncontrolled environments.113 The 
unpredictability of the behaviour of humans who are not part of the robotics operation while in 
relatively close proximity is an additional factor brought about by the new technologies.114 
 
The European Commission conducted a public consultation on the Directive in 2016 which, in part, 
solicited opinions on ‘its fitness-for-purpose to new technological developments’.115 While 45% of 
the respondents answered ‘to a large extent’ on whether the Directive ‘*t+ook account sufficiently of 
new innovations and new technologies at the time’ it was first implemented, only 29% answered the 
same way to the questions of whether it has been able to account for technological developments 
since then and 23% to the question of whether the Directive would be able to ‘deal with new 
innovations and technologies over the next 10 years’.116 For the latter two questions, 32% of the 
respondents answered ‘to a moderate extent’.117 In a 2017 report commissioned by the EC 
Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, the Technopolis 
Group found that a ‘significant minority’ of stakeholders in Member States would like to see the 
Machinery Directive revised to account for technological advances.118 Specifically, new technologies 
in the ‘areas of digitisation and robotics’, including ‘autonomous machines/systems, artificial 
intelligence, collaborative robotics, *and+ mobile robotics’ were mentioned as products that ‘may not 
be well addressed by the Directive currently’.119 The common characteristic of these machines is that 
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their operations and behaviours are governed by computer algorithms, like much of the robotics 
technology used for infrastructure inspection and maintenance.120 
 
In a March 2017 meeting of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC Working Group, the applicability of 
the Directive to autonomous systems and artificial intelligence was first discussed. It was ‘confirmed 
that it is necessary to clarify a whole range of aspects for robots, including a clearcut definition, in 
view of industrial evolution and the new concepts of robots, for the Machinery Directive to provide 
adequate requirements’.121 It is evident that the EU is taking the applicability of the Directive to new 
technologies seriously. In the working document evaluating the 2016 survey responses, the 
European Commission noted the important of accounting for new technologies: 
 
These emerging digital technologies may not be inherently less safe than more 
traditional products whose risks are well addressed by the Machinery Directive, but their 
evolutionary and self-learning capabilities require attention in terms of safety.122 
 
As a result, the European Commission is currently in the process of updating the Machinery Directive 
to take into account technological advances.123 Feedback is closed, and the Commission is expected 
to release its proposal in the first quarter of 2021.124 The Directive may be amended to better 
regulate the health and safety standards of autonomous robots, but in the meantime, manufacturers 
and operators of robotics technology should strive to meet the obligations of the Directive if the 
technology falls within its scope.125 
 
1.2.2 Radio Equipment Directive  
 
The Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU ‘establishes a regulatory framework for the making 
available on the market and putting into service in the Union of radio equipment’.126 This is 
particularly important in the context of new technologies that are constantly connected to and in 
communication with each other. Not only do systems need to communicate with one another, users 
and the systems also need to communicate for certain types of robots to function properly. The 
Directive defines radio equipment as: 
 
an electrical or electronic product, which intentionally emits and/or receives radio 
waves for the purpose of radio communication and/or radiodetermination, or an 
electrical or electronic product which must be completed with an accessory, such as 
antenna, so as to intentionally emit and/or receive radio waves for the purpose of radio 
communication and/or radiodetermination;127 
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Certain equipment are explicitly excluded and would not have to comply with the requirements of 
the Directive, including equipment used for public security, marine equipment, and airborne 
equipment.128 However, ‘electrical/radio equipment not intended for exclusive airborne use’, drones 
in the open and specific category, and drones in the certified category ‘if not intended to operate 
only on frequencies allocated by the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication 
Union for protected aeronautical use’ are covered by the Directive if they are ‘intended to emit 
and/or receive electromagnetic waves of frequencies below 3000 GHz for the purpose of radio 
communication and/or radiodetermination’.129 This means that aerial robots for infrastructure 
inspection and maintenance, if they meet the above requirements, can be subject to the Directive. 
 
The purpose of the Directive, per Article 3(1), is to ensure the ‘health and safety of persons and of 
domestic animals and the protection of property’, and radio equipment must be built with this aim in 
mind.130 Article 3(1) also requires equipment to maintain ‘an adequate level of electromagnetic 
compatibility’ in compliance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive discussed in the next 
section.131 In addition, ‘*r+adio equipment shall be so constructed that it both effectively uses and 
supports the efficient use of radio spectrum in order to avoid harmful interference’, as Article 3(2) 
mandates.132 Finally, Article 3(3) states: 
 
Radio equipment within certain categories or classes shall be so constructed that it 
complies with the following essential requirements: 
(a) radio equipment interworks with accessories, in particular with common chargers; 
(b) radio equipment interworks via networks with other radio equipment; 
(c) radio equipment can be connected to interfaces of the appropriate type 
throughout the Union; 
(d) radio equipment does not harm the network or its functioning nor misuse network 
resources, thereby causing an unacceptable degradation of service; 
(e) radio equipment incorporates safeguards to ensure that the personal data and 
privacy of the user and of the subscriber are protected; 
(f) radio equipment supports certain features ensuring protection from fraud; 
(g) radio equipment supports certain features ensuring access to emergency services; 
(h) radio equipment supports certain features in order to facilitate its use by users 
with a disability; 
(i) radio equipment supports certain features in order to ensure that software can 
only be loaded into the radio equipment where the compliance of the combination 
of the radio equipment and software has been demonstrated.133 
 
Only when the equipment comports with these health and safety essential requirements can the 
manufacturer make them available on the market.134 They can only be put into service and use when 
the equipment ‘complied with this Directive when it is properly installed, maintained and used for its 
intended purpose’.135 Compliance means that the equipment can then be moved freely within the 
EU.136 
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As with the Machinery Directive, compliance with harmonised standards published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union affords the presumption that the essential requirements are met.137 
The manufacturer is obligated to ‘perform a conformity assessment of the radio equipment with a 
view to meeting the essential requirements’.138 Demonstrating compliance with the essential 
requirements in Article 3(1) can be done through one of three ways: 
 
(a) internal production control set out in Annex II; 
(b) EU-type examination that is followed by the conformity to type based on internal 
production control set out in Annex III; 
(c) conformity based on full quality assurance set out in Annex IV.139 
 
For conformity to the essential requirements in Article 3(2) and (3), this can be done by the following 
procedures if a harmonised standard was used: 
 
(a) internal production control set out in Annex II; 
(b) EU-type examination that is followed by the conformity to type based on internal 
production control set out in Annex III; 
(c) conformity based on full quality assurance set out in Annex IV.140 
 
If no harmonised standards were referenced or if no relevant standards exist, conformity cannot be 
shown with internal production control, and one of the other two procedures must be used.141 The 
internal control production control procedure set out in Annex II requires the manufacturer to self-
regulate and ensure conformity. Technical documentation must be drafted, measures to ensure 
compliance during the manufacturing process must be taken, and CE marking and declaration of 
conformity must be prepared.142 For the other procedures, an outside notified body would be 
involved to assess conformity.143 This body is set up by the individual Member States.144 
 
Designers and manufacturers of robots for infrastructure inspection and maintenance should be 
familiar with the requirements of the Radio Equipment Directive because it is likely these robots 
would need to communicate with each other and with users using equipment that would be subject 
to the Directive.  However, some robots may be excluded by the Directive depending on their design, 
so evaluating the applicability of this Directive to various types of robots is an important first step to 
take with regard to new technologies. 
 
1.2.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 
 
The Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 2014/30/EU ‘regulates the electromagnetic 
compatibility of equipment’.145 It main purposes is not health and safety; rather, it is concerned with 
compatibility.146 This is important in the contexts of robotics technology to ensure that the robots 
                                                          
137
 Radio Equipment Directive Article 16. 
138
 Radio Equipment Directive Article 17(1). 
139
 Radio Equipment Directive Article 17(2). 
140
 Radio Equipment Directive Article 17(3). 
141
 Radio Equipment Directive Article 17(4). 
142
 Radio Equipment Directive Annex II. 
143
 Radio Equipment Directive Annex III; Annex IV. 
144




 Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive Article 1. 
146
 March 2018 Guide for the EMCD (Directive 2014/30/EU) 8. 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 23/151 
can operate properly in the electromagnetic environment without interference so that systems such 
as the GPS can function properly.147 
 
The Directive is applied to ‘equipment’, which ‘means any apparatus or fixed installation’.148 
Apparatus, in turn, ‘means any finished appliance or combination thereof made available on the 
market as a single functional unit, intended for the end-user and liable to generate electromagnetic 
disturbance, or the performance of which is liable to be affected by such disturbance’, whereas fixed 
installation ‘means a particular combination of several types of apparatus and, where applicable, 
other devices, which are assembled, installed and intended to be used permanently at a predefined 
location’.149 In other words, the Directive applies to ‘a vast range of equipment encompassing 
electrical and electronic appliances, systems and installations’.150 If the product ‘does not contain 
electrical and/or electronic parts’, it is not covered by the Directive.151 Additionally, radio equipment, 
aeronautical products, inherently benign products, custom built evaluation kits, and equipment 
specifically covered by other legislation are excluded by the Directive.152 
 
Equipment specifically covered by other legislation and thus not under the purview of the 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive include vehicles for road use, agricultural and forestry 
tractors, and vehicles with two or three wheels.153 As a result, robots for infrastructure inspection 
and maintenance may or may not be covered by the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 
depending on how they are designed, and this must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Member States are required to ensure that any equipment ‘made available on the market and/or put 
into service’ complies with the Directive.154 Similarly, Member States cannot restrict the movement 
of equipment that do comply.155 To comply with the Directive, the equipment must meet the 
following requirements set out in Annex I: 
 
Equipment shall be so designed and manufactured, having regard to the state of the art, 
as to ensure that: 
 
(a) the electromagnetic disturbance generated does not exceed the level above which 
radio and telecommunications equipment or other equipment cannot operate as 
intended; 
(b) it has a level of immunity to the electromagnetic disturbance to be expected in its 
intended use which allows it to operate without unacceptable degradation of its 
intended use.156 
 
Additionally, ‘[a] fixed installation shall be installed applying good engineering practices and 
respecting the information on the intended use of its components, with a view to meeting the 
essential requirements set out *above+’.157 
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The manufacturer is the party that must ensure that the equipment or apparatus meets the above 
requirements.158 If the equipment is ‘in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof the 
references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union’, then there is 
a presumption that it is in conformity with the Directive’s requirements.159 For apparatus, 
‘[c]ompliance…with the essential requirements set out in Annex I shall be demonstrated by means of 
either of the following conformity assessment procedures: 
 
(a) internal production control set out in Annex II; 
(b) EU type examination that is followed by Conformity to type based on internal 
production control set out in Annex III.160 
 
Annex II requires the manufacturer to ‘perform an electromagnetic compatibility assessment of the 
apparatus’, which ‘shall take into account all normal intended operating conditions’.161 The 
manufacture must prepare technical documentation that ‘make[s] it possible to assess the apparatus 
conformity to the relevant requirements, and shall include an adequate analysis and assessment of 
the risk(s)’.162 During the manufacturing process, the manufacturer must take into account the 
technical documentation and ensure the essential requirements are met.163 Finally, after meeting all 
of the above requirements, the manufacturer must affix a CE marking to the apparatus and draft a 
declaration of conformity.164 
 
Annex III is a two-step process and states the following: 
 
1. EU-type examination is the part of a conformity assessment procedure in which a 
notified body examines the technical design of an apparatus and verifies and attests that 
the technical design of the apparatus meets the essential requirements set out in point 
1 of Annex I. 
2. EU-type examination shall be carried out by assessment of the adequacy of the 
technical design of the apparatus through examination of the technical documentation 
referred to in point 3, without examination of a specimen (design type). It may be 
restricted to some aspects of the essential requirements as specified by the 
manufacturer or his authorised representative.165 
 
After the examination by the notified body, the manufacturer ‘ensures and declares that the 
apparatus concerned are in conformity with the type described in the EU-type examination 
certificate and satisfy the requirements of this Directive that apply to them’.166 It is obligated to 
monitor compliance throughout the manufacturing process and to affix the CE marking and draft the 
declaration of compliance.167 
 
The Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive is not concerned with health and safety, but compliance 
with it is equally important to ensure that robots for infrastructure inspection and maintenance can 
be manufactured and used in the EU and operate as intended. However, as noted in this section, 
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whether the specific robotics technology would be covered by this Directive is a question that 
depends on the design of the robot and whether other directives are applicable. 
1.3 Civil Liability Regimes 
1.3.1 General issues 
 
Like any technology, robotics can fail, be operated poorly, or be improperly maintained, which could 
result in bodily injuries or damages to property. When such situations occur, there must be ways to 
remedy the situation and compensate the victims for their loss. In general, this is done through the 
civil tort liability or delict regimes. Fundamentally, tort law, as used in common law jurisdictions is a 
mechanism to compensate victims of wrongdoing and vindicate their rights.168 Delict is the functional 
equivalent in civil law countries.169 While tort law developed haphazardly through the development 
of case law, delict law is generally a coherent set of rules in each jurisdiction that is ‘the result of a 
long and characteristic process of generalization, systematization and abstraction’.170 Unlike criminal 
law where a convicted defendant may be punished through imprisonment or criminal fines, 
compensation through monetary damages is the central principle in tort and delict law.171 It can also 
be differentiated from contract law where, in general, there needs to be some type of prior 
contractual relationship between the parties and the aim is to ‘protect specific expectations 
engendered by a binding promise’.172 Damages, or compensation in contract law ‘put the claimant in 
the position he would have been in had the contract been performed, whereas damages in torts put 
him in the position he would have been in had the tort not been committed’.173 
 
 Choice of Law and Jurisdiction 
 
Member States have different tort and delict laws, and where the litigation occurs and which law is 
applicable depends on the specific situation, such as where the robot causing the incident was used 
or where the manufacturer or supplier of the robotics technology conducts business. The Convention 
of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Convention) and Brussels Regulation (recast) 
govern jurisdiction. They are both for international civil cases, but if both parties are EU Member 
States, then the latter would apply.174 Article 4(1) of the latter states ‘persons domiciled in a Member 
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State’.175 Companies are 
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‘domiciled at the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; or (c) principal 
place of business’.176 The defendant can also be sued ‘in the courts for the place where the harmful 
event occurred or may occur’ for tort actions.177 For example, a land-based robot controlled by a 
company registered in Spain and does the bulk of its business in Slovakia crashes into an Estonian 
family driving their car in Lithuania. According to the rules, the family can sue in the courts of Spain 
or Slovakia because either could possibly be the company’s domicile, or the family can sue Lithuania 
because that is where the crash happened. Based on the above, one may assume the family cannot 
sue in an Estonian court. However, the family would be able to sue in Estonia in this case because for 
claims against the defendant’s car liability insurer, the injured party also has the further option to 
bring a claim before the courts of his or her own domicile, pursuant to articles 13(2) and 11(1)(b) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (recast).178 This is an important reminder that the jurisdictional rules 
introduced above have many exceptions and legal advice should be sought if robot manufacturers or 
operators find themselves to be in situations where there may be legal disputes. 
As for the applicable law, the Rome II Regulation would govern. The general rule is that for tort 
actions, the applicable law ‘shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective 
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country 
or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur’.179 This means that the law of 
the Member State in which the direct damage such as injury or death occurred would be used, and 
not the law where indirect damages such as financial losses to relatives.180 On this point, it has been 
outlined that in the context of a road traffic accident: 
If a traffic accident victim brings a claim against the driver, keeper, or owner of a 
vehicle involved in causing the damage, jurisdiction in the courts in Europe is to be 
determined by the Brussels I Regulation (recast). A claim may, in principle, either be 
brought under art 4(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast), before the courts of the 
State of the defendant’s domicile,
 
or under art 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(recast) before the courts of the place where the accident occurred.181 
 
However, if both parties ‘have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the 
damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply’.182 This would be the case even if there were no 
prior relationships.183 There is a third alternative, which is the law of a state that is ‘manifestly more 
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closely connected’ to the situation.184 The law of this state would apply in such a circumstance.185 
This is determined by any pre-existing relationships, including a contractual one, between the parties 
that is closely connected to the tort action.186  For example, an operator based in France entered into 
a contract with a manufacturer based in Poland to purchase an aerial drone for inspection purposes. 
The contract was signed in Greece, where the drone was delivered, and chose Greek law as the 
applicable law for any disputes arising from the contract. The drone malfunctions and crashes in 
Bulgaria, and the operator sues the manufacturer. Although the general rule would lead to Bulgarian 
law as the one the court would use in litigation, the fact that the contractual relationship was formed 
in Greece and the parties chose Greek law as the law for the contractual dispute means that the 
court is likely to find Greek law has the closest connection and choose it as the applicable law for the 
tort dispute.187 It should be noted that these rules for determining the applicable apply regardless of 
whether the incident occurs on land, in the waters, or in the air.188 
In addition, it is important to note that victims of a road traffic accident also have the option to bring 
an action against the insurer of the vehicle responsible for causing any damage directly. This allows 
an action to be brought ‘in the courts for the place where the harmful event *that is the accident+ 
occurred’.189 In addition, that same victim may also bring that claim in the jurisdiction where they, 
themselves are domiciled.190 This has been confirmed by the CJEU in the case Odenbreit.191However, 
it has been noted that: 
 
It is not yet established to which extent the laws of the EU Member States provide for 
direct action against the insurers of manufacturers. Therefore, the holding in the 
Odenbreit case and the rules in art 13(2), 11(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) 
cannot be applied in a general way to claims against manufacturer of defective 
products that caused a traffic accident or their liability insurers. Regarding a claim 
against manufacturers, the victims thus do not necessarily benefit from a further 
forum at their own domicile(s).192 
 
This is particularly resonant in the context of robotic technology because, where a defect in that 
technology leads to damage, the routes to compensation available to a victim could potentially be 
reduced. 
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 Fault-based Liability 
 
While tort systems in Member States vary, they all have some type of fault-based liability regime.193 
To be liable, the defendant would have to have committed a wrong. In other words, it acted in a 
manner than is deemed insufficient under the circumstances and failed to meet its duty. Specifically 
in the present circumstance, the manufacturer or supplier would be responsible for the accident and 
resulting damage if it is shown that they did not meet some kind of objective standard in designing 
or manufacturing the robot, or the operator would be responsible if it did not meet the objective 
standard in operating the robot.194 The focus in fault-based liability is the conduct of the tortfeasor, 
and ‘the idea is that it is fair that liability be imposed wherever the defendant has improperly 
prioritized his or her interests over the claimant’s’.195 The technological advancement of robotics 
technology means that the responsible tortfeasor may be harder to determine, as, for example, ‘the 
designer might not be the one training the AI in ways that caused it to subsequently do harm’.196 In 
the context of new technologies, it is suggested that for operators, the duty of care would include 
the duty of ‘choosing the right system for the right task and skills’, the duty of ‘monitoring the 
system, and the duty ‘maintaining the system’.197  Producers would have the duty to ‘design, 
describe and market products in a way effectively enabling operators to comply with the 
*aforementioned+ duties’ and the duty to ‘adequately monitor the product after putting it into 
circulation’.198  
Being able to show the producer or operator’s fault may also be burdensome. Typically, the burden 
of proving fault is on the plaintiff.199  However, showing that the duty of care was breached may be 
difficult in the context of new technologies, so it has been suggested that this burden ‘should be 
reversed if disproportionate difficulties and costs of establishing the relevant standard of care and of 
proving their violation justify it’.200  Among the factors that various jurisdictions have recognised to 
support the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant are: 
 
a) high likelihood of fault, 
b) the parties’ practical ability to prove fault, 
c) violation of statutory obligation by the defendant, 
d) particular dangerousness of the defendant’s activity that resulted in damage, 
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e) nature and scope of the damage.201  
 
These factors would have to be considered to determine whether the burden of proof of fault should 
be shifted in the context of new technologies. 
In general, one of the advantages of fault-based liability is its flexibility, as ‘*t+he level of duty can 
expand and shrink according to context’. 202Technological advances and different usages of robots 
could theoretically be accommodated by existing law. However, with increasing developments in 
robotics technology, they can become very complex and perform actions that are unforeseeable, 
especially when different systems are interacting.203 This could especially be the case if artificial 
intelligence is writing the algorithms that control the robots.204 If this does become reality, existing 
fault-based liability laws may be unable to account for damages caused by such systems due to the 
importance of foreseeability of the damage as an important element.205 Foreseeability is the notion 
that the damage must have been something the reasonable person would not have disregarded as 
far-fetched.206 For example, it would be foreseeable for a malfunctioning aerial robot performing 
inspection near a bridge to cause damages to cars driving on the bridge. However, the foreseeability 
of the same drone learning how to communicate in a manner it was not designed due to self-
learning interacting with a submersible owned by another company that appeared suddenly, 
resulting in the drone being led into open waters 20 nautical miles away and damaging a cruise ship 
is more questionable. It may be possible for courts to view the damage as too remote to hold the 
drone operator liable.  
The complexity of the system could also possibly make determination of causation more difficult.207 
Causation is important to show liability because it means the actions of the defendant are 
responsible for the damage. Without causation, the victim cannot show that it was the defendant’s 
actions or inactions that led to the injury.208 If a robot malfunctions, the complexity of the system 
may mean that it could be difficult to determine whether the injury was caused by the software 
programming by one party, the hardware design of another company, or the coding error that led to 
the hardware malfunction.209 Furthermore, the injury could be caused by faulty data or robot’s self-
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learning and changing its own code.210 In addition, the software running the robots may be updated 
periodically, and these updates may not necessarily be done by the original manufacturer.211 This 
adds an additional party and possible cause of malfunction that complicates the determination of 
cause.212  
The Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation suggests that 
there should be a balancing test to determine when the bar of the burden of proving causation 
should be lowered.213  The factors to consider are: 
(a) The likelihood that the technology at least contributed to the harm; 
(b) The likelihood that the harm was caused either by the technology or by some 
other cause within the same sphere; 
(c) The risk of a known defect within the technology, even though its actual causal impact is 
not self-evident; 
(d) The degree of ex-post traceability and intelligibility of processes within the technology 
that may have contributed to the cause (informational asymmetry); 
(e) The degree of ex-post accessibility and comprehensibility of data collected and generated 
by the technology 
(f) The kind and degree of harm potentially and actually caused.214 
The general rationale for the shifting of the burden of proof is that victims may be in a weaker 
position to satisfy the burden of proof given the complexity of the technology. 215 
While the law recognises multiple causes, the possibility of multiple causes arising from complicated 
systems could still lead to protracted litigation and delayed compensation for the claimant. This 
increasingly loss of control of the machine by the human due to robots making autonomous 
decisions and having the capacity for autonomous learning results in a ‘responsibility gap’ where 
humans can longer be ascribed the liability.216 If the human operators are not liable, then it leads to 
the problem of the injured party not being able to receive compensation.217 Not only could there be 
a legal vacuum, this gap may also affect the society’s moral sense of justice as it appears that no 
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humans could be morally culpable. While the robots may be blameworthy morally, they would not 
be legally liable under current liability regimes.218 
 
 Strict Liability 
Most Member States also have risk-based regimes applicable in certain situations where there is 
strict liability due to the inherent risk of the thing in question.219 Instead of focusing on the fault of 
the party in fault-based regimes, risk is the key. The party that has the greater knowledge and 
control should bear the risk because it is in a better position to do so. Thus, many jurisdictions have 
strict liability regimes for wild animals.220 Product liability law is also another area of strict liability.221 
In the context of robotics, the rationale for the development of strict liability regimes is that a robot 
operator should take on a greater risk because it is allowed to ‘legally exercise a socially useful 
activity which otherwise (because of its statistically unavoidable risks) should have been 
forbidden’.222 Here, ‘the focus *is+ on the condition of the product itself’ and not ‘the defendant’s 
conduct’.223 While the potential tortfeasor could have performed to a reasonable standard or far 
exceed it, the conduct is irrelevant if the product ends up being the cause of the harm. It does not 
matter that there was no fault because the system of strict liability is more interested in how the 
product itself performed and placing the culpability on the party that had the control over the 
design, manufacture, and distribution of the product.224 
 
A strict liability regime, as it does not require a showing of fault, would usually be an easier path 
toward obtaining compensation.225 However, ‘often strict liabilities are coupled with liability caps or 
other restrictions in order to counterbalance the increased risk of liability of those benefiting from 
the technology’ so the compensation received by the victim may be more limited.226 It has been 
argued that relying on strict liability, however, may inhibit progress in robotics technology ‘since the 
more the strict liability rules are effective, the less we can test our AI systems, the more such rules 
may hinder research and development in the field’.227 On the other hand, it has been suggested, in 
the context of autonomous cars, that a predictable, strict liability regime ‘may better spur innovation 
than a less predictable system that depends on a quixotic search for, and then assignment of, 
fault’.228 As noted in the previous section, finding fault may be difficult in the context of robotics 
technology. A predictable liability regime that is based on the product and not the actions or 
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inactions of the potential tortfeasor would take that element away and allow claimants to be 
compensated without having to address the problems of the foreseeability of the harm and what 
constitutes a reasonable person in the context of new technologies. According to the Expert Group 
on Liability and New Technologies, a strict liability regime would be most appropriate when the 
robots are ‘operated in non-private environments and may typically cause significant harm’.229 By 
contrast, ‘merely stationary robots…employed in a confined environment, with a narrow range of 
people exposed to risk’ would be better served with other regimes, such as a fault-based one.230 To 
ensure civil justice for victims, both regime must continue to co-exist.231 Whether a fault-based or 
strict liability regime provides better compensation for victims in a particular situation will depend 
on the specific context and technology, and victims should have the option of choosing the route 
that would lead to the most just outcome from their perspective.232 
 
It is important to note that when discussing liability, it is the entity or person associated with the 
robot that would be liable for compensation, and not the robot itself, as the latter ‘can never bear 
any legal responsibility until there is a degree of legal personality attributed to it and an acceptance 
of a legal position to perform legal actions with legal effect’.233 One difficulty this raises is that it may 
be difficult to determine who or what is the entity or person behind the robot, as it could include, 
amongst others, the hardware manufacturer, software developer, and the operator.234 For now, one 
way that could possibly be used to form the nexus between the robot and the entity or person is 
through the perspective of robot-as-tool, so the entity or person using or controlling the tool would 
ultimately be liable.235 Since the robot is only a tool, it is the person or company that has control over 
and wielding the robot that would retain the ultimate responsibility.236 
 
 Legal personhood for robots 
 
The EU recognises the issue of possibly granting robots legal personality. In the European Parliament 
resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics, the European Parliament called on the Commission to consider: 
 
                                                          
229
 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (European Union 2019) 
<ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 39. 
230
 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (European Union 2019) 
<ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 40. 
231 231 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (European Union 2019) 
<ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 36. 
232
 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (European Union 2019) 
<ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608> 35-36. 
233
 Robert van den Hoven van Genderen, ‘Legal Personhood in the Age of Artificially Intelligent Robots’ in 
Woodrow Barfield and Ugo Pagallo (eds) Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence (Edward Elgar 
2018) 245-46. 
234
 Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Machine Rules. Of Drones, Robots, and the Info-Capitalist Society’ (2016) 2 Italian Law 
Journal 367, 396. 
235
 Paulius Cerka, Jurgita Grigiene and Gintare Sirbikyt, ‘Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial Intelligence’ 
(2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 376, 385. See also Ugo Pagallo, The Law of Robots: Crimes, 
Contracts, and Torts (Springer 2013) 98-99. 
236
 Mark A Chinen, ‘The Co-Evolution of Autonomous Machines and Legal Responsibility’ (2016) 20 Va JL & Tech 
338, 360-61. 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 33/151 
[C]reating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most 
sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of 
electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and 
possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous 
decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.237 
 
Though it urges the careful contemplation of this issue, the European Parliament warns that ‘at the 
present stage the responsibility must lie with a human and not a robot’.238 In its own report released 
in April 2018, Artificial Intelligence for Europe, the Commission did not include the issue of robotics 
legal personality.239 The report Liability for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital 
Technologies by the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation 
commissioned by the EU also concluded that granting legal personality to robots is unnecessary 
because liability can always be attributed to some natural or legal persons.240 As a result, this is a 
question thus far limited to academia.241   
Legal personhood for robots is the idea that robots should be considered persons in the eyes of the 
law.242 In the context of artificial intelligence, Solum argues that the basic characteristic of 
personhood is ‘intelligence’.243 However, current law recognises companies as legal persons not for 
such philosophical or moral reasons.244 A company is a ‘collective body that is separate from the 
natural persons associated with it as owners, agents, and employees’ and became to be treated as 
legal persons due to economic and pragmatic reasons, as this allowed shareholders to invest in 
companies while ensuring that the companies could be held legally liable for its actions.245 If robots 
were granted legal personhood, they would be capable of being sued in court and be held liable for 
their actions.246 Pagallo warns that whether robots should be granted legal personality and how they 
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could be held accountable should be approached pragmatically in ways that would address the issue 
rather than be directed politics or dogma. 247 
If the artificial intelligence develops to the state where the robots can operate autonomously and is 
granted personhood to be held legally liable for its own actions, a challenging question that is raised 
would be how one can determine the reasonable robot standard, making the application of existing 
negligence law difficult.248 Nonetheless, a ‘reasonable computer’ standard has been proposed which 
even humans would have to meet once it is shown that computers can make safer decisions than 
humans.249 If the robot itself were to be found liable, it has been suggested that making robots the 
culpable party would limit compensation to the victims and ‘diminish the preventive remedial effect 
of liability law’.250 In any case, robots ‘would need a source of capital in order to pay damages’.251 
Currently, when humans or companies are found liable under tort law, they would be mandated to 
financially compensate the injured party. The compensation would come from the tortfeasor’s 
assets, such as money in bank accounts, real property, or future earnings. If robots were to be the 
liable party, they would also need to have some way to compensate the victim. Without a source of 
funds, a finding of liability on its own would not make the claimant whole. Consequently, to ensure 
that the goal of tort law would be met in the future if robots are granted personhood and can be 
found legally liable, this question would need to be addressed. 
 
 Autonomous vs semi-autonomous robots 
 
The question of legal personhood for robots is closely intertwined with the level of autonomy of the 
robot. Different types of robots may have different systems of taxonomy, but robots can generally 
be divided into four types based on the degree of autonomy: remotely operated, passive, semi-
active, and active. Remotely operated and passive do not have any autonomy, whereas semi-active 
robots are semi-autonomous and active robots are autonomous.252 Autonomous robots are fully 
independent, whereas semi-autonomous robots require some sort of human intervention such as 
pre-programming and prompting to perform certain tasks.253 Theoretically, there is a stronger 
rationale to granting autonomous robots legal personhood as they could act and make decisions on 
their own, and if legal personhood were not granted, attributing liability could be difficult due to 
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questions of foreseeability and predictability of the robot’s actions.254 It would be easier to ascribe 
liability to the human associated with semi-autonomous robots due to the former’s control. It must 
be stressed that this is not currently an issue because given the current state of the technology and 
the law, there are no robots with legal personhood and only legal or natural persons can be sued.255 
  
 Which regime for the future? 
 
The European Parliament has suggested that the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics study 
whether the risk management or strict liability approach would be more suitable for the civil liability 
regime for robots. The former focuses ‘on the person who is able, under certain circumstances, to 
minimise risks and deal with negative impacts’ while the latter ‘requires only proof that damage has 
occurred and the establishment of a causal link between the harmful functioning of the robot and 
the damage suffered by the injured party’.256 When designing a liability system for new technologies, 
Wagner warns that ‘the normative foundations on which a liability regime for new technologies may 
be built’ needs to be revisited and the regime should ‘maximize the net surplus for society by 
minimizing the costs associated with personal injury and property damage’.257 These costs include 
those incurred by the victims who suffer monetary losses and need to pay litigation expenses to 
make themselves whole, those by potential manufacturers or operators who need to invest in 
precautionary measures to ensure the robots are of a high enough safety standard, and 
administrative costs borne by society.258 This new liability regime for new technologies should have 
the goal of weighing the different costs and reaching a balance where those who are in the best 
position to reduce harms, whether it is the manufacturer of the robot, developer of the software, or 
another party, take measures to do so in a manner that is not as costly as potential measures by 
other parties and the harm that could be inflicted on the victims that the precautionary measures 
are designed to prevent.259 If this balance were attained, the net social cost amongst the parties 
would be minimised and as a result ‘net surplus for society’ would be maximised.260 
Overall, while existing tort laws can be used to make victims whole when losses occur, as technology 
advances further, it is generally believed that civil liability laws will need to be amended to ensure 
both just compensation for victims and fairness for humans who may not have any meaningful 
control over artificially intelligent, autonomous robots.261 This is due to the fact that these new 
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technologies lead to ‘fundamental changes to our environments, some of which have an impact on 







(f) data-drivenness, and 
(g) vulnerability 
of emerging digital technologies.263 
 
Complexity refers to the interaction of multiple parts to create the robot, the multiple parties 
involved, and ‘the internal complexity of the algorithms involved’.264 Complexity leads to opacity, as 
the system becomes difficult to comprehend.265 Openness refers to the design, as new technologies 
such as robots must be open to updates and interactions with data or other systems.266 Autonomy is 
the lack of ‘human control or supervision’ and the robot’s ability to self-learn and make decisions.267 
Autonomy leads to unpredictability, as ‘the more [systems] are equipped with increasingly 
sophisticated AI, the more difficult it is to foresee the precise impact they will have once in 
operation’ as they no longer operate based on preprogrammed routines.268 Data-drivenness refers to 
the robots ability to function being based on external input and communication with other systems, 
which could be a source of failure due to faulty or missing data, communication failure, or sensor 
errors.269 Vulnerability in the robots is caused by its open design, as ‘granting access to [outside] 
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input make these technologies particularly vulnerable to cybersecurity breaches’.270 All of these 
factors could make existing liability regime less effective and lead to adjustments to better 
compensate victims. 
However, some disagree that changes to the liability regimes must be made. Cauffman questions 
‘whether the fact that a robot can take autonomous decisions really makes it impossible to identify a 
party who can be held liable under the existing rules of civil liability’ and argues that ‘it seems that 
most generally accepted principles and rules should remain applicable, even in the case of damage 
caused by robots’.271 Hubbard notes that the ‘legal schemes for regulating the development and use 
of robots and for allocating the costs of injuries from robots have successfully balanced innovation 
and safety in a fair, efficient manner for decades’ and can continue to function as is going forward.272 
Regardless of which approach is taken, it is essential that there are concrete rules that both victims 
and manufacturers and operators can refer to, as legal certainty is important for technological 
progress and societal acceptance.273 
The rest of this section introduces the different approaches to tort and delict law in the Member 
States, as each jurisdiction has its own tort or delict laws.274 At the risk of overly generalising, the 
difference between the delict law of the Continental law system, as exemplified by the French Civil 
code, and the tort law of the common law systems of the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland is the difference ‘between the unitary law of delict and the pluralistic, fact-driven wrongs of 
the law of torts’.275 The act of classifying legal systems into different legal families has been criticized 
for being Eurocentric, narrowly focused on particular types of law, and not being dynamic.276 This 
report acknowledges the shortcomings of such groupings but also recognises that this approach is 
necessary given the format of the report.  
The liability regimes are divided by major legal families as classified by Zweigert and Kötz whose 
criteria included historical development and sources of law to develop a taxonomic system that has 
gained widespread acceptance.277 The various legal approaches to civil liability are discussed. 
Characteristics in each legal approach are also briefly discussed from a practical perspective showing 
how they would affect manufacturers, suppliers, or operators of robots, especially in the realm of 
infrastructure inspection and maintenance. The issue of causation is then discussed in further detail 
due its influence on different jurisdictions. Finally, insurance is examined. 
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Legal Approach Member States examined in report 
Common Law United Kingdom, Ireland 
French France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
German Germany, Austria 
Central European Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
Nordic General overview 
Table 1. Liability regimes in EU Member States 
 
1.3.2 Common Law Approach 
 
 United Kingdom 
 Negligence 
In the United Kingdom, victims of robotics technology could sue for negligence against the 
manufacturer, designer, others in the supply chain, or the operator for their wrongdoing. For 
example, the designer could have failed to consider the types of materials maintenance robots need 
to carry, making them unable to hold certain toxic materials safely and damaging the bridge they 
were fixing. The manufacturer could have used the wrong materials for the external sensors, making 
them fail in inclement weather and causing accidents. Or the operator could have been untrained in 
operating the robots in the rain, leading to injuries of bystanders. All of these situations could lead to 
civil litigation. The modern tort law in England resulted from the 1932 case Donoghue v Stevenson, 
which found negligence to be a distinct cause of action.278 There are four elements to negligence: 
duty of care, breach of the duty by the defendant, causation between the breach and the damage, 
and proximity of the damage making it foreseeable.279 
 
 Elements of negligence 
Regarding duty, the question is whether it would be ‘just and reasonable to impose a liability in 
negligence on a particular class of would-be defendants’.280 For there to be duty, according to the 
Caparo test, the harm must be foreseeable, meaning there is proximity between the parties and 
determination that it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability.281 The ‘fair, just and reasonable’ 
element is a policy test to reject the existence of duty when there are other important public policy 
concerns to protect the defendant from being unfairly exposed to liability.282 Recently, however, the 
UK Supreme Court decided two cases that put the validity of this test in doubt.283 Rejecting that 
Caparo set out the three-stage test, the Supreme Court found that it applied an incremental 
approach, which it endorsed: 
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In cases where the question whether a duty of care arises has not previously been 
decided, the courts will consider the closest analogies in the existing law, with a view 
to maintaining the coherence of the law and the avoidance of inappropriate 
distinctions. They will also weigh up the reasons for and against imposing liability, in 
order to decide whether the existence of a duty of care would be just and 
reasonable.284 
 
There must be a breach of this duty, meaning the defendant did not act in a way that a reasonable 
person in the situation would.285 The reasonable person is knowledgeable of the general practice of 
the field and is expected to keep abreast of development.286 In the context of new technologies, due 
to the rapid pace of advances, manufacturers and operators need to keep track of technological 
progress and ensure their actions would meet the standard practice. 
In the context of robotics technology, this means that the manufacturer or supplier must act with the 
standard of care of a reasonable person in that situation to the operator, and the manufacturer, 
supplier, or operator must act with the standard of care of a reasonable person to the victim.287 
Because the situation may be novel, courts may use analogies in the existing law to determine the 
standard of care, such as vehicles, computers, or other technologies.288 Courts may also choose to 
look at soft law standards such as the ISO or IEEE standards to determine the appropriate standards 
of care. The industry best practices thus gain legal, binding effect through incorporation as an 
element of negligence.289 
The initial factual test for the element of causation is the ‘but for’ test: ‘would the damage of which 
the claimant complains have occurred “but for” the negligence (or other wrongdoing) of the 
defendant?’290 If the damage would have happened anyway, the test fails.291 It should be noted that 
this is just the general rule, as, for example, it may be possible for multiple causes or tortfeasors to 
exist.292 The robot manufacturer’s negligence in the manufacturing process and the operator’s 
negligence in using the robot could both be causes if both were required for the loss to occur. 
Furthermore, the test is ‘sometimes relaxed to enable a claimant to overcome the causation hurdle 
when it might otherwise seem unjust to require the claimant to prove the impossible’.293 
 
Proximate cause must also be shown. In order for there to be proximate cause, the act and the 
damage cannot be too remote.294 In other words, it must be foreseeable, and the causal link is not 
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broken by an intervening event.295 This is essentially a policy judgment based on the common sense 
of the judge.296. Causation may be shown through inference in a negligence product liability case. In 
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd, the Privy Council found that ‘*n+egligence is found as a matter of 
inference from the existence of the defects taken in connection with all the known circumstances.297 
For robotics, causation may be difficult to ascertain due to the multiple parties involved in designing, 
building, and operating the robots.298 Furthermore, machine learning or self-learning robots may 
perform actions unpredictable to the human based on the programming input, leading to difficulty in 
determining the cause of the action or harm.299 This is sometimes known as the ‘black box’ where 
machine learning algorithms are unknown to the humans involved, and the resulting outputs could 
lead to unintended effects.300  
Finally, foreseeability of the damage must be shown. The question is ‘whether the damage is of such 
a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen’.301 Applied to the robotics context, if a robot 
manufactured for the purpose of maintenance and inspection is used by the operator for the 
purpose of transporting passengers and there is an accident, the loss may not be seen as foreseeable 
by the manufacturer and may not be held liable for the damage. In addition, the same ‘black box’ 
algorithm problem may make foreseeability of the damage an issue. 
 
 Liability for land robots 
 
Unlike many other Member States, as will be seen later, motor accidents in England are addressed 
through the traditional negligence regime rather than a strict liability regime. This is because the 
common law is ‘very cautious and allows strict liability claims in only a very limited number of cases’, 
such as cases with dangerous animals.302 For operators of robots for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance that operate on the roads, this means that to be found liable for an accident, the 
operator or robot would have had to fail to meet the duty of care and be shown to be at fault. While 
this may appear to be advantageous for operators of robots on roads as liability is predicated on 
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Irish law on negligence is similar to that in English law, where the elements of duty, breach, 
causation, and damages are required. In general, English case law is followed by the Irish courts.304 In 
2002, Glencar Exploration plc and Andaman Resources plc v Mayo County Council added a third 
element to the duty of care in addition to the proximity of the relationship and the absence of 
countervailing public policy considerations.305 The Irish Supreme Court found that the threshold 
question of whether it is just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant needs to be 
overcome for a negligence cause of action.306 Although the just and reasonable language may be 
similar to that of Caparo, this additional language was meant to ‘transform the scope of the duty of 
care from one based on broad principle to one involving merely incremental progress from one case 
to another’.307 
For a robot operator to successfully sue the robot manufacturer from which it purchased the robot 
in a tort action, it must show that there was a duty of care. The proximity element is likely to be met 
easily because there was a seller and buyer relationship. There should not be any countervailing 
public policy considerations since this is a straightforward relationship that does not touch upon 
public policy concerns. Finally, the court would have to ask whether it would be just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care on the robot manufacturer, and the answer would be in the affirmative in 
this case. The substance of the duty of care would be the reasonable person standard, and if there is 
no case law on point, the court, similar to the English courts, may use existing case law on other 
technologies such as computers or cars to establish the standard of care. Also, soft law industry 
standards could also be used by the court to establish the standard in the absence of other guidance. 
The other elements of negligence, breach, causation, and damage, are all similar to the 
jurisprudence in English law. In particular, both factual causation and proximate cause would have to 
be shown, and the same difficulties would arise due to the unpredictability of actions due to the 
complexity of new robotics technology.308 
 
 Complexity of robotic systems and liability 
In both jurisdictions, robotics technology that lead to injuries may lead to negligence actions, though 
if the loss is purely economic, which is financial loss that is unaccompanied by physical loss such as 
property damage or bodily injury, it is unlikely they would be successful. In such cases, actions in 
contract law may prove to be more useful. Because the robots themselves are not the defendant in 
liability cases, when applying existing law to losses caused by robots: 
 
[D]etermining the person liable for damage caused by a robot will be a difficult task 
due to the number of subjects involved in the creation, commercialisation and 
operation of robots. For instance a single robot may involve different people and 
organisations in the roles of developers of software (open source software for 
example will involve a range of authors), service and data providers that collect data 
and provide services through robots, suppliers, importers, designers, manufacturers, 
users and owners.309 
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For example, a submersible may have been designed by one company, manufactured by another, 
and operated by software that has been coded by multiple companies. Different companies supply 
the sensors and other parts of the robot. Another company advertises it, and yet another company is 
responsible for distributing it to the operator who uses it for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance, which is another company. Any of these companies could be potentially liable if the 
submersible were to malfunction and cause damages. The interaction of the different systems could 
make determining the cause of the malfunction difficult to determine. The complexity of the systems 
may also make determining culpability difficult, especially when the technology is constantly 
changing. This may mean that the harm would not have been foreseeable by a reasonable person 
who was involved in bringing the robot into fruition. If the cause is undeterminable or the harm is 
unforeseeable, the claimant may be left without redress if none of the parties are found liable or 
may be forced to accept incomplete civil justice if the culpable party could not be determined due to 
the complexity of the system. 
However, a laws are made by court decisions in common law systems and ‘judges continue to adapt 
the common law to changes in commercial practice and social values’, determining liability in such 
complicated novel situations should theoretically be easier in English and Irish law compared to the 
other Member States because laws will be made with actual fact patterns and would not need to 
undergo the often time-consuming legislative process.310 For now, without legal certainty, any of the 
above parties may be part of the litigation, so entities that are associated with using robots for 
inspection and maintenance, even if they are not the manufacturer or operator, would have to 
understand their possible exposure to liability. 
The common law is based on case law, so negligence law has been developed by the courts. The four 
elements of duty, breach, causation, and harm have remained the same in recent years, but the 
substance on how to determine those elements have been refined or changed by judges throughout 
the years. The development of new technologies means that the law may have to adjust to keep up 
with the advances, and while so far it appears to be able to do so, increasingly complex systems 
means that more fundamental and systematic review of existing law may need to take place to 
ensure that the elements of foreseeability and causation in common law negligence can still 
accommodate complex robotics systems.311 
 
1.3.3 French Approach 
 
 France 
 Fault-based liability 
Fault-based liability is the primary cause of action in tort. In general, the ‘overall criterion is whether 
the tortfeasor has acted in a way that – objectively – differs from the required standard of care, 
regardless *of+ whether he was aware of causing damage to others or not’.312 This objective standard 
is that of the reasonable person ‘integrated with reference to customs and to the specific duties of 
conduct laid down in statutory provisions’.313 In general, the individual’s deficiencies or lack of 
experience would not absolve one of liability except in the case of minors or those with mental 
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incapacity.314 Significantly, these exemptions do not exist in France where ‘children (even during 
early childhood) are not exempted from liability, regardless of their concrete ability of reason’ and 
‘mentally handicapped adults are also liable for the full extent of the damage they cause to 
others’.315 While this remains to be seen, the lack of exemptions in French law could possibly extend 
to robots in the future if robots are treated as legal personalities down the line. Robots that are 
designed to be less artificial intelligent or have less capacity for learning may be held to the standard 
of an average robot, leading to a widening of the scope of liability that may not be a problem in 
other jurisdictions. 
France has a general tort clause as encompassed in article 1382 of the Code civil, which states: ‘Any 
act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose faute it occurred, 
to compensate it’ and article 1383 states: ‘Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by 
his act, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence’.316 To prove this claim, the claimant must 
show ‘intention or negligence (faute), damage (dommage), and causation’, and duty of care is 
unnecessary because ‘any relationship can give rise to liability’.317 Establishing faute can be done 
through showing a statutory rule was violated, breach of pre-existing standard such as that of a ‘just 
or cautious man’, non-intentional criminal faute, or abuse of one’s rights.318 This is the fault-based 
liability regime in France that applies to all types of torts and will cover potential damage caused by 
robots. 
Because of the generality of the tort statute in France and the lack of need to show duty of care, it is 
theoretically more accommodating of new technologies. For example, an aerial drone inspecting a 
bridge malfunctions and collides with the bridge and subsequently lands on it, leading to a traffic jam 
that delays a previously injured person from reaching the hospital. The person dies. In other 
jurisdictions, there may not be a duty between the drone operator and the deceased person because 
the connection is remote and unforeseeable, but in France, because duty is not an element, it may 
be possible for the deceased’s relatives to sustain a tort action against the operator as long as the 
other elements are met. 
Article 1384 of the Code civil provides a strict liability regime for damages caused by ‘things’, which is 
defined very loosely and includes ‘movable or immovable property, whether or not operated by the 
hand of man, and whether or not inherently dangerous’.319 The code itself would undoubtedly apply 
to robots, but even if not, the French courts have taken a lax attitude in extending the scope of the 
strict liability regime.320 
However, if the robot is considered a land motor vehicle or a product, this article would be 
inapplicable as the special liability regimes dealing with vehicles and products would take 
precedence respectively.321 To prove liability under article 1384, it must also be shown that the robot 
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played an active role in causing the damage.322 If the robot were moving, this could be easily shown, 
but otherwise the circumstances would have to be examined such as the robot’s location or 
behaviour.323 Finally, the guardian, or the person who has custody of the robot, must be identified, 
as he or she would be the person liable for compensation.324 The owner is presumed to be the 
guardian, but in circumstances where the damage was caused by security breaches to the robot, the 
manufacturer could also be the one to have custody.325 It is also worth noting that there are obvious 
questions that would be asked should there be an attempt to draw an analogy in this context 
between robots and animals. This is relevant on the basis that article 1385 would extend 
responsibility for the acts of an animal to the owner.326 However, it is important to note that under 
the article 515-14 of the French civil code, animals are considered to be sentient beings with 
feelings.327 Clearly, robots do not share these characteristics. 
 
 Belgium 
Even though there have been recent Dutch, English, and American influences on the Belgian Civil 
Code, the Belgian fault-based liability regime is similar to that in France.328 The regime is 
encompassed in Articles 1382 to 1386 of the Belgian Civil Code.329 There is also a strict liability 
regime for damages caused by civil drones.330 Robots that operate in the air could potentially be 
liable under this regime. 
 Italy 
Italian tort law is seen as being in between French and German law.331 This can be seen from the 
general tort provision in Codice civile Article 2043, which is like that of the French law and the 
separation of fault from unlawfulness similar to German law.332 Multiple provisions in the Codice 
civile may be applicable to robotics liability. Article 2050 ‘creates a form of objective liability for 
those who carry out dangerous activities (responsabilità per esercizio di attività pericolose), and 
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Article 2049 ‘deals with the liability of the owner and of the commissioner for the damages’.333 
Article 2051 also creates a strict liability regime. The custodian, which could be the owner or a 
person with physical control, has the duty to ‘adopt adequate precautions to avoid that the thing in 
custody does find itself in a situation in which it may cause damages to third parties’.334 The 
custodian could avoid liability if he or she could show ‘the damage was caused by an act of God’.335 
Furthermore, Articles 2048 and 2052 deal with ‘liability for harms caused by an individual’s children 
or animals’.336 There is strict liability for the parent or owner unless actions were not preventable or 
‘a fortuitous intervening event occurred’ respectively.337 This could be seen as analogous to 
situations where robots caused the loss. Indeed, it has been suggested that the behaviour of a robot 
could, in some circumstances, be seen as analogous to that of an animal (likely a pet).338 However, 
specific legislation would have to be passed because Italian courts would be unlikely to expand the 
scope of the strict liability regime.339 
 
 Portugal 
Though Portuguese law has traditionally been grouped with the French Romantic approach, the 1967 
Código Civil was greatly influenced by German and Swiss law.340 Portuguese law has three types of 
regimes that could be applied to damages caused by robots, fault-based, presumption of fault, and 
strict liability.341 There is a presumption of fault if there is a ‘duty to watch over hazardous movable 
things in one’s control, which can be rebutted by a showing of lack of fault or that ‘the damage 
would have occurred regardless of his/her actions’.342 Another situation in which there is a 
presumption of fault is where there is a duty to prevent danger from ‘a dangerous activity’, which is 
defined as ‘one that involves a greater likelihood of causing harm than the remaining activities in 
general and where the danger is assessed beforehand’.343 Finally, there is strict liability for 
operating a land vehicle.344 Robots that operate on land would be subject to strict liability, whereas 
it is likely that other robots used for inspection and maintenance could be subject to the 
presumption of guilt as it may be possible to categorise them as hazardous movable things or 
dangerous activities. This would depend on how these activities are viewed if there is actual 
litigation. It may also be possible for robots to be further divided so that semi-autonomous robots 
may be treated differently from autonomous robots. As there would theoretically be more control 
over semi-autonomous robots, the activity in which it is engaged may be seen as less dangerous and 
therefore not subject to the presumption of fault. While this is mere speculation, the possibility that 
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robots of different degrees of autonomy could be treated differently by the law exists, and this is an 
issue that manufacturers, suppliers, and operators must contemplate. 
 Spain 
In Spain, fault-based liability is encompassed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which states that ‘the 
person who by action or omission causes damage to another by fault or negligence is obliged to 
repair the damage caused’.345 The elements that need to be shown by the claimant are ‘(i) an 
unlawful act or omission, (ii) fault, (iii) the occurrence of damage, and (iv) the existence of a causal 
link between the act or omission and damage.’346 There may also be a cause of action for latent 
defect per article 1484. Under this provision, ‘the seller is bound to remedy hidden defects of the 
thing sold which render it unfit for the use for which it was intended, or which so impair that use that 
the buyer would not have acquired it’.347 
For example, a submersible operating near coastal waters malfunctions due to the operator’s error 
and starts heading toward the beach where there is a crowd of people. Due to the diligence of the 
lifeguards, people were warned and ran toward land, resulting in no contact between the 
submersible and anybody. Nonetheless, some of the sunbathers contemplated suing because their 
vacations were interrupted. Although there is probably fault due to human error, the lack of any 
damage sustained by the beachgoers means that there would not be a viable delict action. 
 
1.3.4 German Approach 
 
 Fault-based liability 
In Germany, tort liability (unerlaubte Handlungen) is codified in § 823 ff. The codification is 
supplemented by a ‘patchwork’ of case law.348 Germany takes an intermediate approach to tort law 
between the very general rules of the French Civil Code and the specificity of English jurisprudence 
on torts.349 As a result, ‘an intermediate approach was chosen by designing three general rules with a 
restricted scope of application’, though in practice ‘German tort law now mainly operates on the 
basis of a general fault rule’.350 
To show fault-based liability, the claimant must show that a codified normative rule 
(Tatbestandswidrigkeit) was breached, which shows the conduct is unlawful.351 This can be shown 
‘by infringing another person's protected right (§ 823 I), by violating a statutory rule (§ 823 II), or by 
intentionally inflicting damage contra bonos mores (§ 826)’.352 This objective test of unlawfulness ( 
Rechtswidrigkeit ) is separate from fault, or the tortfeasor’s attitude353. The third element is fault 
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(Verschulden), which is ‘fulfilled if the wrongdoer acted intentionally or negligently’.354 An act is 
negligent if it is ‘contrary to the care required by society’.355 Causation is also required, which is ‘a 
two-phased inquiry, the first being preoccupied with the question *of+ whether the defendant’s 
conduct played some role in bringing about the plaintiff’s hurt, while the second seeks to discover 
which of the main conditions of the harm will also be treated as its legal cause’.356 These are roughly 
respectively equivalent to cause in fact and the policy-oriented proximate cause of common law 
negligence.357 
A special type of fault-based liability in Germany is manufacturer liability (Produzentenhaftung) per 
Section 823 et BGB, which ‘requires an intended or negligent behavior of manufacturer or his 
employees’.358 The claimant must show that the manufacturer did not act with reasonable care.359 It 
would be difficult to show intentional or negligent behaviour by the robot manufacturer because of 
the likely secrecy surrounding the process, particularly for new technologies.360 
 
 Strict liability  
There is no general strict liability law in Germany.361 However, there are also special strict liability 
regimes for special circumstances, such as those for cars, trains, and aircraft. The rationale is that 
‘*t+he inherent risk of owning a potentially dangerous vehicles is sufficient to justify such liability’.362 
While German courts have been active in interpreting the scope of these strict liability provisions, 
they have not expanded the ambit of these statutes to cover other situations analogously, so strict 
liability is still restricted to the activities prescribed by the legislative branch.363 This means that even 
if the manufacturer, supplier, or operator exercised reasonable care, it could still be culpable for 
damages.364 Robots that could be categorised as any of these could be subject to both the strict 
liability regime and the fault-based regime, depending on how the claimant would like to proceed. In 
practice, this may mean that producers and operators of robots for I&M that could be argued to not 
be one of these types of vehicles could be better protected than those that produce or operate cars, 
trains, or aircraft, as the former could escape liability if they exercise reasonable care. On the flip 
side, however, this suggests that the existing liability regime may not be suitable to compensate 
damages caused by robots, as it would often be difficult to show the lack of reasonable care, and 
with possible unknowns associated with new technologies, errors leading to harm could occur even 
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if manufacturers or operators acted with reasonable care, resulting in victims not being offered 
redress through the liability system.365 
 
 Austrian practice of analogies 
While German law is strict on the scope of the applicability of the strict liability regime, courts in 
Austria have been willing to ‘apply existing strict liability laws analogously’ to other circumstances.366 
This could mean that even without legislative amendments, robots used in various contexts could be 
held to a higher standard of strict liability where the operator could be found liable without fault 
even though it would not have been a law in the books. Because of this possibility, operators may 
have to be more cautious in Austria, as courts could find various types of robots operating in 
different environments to be subject to strict liability when losses occur when the same situation 
would require fault for liability to be found in other Member States 
 Damages 
Compensation for pure economic losses is very limited under German law: 
Under German tort law, economic loss can be compensated under § 823(1) BGB only 
if it flows from an injury to one of the legally protected interests specified in that 
provision including infringements to any “other (absolute) right”. If wilful or negligent 
conduct causes the victim economic damage unrelated to any absolute right (“reiner 
Vermögensschaden” – pure economic loss), no claim arises under the general rule of 
§ 823(1) BGB.367 
In fact, ‘it could be argued that in no other area of its law of torts does German law demonstrate 
such an ideological affinity with the Common law as in its refusal to compensate pure economic loss 
through the medium of tort rules’.368 The limitation for pure economic losses in Austrian law is 
similar.369 Austrian law is unique in Europe for having a statutory definition of ‘damage’, which, 
according to 1293 General Austrian Civil Code is ‘every detriment which was inflicted on someone’s 
property, rights or persons’.370 
If an autonomous vessel malfunctions and continues to circle around and blocks a key waterway for 
other ships, there may be no physical damage to the other ships, but these other ships may suffer 
economic losses due to being delayed. If the economic loss is due to losing business because the ship 
not able to reach another port to be hired out, then a tort action would unlikely to be sustained 
because the loss is purely economic.371 However, if the delay caused the cargo on the ship to spoil 
and thus unable to be sold, then a tort action may be possible because the economic loss is 
connected to the physical loss of the cargo spoilage. 
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1.3.5 Central European Approach 
 
 Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Civil Code was overhauled in 2012 and ‘establishe*d+ a new liability framework based on a 
differentiation between contractual and non-contractual damages’.372 Tort liability is enshrined in 
sections 2909 and 2910 of the Civil Code, which govern ‘liability for breach of good morals and 
liability for breach of a legal obligation’ respectively.373 For the former, the question is whether the 
standard of a reasonable person ‘of average abilities in his private dealings’ is breached, while if 
there is a breach of legal obligation leading to damages, negligence is presumed.374 For example, an 
operator for land-based robot for infrastructure inspection would have to meet the standard for an 
average land-based infrastructure inspection robot operator, and not just that of the average robot 




Hungary is unique in that the burden of proof is reversed in fault liability. While the claimant must 
show damage and causation between the damage and the defendant’s unlawful act, the defendant 
has the burden of proving that there was no fault and the duty of care was met.375 The situation in 
H3ungary creates additional burden for robot manufacturers and operators to show that they were 
not at fault. One the one hand, this could be made difficult by the complexity of robotics technology. 
On the other hand, it is likely that such robots, especially those manufactured for I&M purposes, 
would have sensors and cameras installed on the exterior to perform their duties. The sensors and 
cameras would likely record the situation at the time of the accident and make it easier for the 
operator to show that it was not at fault. 
 
 Poland 
In Eastern European tort regimes, ‘the main aim…is the compensation of losses sustained’.376 
Traditionally, the Polish law of obligations was influenced by both the French and German legal 
cultures.377 For a tort action to be sustained, the following must be shown: ‘First, there must be an 
event triggering damage, second, there must be damage, and third, causation should exist between 
the event and the damage’.378 It must be shown that due diligence was not met where ‘*t+he 
perpetrator’s act is set against the pattern of behaviour of a diligent person acting under the same 
                                                          
372
 Jiří Hrádek and Andrew J Bell, ‘The New Czech Civil Code and Compensation for Damage: Introductory 
Remarks’ (2016) 7 Journal of European Tort Law 300, 302. 
373
 Jiří Hrádek and Andrew J Bell, ‘The New Czech Civil Code and Compensation for Damage: Introductory 
Remarks’ (2016) 7 Journal of European Tort Law 300, 302. 
374
 Czech Civil Code Section 2910-2911. 
375
 Attila Menyhárd, ‘Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Hungarian Perspective’ in Helmut Koziol (ed) Basic 
Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective (Jan Sramek Verlag 2015) 312. 
376
 Luboš Tichý, ‘«EC Tort Law» and the Eastern-European Legal Family’ in Helmut Koziol and Reiner Schulze 
(eds) Tort Law of the European Community (Springer 2008) 523. 
377
 Ewa Bagioska, ‘Developments in Personal Injury Law in Poland: Shaping the Compensatory Function of Tort 
Law’ (2015) 8 Journal of Civil Law Studies 309, 312. 
378
 Ewa Bagioska, ‘Developments in Personal Injury Law in Poland: Shaping the Compensatory Function of Tort 
Law’ (2015) 8 Journal of Civil Law Studies 309, 314. 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 50/151 
circumstances’.379 Causation is shown by the adequacy theory where ‘the person obliged to pay 
damages is liable only for the normal consequences of the act or omission from which the damage 
resulted, where normal consequence is defined as ‘a consequence that ensues usually, 
predominantly, as a rule ( which does not mean always ) as a result of a given event’.380 Damage is 
defined as ‘every wrong upon an interest protected by law, be it property or personality interests, 
suffered by a person against her will’.381 In recent years, the standard of proof that must be met by 
the claimant has ‘shifted from “probability bordering on certainty” to “a sufficient degree of 
probability,” with the approval of legal scholarship’.382 
 
An operator of an aerial drone sues the manufacturer because the drone suddenly stopped working 
and fell on a crowd of people and caused injuries. When it was sold, the manufacturer expressly 
informed the operator that the software needs to be updated every month, but it had not done so. 
In this situation, the operator is unlikely to win against the manufacturer because the manufacturer 
had shown due diligence. On the other hand, the injured crowd’s tort action would likely be 
successful against the operator because the operator failed to meet the diligent person standard 
when it failed to update the software. 
 
1.3.6 Nordic Approach 
 
Laws in the Nordic countries occupy a special place because the common law had little influence 
over their development as they were not as impacted by Roman law, and they had less proclivity to 
codify their private laws to the extent of other Continental civil law jurisdictions.383  In general, the 
tort liability regimes in the region have similar approaches because ‘*h+istorically, the Nordic 
countries cooperated with each other when drafting their compensation acts’.384 Under the general 
liability rule of negligence, liability is based on fault where the ‘criterion is whether the person has 
acted in a way that differs from the required standard of conduct or from the “right” behaviour’.385 
In principle, this is the reasonable person standard, though ‘*i+f statutory provisions provide for a 
description of the standard of care, these provisions are relevant provided it is the aim of the 
provisions to prevent individuals from causing damage’ and ‘customary behaviour is relevant’.386 
Personal deficiencies are in general not taken into account for the standard, though there is an 
exemption for minors.387 The test for causation is the sine qua non test.388 As for damages, it is noted 
that: 
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A somewhat imprecise definition of the legal concept of damage is that a person 
is exposed to a “negative effect”. This negative effect must be qualified as relevant to 
the tort law compensation rules; it must be protected by the law. A core requisite in 
this respect is that it is possible to estimate the negative effect in monetary terms. 
Hence, as a general rule the claimant must have suffered an economic loss.389 
 
The rigidness of how causation is interpreted in Scandinavian countries, as described in the next 
section, means that it would be more difficult to show tort liability in a court of law. However, the 
welfare state model of these states that focuses on insurance rather than the tort regime for 
compensation would allow the victims to be made whole. Robot manufacturers and operators must 
understand how the insurance regimes operate in these states and how they would affect their 




One of the elements of tort liability, causation, transcends the legal family categorisation and is 
worth mentioning separately. Causation is important because it makes the connection between the 
tortfeasor’s actions or inactions and the harm suffered by the claimant, an especially key and difficult 
question to determine in the context of complex, new technologies.390 Action or inaction without 
associated harm, or harm that is not caused by the tortfeasor’s actions or inactions would not lead to 
compensation because the defendant would not be culpable. It would be patently unfair for a 
defendant to be held legally responsible without this causation, especially when the harm itself is not 
foreseeable. Consequently, being able to show causation, that the action or in action caused the 
harm, and that the harm is something that is within the realm of possibility, is important in tort and 
delict law, and the different ways causation is conceived and applied in practice affect the rate of 
success of these actions. There are three main models of causation in Europe, overarching causation, 
bounded causation, and pragmatic causation.391 Countries that take the overarching causation 
approach include France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Bulgaria, all of which follow ‘the French open-
ended approach to liability’.392 Infantino and Zervogianni note that in these states: 
 
[C]ausation has a large role to play, because it is used as a privileged instrument to 
weigh the interests of the parties as well as policy interests in the absence of 
preliminary filters other than fault and damage. Yet, this weighing of interests, rather 
than being openly carried out by judges, is generally unexpressed and concealed 
under the manipulation of the ordinary principles and requirements of causation. As 
to liability outcomes, the open-endedness of tort law structure in these countries 
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relates to an overall high rate of success of tort law claims, although significant 
differences between countries might be detected.393 
 
On the other end of the spectrum is the rigid bounded causation in the laws of Germany, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden where ‘causation is only one of the many means 
set up by the system to deny or, in any case, limit tort law liability, whose functions are largely 
absorbed by other concurrent mechanisms’.394 As a result, relying on tort law for compensation is 
more difficult.395 
 
In between are the states that take a pragmatic approach: 
 
[C]ourts are openly sensitive to the concrete implications of their decisions, and tend to 
propose flexible, case-tailored solutions that are driven neither by the dictates of wide or 
limited tort law rules, nor by the dogmatic adherence to causation principles, but rather by a 
concrete and overt policy-making effort.396 
 
The determination of the duty of care is also emphasised. States in this category include Austria, the 
Netherlands, Lithuania, England and Ireland.397 
The different approaches to causation the legal systems of Member States show that for the same 
set of facts involving robots causing injuries or property damage, claimants are more likely to receive 
compensation in states that take the overarching approach, followed by the pragmatic approach, 
and finally the bounded approach. Manufacturers and operators must take this into account when 
deciding where they will set up their factories or operate robots for inspection and maintenance, as 
the likelihood of their being found liable in civil actions differ between the Member States. 
 
Type of causation Representative Member States 
Overarching causation France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Bulgaria 
Pragmatic causation Austria, Netherlands, Lithuania, England, Ireland 
Bounded causation Germany, Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, 
Sweden 




Insurance is a risk management tool whereby an insured can transfer some or all of the risks to the 
insurer in exchange for paying a premium.398 Traditionally, insurance is seen as allocation of risk.399 
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However, insurance can also reduce the overall amount of risk because it encourages the adoption 
of practices that minimise the chances of loss.400 First party insurance is meant to protect one’s own 
life or property, whereas third party insurance, also known as liability insurance, is designed to pay a 
third party to compensate for the loss for which the insured is legally responsible.401 If a land-based 
robot malfunctions and collides with a building, the operator’s first party insurance would pay for 
repairs to the robot and liability insurance would pay for the damages to the building. 
 
 
In the EU, liability insurance is compulsory for the use of motor vehicles,402 aircrafts,403 and 
passenger-carrying vessels.404 If the robots fall under the definitions used in these laws, operators 
would be compelled to purchase insurance. The European Parliament has urged the study of 
‘establishing a compulsory insurance scheme where relevant and necessary for specific categories of 
robots whereby, similarly to what already happens with cars, producers, or owners of robots would 
be required to take out insurance cover for the damage potentially caused by their robots’.405 A 
compulsory scheme for different types of robots would cover the gaps of the current compulsory 
insurance regime, such as submersibles and vessels for infrastructure inspection and maintenance 
that are not designed to carry passengers. Making insurance compulsory is especially important 
when there are ‘highly significant risks (which may either lead to substantial harm133F and/or cause 
frequent losses), where it seems unlikely that potential injurers will be capable of compensating all 
victims themselves (either out of their own funds, with the help of alternative financial securities, or 
through voluntary self insurance)’.406 
Compulsory insurance protects both the insured and the victim, as the tortfeasor ‘may not 
necessarily be in a position to effectively assess the likely advantages of having insurance’ and it 
would ensure the victim is compensated.407 According to the economics literature, strict liability 
regimes may lead to the risk of underdeterrence, the problem that the tortfeasor does not take all 
reasonable precautions when the amount of damage exceeds the tortfeasor’s wealth.408 Thus, 
compulsory insurance is especially important for strict liability regimes because it would ensure the 
victim is compensated. Insurance is also important to counter the chilling effect liability may have on 
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the innovation of technology.409 Nonetheless, the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – 
New Technologies Formation warns that ‘compulsory liability insurance should not be introduced 
without a careful analysis of whether it is really needed, rather than automatically linked to a certain 
activity’.410 
 
While insurance may play an important role in ensuring that the tortfeasor would not become 
insolvent from paying damages and that the victim would be compensated, there are some obstacles 
to tailoring insurance products to robots. First, the types of damages robots could inflict could be 
novel and unpredictable due to the complexity of the technology411 Second, the complexity of the 
robots and lack of existing data on potential risks and accidents make pricing the risk difficult.412 
These problems may prevent insurers from offering insurance to robot manufacturers, suppliers, and 
operators, lead them to offer existing insurance that is inadequate for the technology, or allow them 
to only offer insurance at exorbitant prices that outweigh their utility.413 To combat these problems, 
it is important for those in the robotics industry to work closely with insurers as technology develops 
to ensure that the latter has the information to put itself in the position to manage and minimise the 
risks associated with robotics technology.414 
 
Tort or delict actions are necessary for claimants to receive compensation from the tortfeasor, 
whether it is the party that manufactured the robot or the party that operated it. As the claimant 
would need to litigate in the courts of Member States using the laws of the Member States, the 
specific circumstances of each case would determine where the case would take case and what laws 
would be used applied. While the tort and delict laws differ in each jurisdiction, they share 
similarities, and all have the aim of making the victim whole through monetary compensation. Each 
Member State has fault-based liability and strict liability regimes. While the former would be 
applicable in all cases, the latter is usually reserved for particular circumstances allowed by the law. 
Fault-based actions require the defendant to have failed to meet the standard of a reasonable 
person, thus causing the damages, whereas strict liability cases do not require a showing of fault, as 
the focus in on the product that caused the harm and not the person’s actions. While these 
traditional forms of civil action have so far been able to accommodate the robotics technological 
advances, it may be increasingly hard to meet the legal standards required for tort and delict actions 
as technology further progresses, as the complexity of the systems would make determining 
foreseeability and causation difficult. Whether amendments or complete overhauls of the civil justice 
regime need to be made remains to be seen, and manufacturers, distributors, and users of robotics 
liability should keep abreast of the developments not only in the technology but also in the law to 
ensure their commercial interests are protected. 
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1.4 Product Safety and Product Liability 
This section introduces the product safety and product liabilities regimes of the EU. It then discusses 
the product safety laws of selected Member States divided by different legal family approaches with 
an emphasis on the state of the art defence because it is particularly relevant to new technologies. It 
should be noted that the product liability regimes are applicable in addition to the fault-based and 
strict liability regimes discussed above, as claimants can assert all the causes of action in litigation to 
maximise their chances of success due to different elements they have to show and the different 
defences the designer, manufacturer, or operator may have. 
 
1.4.1 European Product Safety 
The product safety and liability regime may be applicable robots because they can generally be 
classified as products.415 The European General Product Safety Directive was passed in 2001.416 Its 
goal is ‘to ensure that products placed on the market are safe’.417 As such, it plays a preventative 
role.418 In general, a product is considered to be safe if it ‘does not present any risk or only the 
minimum risks compatible with the product’s use, considered to be acceptable and consistent with a 
high level of protection for the safety and health of persons’.419 
The Directive would likely apply to all robotics technology, including those used for I&M, because of 
the broad definition of product.420 Product is defined as: 
any product — including in the context of providing a service — which is intended for 
consumers or likely, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, to be used by 
consumers even if not intended for them, and is supplied or made available, whether 
for consideration or not, in the course of a commercial activity, and whether new, 
used or reconditioned.421 
This means that products that are not manufactured in the EU but are meant to be used by those in 
the EU would also have to abide by the Directive. The manufacturers of the robots, or others in the 
supply chain, must ensure that any products they make available to consumers must be safe by 
conforming to national laws of the Member State the product is marketed, so long as those laws are 
‘in conformity with the Treaty...and *lay+ down the health and safety requirements which the 
product must satisfy in order to be marketed’.422 If technical safety standards promulgated by the 
industry and standardisation organisations and subsequently published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities are met by the product, it is presumed to be in conformity.423 These 
published standards that give rise to the presumption of conformity are called harmonised 
standards.424 Although the standards are voluntary, the European Commission is dedicated to 
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facilitating the process because ‘standards can influence most areas of public concern such as the 
competitiveness of industry, the functioning of the Single Market, the protection of the environment 
and of human health, *and+ the enhancement of innovation’.425 
In the alternative, if no published standards exist, the product must conform to safety requirements 
that take into account the following: 
a) voluntary national standards transposing relevant European standards other than 
those referred to in paragraph 2;  
(b) the standards drawn up in the Member State in which the product is marketed;  
(c) Commission recommendations setting guidelines on product safety assessment;  
(d) product safety codes of good practice in force in the sector concerned;  
(e) the state of the art and technology;  
(f) reasonable consumer expectations concerning safety.426 
 
The malleable nature of the Directive and lack of specifications make it flexible and geared toward 
application in diverse circumstances.427 There is also no requirement that the product attains the 
highest safety standard possible, so just because a similar product meets higher standards does not 
mean one that does not is unsafe.428 There is also no requirement that a third party determine 
whether safety standards have been met. Indeed, it is each manufacturer and distributor’s obligation 
to ensure their products meet the requirements.429 This, in addition to the use of guidelines devised 
by the industry, shows that this Directive employs co-regulation involving the EU, Member State, and 
private parties to maintain safety standards.430 The involvement of various parties in the regulation 
of safety standards is seen as making the regime more robust.431 
Manufacturers and distributors must monitor their products after they are introduced to the market, 
inform the consumers of the risks of the product, and if they know that a product is in violation of 
general safety standards, they must inform the relevant authorities and the consumers.432 They must 
also withdraw or recall the product depending on the situation.433 EU Decision 2019/417 provides 
guidance on the risk assessment that must be undertaken to determine what actions need to be 
taken regarding the unsafe product.434 The Decision offers guidelines on how to navigate the alert 
system Rapid Exchange of Information System (RAPEX).435 Should manufacturers or distributors 
violate the national laws pursuant to this Directive, they would be subject to penalties as provided by 
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each Member State.436 The Directive does not specify the penalties besides noting that they must be 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.437 
A major caveat that must be noted is that this Directive applies to products for consumers. Although 
it does not define ‘consumer’, it is clear under EU law that only natural persons can be considered 
consumers and those who act for business or professional purposes are not consumers.438 As a 
result, businesses that use robots for infrastructure purposes would not be considered consumers 
and would consequently not fall within the ambit of this Directive. Nonetheless, the safety measures 
offered by the Directive can serve as guidance for best practices and for legal reform in the future to 
extend the regime to the commercial setting. Furthermore, some Member States may extend 
consumer protection to legal persons or some enterprises, so it would be important to be aware of 
the national laws of the Member State in which one is considering to conduct business, as robot 
manufacturers and distributors may still have to abide by the safety standards.439 Similar to other 
products, robots would not have be risk free; they just need to meet the standards.440 Furthermore, 
this Directive is not applicable to medical devices, pharmaceutical, or food. In the realm of robotics, 
this may mean that those used for healthcare may not fall under the jurisdiction of this Directive, but 
for robots in infrastructure inspection and maintenance, this is unlikely to be a concern.441 
 
1.4.2 European Product Liability 
The Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC came into effect in 1985. It has largely harmonised the 
central tenets of product liability laws in EU Member States since its introduction, though there are 
still diverging interpretations on the margins.442 The Directive specifies that producers, which include 
manufacturers and suppliers, are ‘liable for damage caused by a defect in his product’.443 Similar to 
the Product Safety Directive, the protection is over consumers, which again raises the same set of 
issues discussed previously, though the product liability regime could serve as useful guidance. While 
the Product Safety Directive is preventative in nature, the Product Liability Directive seeks to create 
certainty on how to allocate liability when products do cause personal injuries, death, or property 
damage. 
 
The burden of proof is on the injured party to show that there is damage, a defect in the product, 
and that the defect caused the damage.444 The damage could include bodily injuries, death, or 
damage to property.445 The Directive states that ‘*a+ product is defective when it does not provide 
the safety which a person is entitled to expect’, a standard that should take into account the 
following: 
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‘a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.’446 
 
These relevant factors show that ‘the assessment of the defective character of a product is entirely 
focused on the consumer’ and not the manufacturer or supplier.447 Nonetheless, this is an objective 
standard.448 With new technologies that have autonomous and machine learning capabilities, ‘the 
question of whether unpredictable deviations in the decision-making path can be treated as defects’ 
is one that will have to be answered.449 Although EU product liability is a strict liability regime, the 
foreseeability of damage is still relevant and may be used as a defence if an external cause can be 
shown by the defendant.450 It has been noted that placing the burden of proof on the consumer is 
particularly burdensome due to the possible complexity of the matter where the manufacturer 
would have superior knowledge, though discussions of amending the provision did not result in any 
changes.451 
 
Besides showing there was no damage, defect, or causation, there are six defences to liability the 
producer and supplier may present. The three that are most notable are that ‘he did not put the 
product into circulation’,452 ‘the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory 
regulations issued by the public authorities’453 and ‘the state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the 
defect to be discovered’.454 The last defence, known as the state of the art defence or the 
development risk defence, is one Member States could have chosen not to implement in their 
national laws per the Directive.455 Finland and Luxembourg have chosen to derogate from the 
Directive and not apply this state of the art defence, while France, Hungary, and Spain exclude the 
defence for certain products.456 
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Figure 1. EU Product Liability elements and affirmative defences 
The state of the art defence can raise issues particularly when it comes to new technologies such as 
robotics for I&M, and this is a question the EU has contemplated recently with the development of 
artificial intelligence technology. The EU notes: 
In certain cases, when digital technology products or services cause a damage, the 
allocation of liability may be complex due to their specific characteristics. In addition, 
ensuring their safety over their lifetime is important, as it can prevent or reduce 
potential damages and liability issues. It is therefore necessary to examine whether 
existing rules at EU and national level for safety and for the allocation of liability and 
the conditions, under which a victim is entitled to obtain compensation for damages 
caused by products and services stemming from emerging digital technologies, are 
appropriate and whether, for the producers and services providers, the framework 
continues to deliver an adequate level of legal certainty.457 
The ‘interdependency between the different components and layers’ of new technologies and the 
increasing autonomy of artificial intelligence and robots that are able to interpret their environment 
may cast doubt on the present product liability regime.458 Concepts such as product, producer, and 
damages may have to be rethought.459 In addition, questions like ‘whether concepts like the liability 
of a guardian or similar concepts are appropriate to technologies like AI’ and ‘whether and to what 
extent it matters for determining liability whether the damage could have been avoided or not’ 
would need to be tackled.460 
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Toward that end, in March 2018, the EU formed the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies 
to investigate whether and how the current liability framework should adapt to the proliferation of 
new technologies, including robotics.461 The Expert Group is further divided into two subgroups: the 
Product Liability Directive formation and the New Technologies formation.462 The latter released a 
report in November 2019 entitled Liability for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital 
Technologies.463 Concerning product liability, the report found that fault liability and strict liability for 
defective products should both ‘continue to coexist’. Further, it concluded: 
Existing defences and statutory exceptions from strict liability may have to be 
reconsidered in the light of emerging digital technologies, in particular if these 
defences and exceptions are tailored primarily to traditional notions of control by 
humans.464  
The New Technologies Formation also found that the state of the art defence should not be 
applicable in the context of new technologies: 
The producer should be strictly liable for defects in emerging digital technologies 
even if said defects appear after the product was put into circulation, as long as the 
producer was still in control of updates to, or upgrades on, the technology. A 
development risk defence should not apply.465 
The rationale is that: 
In view of the need to share benefits and risks efficiently and fairly, the development 
risk defence, which allows the producer to avoid liability for unforeseeable defects, 
should not be available in cases where it was predictable that unforeseen 
developments might occur.466 
The experts further believe that defect should be interpreted more widely temporally for new 
technologies: 
When the defect came into being as a result of the producer’s interference with the 
product already put into circulation (by way of a software update for example), or the 
producer’s failure to interfere, it should be regarded as a defect in the product for 
which the producer is liable. The point in time at which a product is placed on the 
market should not set a strict limit on the producer’s liability for defects where, after 
that point in time, the producer or a third party acting on behalf of the producer 
remains in charge of providing updates or digital services.467 (bold in original) 
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Finally, it recommends shifting the burden of proof in certain situations: 
If it is proven that an emerging digital technology has caused harm, the burden of 
proving defect should be reversed if there are disproportionate difficulties or costs 
pertaining to establishing the relevant level of safety or proving that this level of 
safety has not been met.468 
The report also concluded that ‘*t+here should be a duty on producers to equip technology with 
means of recording information about the operation of the technology’ so that the defect or cause of 
failure could be documented.469 The lack of such logs ‘should trigger a rebuttable presumption that 
the condition of liability to be proven by the missing information is fulfilled’, which means that the 
burden is on the designer or operator to show that no such defect or causation existed.470 While an 
amendment of the Product Liability Directive to keep up with technological advances may not occur 
for a while, in the meantime, it may be possible to create more certainty when addressing allocation 
issues with new technologies through soft law guidance, as proposed by Fairgrieve, Howells, and 
Pilgerstorfer.471 
The formation of the Expert Group shows that the EU is serious about ensuring that the liability 
regime will be adequate to address the allocation of responsibility of robotics technology should 
accidents occur. For now, enterprises manufacturing or using robots must understand and follow the 
product safety and liability frameworks. However, the rapid development in the legal realm to keep 
pace with technological advances must be monitored by enterprises to ensure that they make 
business decisions that would ensure high safety standards possible and minimise risks of liability. 
Similar to the civil liability section, the rest of this section discusses the various approaches to 
product liability in the Member States categorised by legal family approaches. 
 
Legal Approach Member States examined in report 
Common Law United Kingdom, Ireland 
French France, Italy, Spain 
German Germany, Austria 
Central European Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary 
Nordic Denmark 
Table 3. Product Liability Regimes in EU Member States 
 
1.4.3. Common Law Approach 
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Directive 85/374/EEC was implemented in the UK by Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, 
which became effective in March 1988, and it was then amended by the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modification) Order 2000 to implement the amendments in Directive 
1999/34/EC. Under the Consumer Protection Act, a product is ‘any goods or electricity and…includes 
a product which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or 
raw material or otherwise’.472 Oliphant and Wilcox have doubts as to whether this definition of 
product would cover new technologies, including robots, and issues could arise if litigation were to 
concern such technologies.473 
The English law includes a state of the art defence, which is enshrined in section 4(1)(e). The 
defendant must show that: 
 
the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that 
a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be 
expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they 
were under his control.474 
 
The language deviates from that in the Directive, and it was at first unclear whether it was similar in 
scope with the defence in the Directive.475 In the Court of Justice of the EU case Commission v United 
Kingdom, it was ruled that the ‘scientific and technical knowledge’ in the defence did not include 
industry safety standards.476 This means that the producer claiming they followed industry standards 
such as ISO or IEEE guidelines, which did not allow for discovery of the defects while the robot was 
under its control would not be a successful defence if knowledge was otherwise available. 
In addition, the opinion found that the test for whether there was ‘knowledge’ is objective and only 
knowledge that is accessible would count.477 In this day and age with information widely shared and 
available on the Internet, accessibility would most likely be interpreted more widely, which means 
manufacturers would have to be more careful about keeping abreast of new knowledge. 
Although redress via the Consumer Protection Act exists, there have not been a significant amount 
of cases using this cause of action and litigation instead have focused on tort or contract law.478 
Proving liability of robots using the Consumer Protection Act may be difficult, as the Department of 
Transport noted in The Pathway to Driverless Cars: A Detailed Review of Regulations for Automated 
Vehicle Technologies that the existing liability regime would be difficult for claimants to navigate 
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because of the complex technology and the need for experts to establish causation and the state of 
the art.479 
In Ireland, the Directive was implemented in national law by the Liability for Defective Products Act, 
1991. It also includes the state of the art defence, which states: ‘that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable 
the existence of the defect to be discovered’.480 This is identical to the language in the EU Directive. 
According to the Act, ‘a product is defective if it fails to provide the safety which a person is entitled 
to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including—(a) the presentation of the product, (b) 
the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put, and (c) the time 
when the product was put into circulation’.481 Again, this language follows the Directive. As noted 
previously, as the Irish courts follow the case law in the United Kingdom, product liability law in 
Ireland is very similar to its UK counterpart. 
 
1.4.4 French Approach 
 
The Romance legal traditions include France, Spain, and Italy, with legal systems modelled after the 
French Civil Code.482 Italian tort law, however, has also been influenced by German law.483 While ‘tort 
liability was traditionally seen as a sanction against a reproachable (illicit) conduct’, compensating 
the victim is now seen as the main goal.484 
In France, the Product Liability Directive was implemented in domestic law relatively late due to the 
development risk defence.485 It was finally inserted into the Civil Code in 1998 after much debate, 
and some saw the development risk defence as a step back in French consumer protection.486 The 
implementation contained several departures from the EU Directive offering greater protection, but 
they were subsequently amended due to ECJ judgments.487 Today, the product liability law in France 
is ‘exactly the same as the Directive’s’ save for the section on recoverable damages.488 It has also 
garnered general acceptance, with several hundred cases invoking the cause of action each 
year.489The claimant has the burden of proof for defect, damages, and causation.490 Like the 
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Directive, French law does not offer guidance on the specifics of causation between the defect and 
damage, and case law has only required that the causation be ‘certain and direct’.491 
In Spain, the Product Liability Directive was implemented in 1994 by the Product Liability Act 
22/1994.1.492 The Spanish law includes the development risk defence but excludes its application for 
‘food, foodstuffs and medicines intended for human consumption’.493 The Spanish law is not 
exclusive to the protection of consumers.494 
In Italy, the Product Liability Directive was first implemented in Presidential Decree 224/88 then 
incorporated into the Consumer Code in 2005. The development risk defence is available under 
Italian law.495 While this defence may absolve the producer of liability in case of defects, it may still 
be liable for penalties per safety provisions in legislation.496 While Italian law should be able to 
accommodate new technologies such as robotics, Comandé notes that several questions need to be 
further explored: 
 
(i) the actual scope of the development risk defence; (ii) the possible interplay 
between product safety regulations and the Product Liability Directive; and (iii) a 
potential reading of such rules in light of the precautionary principle due to the 
uncertainties related to new technologies employed in production.497 
 
In general, product liability laws in these Member States do not differ significantly from the Product 
Liability Directive. They face the same questions as the Directive as to whether they could be applied 
to new technologies such as robots. Scholars generally agree that the general framework should still 
be applicable but important questions need to be answered to create more certainty. 
 
1.4.5 German Approach 
 
While the major aim of tort law is compensation, one of the other major aims of tort law in the 
German legal family is the prevention of damages, as the threat of ‘liability creates an incentive to 
act carefully and to avoid damages’.498 Punishment of the wrongdoer is not an aim, as shown by the 
lack of punitive damages.499 
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In Austria, the product liability law following the Product Liability Directive has been accepted as the 
dominant and accepted cause of action for product liability cases, with over 100 cases being decided 
by the Austrian Supreme Court.500 The Austrian product liability law tracks the Product Liability 
Directive for the most part. Product is defined as ‘any movable tangible property’ under §4 PHG. The 
law defines defect as: 
 
(1) A product shall be deemed defective if it does not provide the safety which, taking 
all circumstances into account, may be reasonably expected, in particular with 
respect to: 1. the presentation of the product, 2. the use to which it can reasonably 
be expected that the product would be put, 3. the time when the product was put 
into circulation. (2) A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason 
that an improved product was subsequently put into circulation.501 
 
While the Product Liability Directive does not offer guidance on the meaning of putting into market, 
Austrian law seeks to fill the gap: 
 
A product shall be deemed put into circulation as soon as the entrepreneur – 
irrespective of the title – has transferred it to another person into the latter’s power 
of disposition or for the latter’s use. Dispatching the product to the customer shall be 
deemed sufficient.502 
Furthermore, internal use of a product by the producer is also seen as being put into circulation in 
Austria, as even though the party is the same, it is playing a different role.503 Consistent with Austrian 
tort law principles, causation between the damage and the defect must be shown by both factual 
(conditio sine qua non) and legal causation (adequacy of causation).504 
As for defences to liability, Austria chose to include the development risk defence. The state of the 
technology is seen as ‘the highest imaginable standard of conduct, determined by the totality of any 
expertise available in science and technology’.505 
The German acceptance of the product liability law has not been as widespread as in Austria.506 In 
Germany, instead of implementing the EU Directive into the existing Civil Code, it was enacted as a 
separate law.507 The German law tracks closely with the Directive, and one of the reasons is that 
‘German law considerably influenced the Directive’.508 The law applies whether a product is put into 
                                                          
500
 Bernhard A Koch, ‘Product Liability in Austria’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 146. 
501
 Austrian PHG. 
502
 Austrian PHG. 
503
 Bernhard A Koch, ‘Product Liability in Austria’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 127-8. 
504
 Bernhard A Koch, ‘Product Liability in Austria’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 137. 
505
 Bernhard A Koch, ‘Product Liability in Austria’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 139. 
506
 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Product Liability in Germany’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 243. 
507
 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Product Liability in Germany’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 241 
508
 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Product Liability in Germany’ in Piotr Machnikowski (ed) European Product Liability: An 
Analysis of the State of the Art in the Era of New Technologies (Intersentia 2016) 241 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 66/151 
circulation for commercial or non-commercial purposes, so the law is not restricted to protecting 
consumers.509 
German law implements the risk development defence, though the standard appears to be slightly 
different from other jurisdictions. The ‘knowledge must be more or less certain and accepted by the 
respective community of scientists and technicians’ and ‘it is necessary that a real alternative already 
exists that has been successfully tested and shown to be better than the present product, and that it 
can be produced with reasonable means and efforts’.510 It is not enough that the knowledge exists 
and is available, but it has to have garnered acceptance and be shown to be replicable. This may 
make the scope of the defence broader than other jurisdictions that do not explicitly have the latter 
requirement. The defence not only includes construction defects, but it also includes instruction 
defects where the producer ‘did not warn against dangers which were not known at the time the 
product and the instruction were put into circulation’.511 
The German product liability law is seen to be capable of being applied to new technologies so long 
as it is not interpreted restrictively, as it has shown to be able to adapt to new trends.512 The fact 
that it is a separate law is also seen as an advantage for easier amendments.513 
 
1.4.6 Central European Approach 
 
The EU Directive was implemented into the Polish Civil Code by the Act of 2 March 2000 on the 
protection of certain consumer rights, on product liability and the amendment of the Civil Code. 
Consistent with the Directive, the claimant must show defect, damage, and causation to support a 
product liability claim. Instead of using the term ‘defective product’, the Civil Code uses ‘unsafe 
(dangerous) product’.514 The rationale was to distinguish product liability from breach of 
warranties.515 Despite the different wording, the definition is consistent with the Directive.516 As for 
causation, there is a two-prong test: ‘the causal link between the marketing of the product and the 
creation of the risk of damage, and then the causal link between the realisation of that risk and the 
damage inflicted by the claimant’.517 The state of the art defence is available in the Civil Code.518 
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Another affirmative defence is that the defect was not revealed when put into the market, but the 
claimant can overcome this defence by showing that the defect was inherent.519 
While the Directive is meant to protect consumers, Polish law allows for the same regime to apply to 
commercial parties and in commercial transactions.520 However, as with the Directive, the product 
liability regime is not applicable to legal persons.521 
In the Czech Republic, Act No 59/1998 Sb on Product Liability implemented the EU Directive into 
national law. It is a separate law distinct from the Civil Code.522 Article 4 of the Directive spelling out 
the elements of defect, damage, and causation was not implemented, but these elements are 
derived from general tort law.523 In terms of causation, ‘*t+he current approach is based on the 
conditio sine qua non rule and on a doctrine of adequacy’.524 The former refers to ‘*a+n activity or 
conduct…is a cause of the victim’s damage if, in the absence of the activity, the damage would not 
have occurred’.525 The latter means that ‘the damage must have been foreseeable and must not 
have been too remote’.526 The state of the art defence is also available.527 Tichý asserts that because 
the definition of product is so vague in Czech law, it would be able to accommodate new 
technologies.528 As such, the current regime should be able to be applied to robotics technology. 
In Slovakia, on the other hand, the Directive was ‘transposed word for word’, with only slight 
deviations in the notion of product.529 It was enacted as a separate Act No. 294/1999 rather than 
incorporated into the Civil code.530 This was also the case in Hungary, where the Directive was 
implemented by Act No. X/1993, which was subsequently amended by Act No. XXXVI/2002 to track 
the amendments to the Directive.531 
In both Poland and the Czech Republic, it appears that there are deviations from the Directive when 
implementing them into the domestic laws. There are no explicit provisions limiting their 
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applicability to consumer protection, so the product liability regimes would likely also apply to 
commercial parties who are purchasers of robots used for infrastructure maintenance and 
inspection. The state of the art defence is available to the producer in all the Member States in this 
section, which, like in the UK, means that litigation could be highly complex when they involve 
robotics technology. 
 
1.4.7 Nordic Approach 
 
In general, Scandinavian countries see tort law as a preventative mechanism and position the state 
as the institution that should cover the costs of personal injuries.532 The Danish Product Liability Act 
came into effect in 1989 and coexists with previous case law.533 Today, ‘both the court-developed 
principles (CDPL) and the rules of the PLA apply to personal injury and damage to consumers’ 
property whereas only the court-developed principles apply to damage to non-consumer 
property’.534 
The court-developed principles operate on a fault basis, in contrast with the strict liability regime of 
the product liability law.535 Danish courts ‘often assume causation once the plaintiff has proven a 
violation of safety rules or clear negligence’.536 The state of the art defence is incorporated in the law 
without changes from the Directive.537 
 
Product liability cases are rare in Denmark. Holle notes: 
 
The most likely reason for this is that products on the Danish market are generally 
relatively safe, because product safety tends to be more a question of preventing 
than curing. Thus, there are detailed obligations that producers and suppliers must 
comply with before products can be put onto the market. In addition, the relevant 
authorities generally seem to be rather active enforcing rules on safety, both before 
and after products are put into circulation.538 
 
Holle also argues that the current regime should be able to accommodate new technologies even if 
the question of what constitutes a product would have to be evaluated, but such a development 
should occur above the national level.539 
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2 Robots for M&I: Related Works and 
Conceptual Overview 
 
The European Union has been very active in fostering the development of artificial intelligence in the 
past few years. The EU Declaration on Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence was signed in April 2018. 
The Member States agreed to work toward ‘a comprehensive and integrated European approach on 
AI and, where needed, review and modernise national policies to ensure that the opportunities 
arising from AI are seized and the emerging challenges addressed’.540 Specifically, the signatories 
agree to cooperate on ‘*e+nsuring an adequate legal and ethical framework, building on EU 
fundamental rights and values, including privacy and protection of personal data, as well as 
principles such as transparency and accountability’.541 The Declaration, a non-binding instrument, 
has been signed by all EU Member States and Norway.542 
The European Commission organised a workshop in January 2018 with the European Association for 
Artificial Intelligence that resulted in a report entitled The European AI Landscape that included 
country reports from Member States on the AI ecosystem.543 Communication on AI: Artificial 
Intelligence for Europe and Coordinated Plan on the Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence 
Made in Europe were both published by the European Commission in 2018. The former was a 
response to the European Council’s invitation to draft ‘a European approach to artificial intelligence’ 
and calls for a ‘coordinated approach to make the most of the opportunities offered by AI and to 
address the new challenges that it brings’.544 The latter’s goals are ‘to maximise the impact of 
investments at EU and national levels, encourage synergies and cooperation across the EU, including 
on ethics, foster the exchange of best practices and collectively define the way forward’.545 It 
encourages Member States to formulate national artificial intelligence strategies and designates the 
Member States’ Group on Digitising European Industry and Artificial Intelligence as the entity to 
coordinate amongst the Member States and other stakeholders.546 The European Commission also 
released Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence in April 2019.547 
European Commission President Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen who started her term on 1 December 
2019 put artificial intelligence as one her top agenda items and vowed to ‘put forward legislation for 
a coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence’ 
within her first 100 days in office.548 
The High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence formed by the European Commission and 
comprising experts from academia, civil society, and industry, released three reports in 2019. Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, published in April 2019, provides a framework for trustworthy AI, 
which should be lawful, ethical, and robust.549 Concurrently, it also released the A Definition of AI: 
Main Capabilities and Disciplines, which proposes a definition of artificial intelligence: 
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Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also hardware) systems 
designed by humans3 that, given a complex goal, act in the physical or digital 
dimension by perceiving their environment through data acquisition, interpreting the 
collected structured or unstructured data, reasoning on the knowledge, or processing 
the information, derived from this data and deciding the best action(s) to take to 
achieve the given goal. AI systems can either use symbolic rules or learn a numeric 
model, and they can also adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is 
affected by their previous actions.  
As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, such as 
machine learning (of which deep learning and reinforcement learning are specific 
examples), machine reasoning (which includes planning, scheduling, knowledge 
representation and reasoning, search, and optimization), and robotics (which 
includes control, perception, sensors and actuators, as well as the integration of all 
other techniques into cyber-physical systems).550 
In June 2019, the High-Level Expert Group also released the Policy and Investment Recommendations 
for Trustworthy AI containing ‘33 recommendations that can guide Trustworthy AI towards 
sustainability, growth and competitiveness, as well as inclusion – while empowering, benefiting and 
protecting human beings’.551 A second group created by the European Commission is the European 
AI Alliance. An online platform, membership is open to all and it allows interested parties to engage 
in discussions with each other and to communicate with the High-Level Expert Group.552 
For artificial intelligence to function, algorithms are key. Toward that end, the European Commission 
is conducting a study on algorithmic transparency, which is ‘an important safeguard for 
accountability and fairness in decision-making’.553  
In addition, Opinion on AI: Artificial Intelligence – The Consequences of Artificial Intelligence on the 
(Digital) Single Market, Production, Consumption, Employment and Society was published by the 
European Economic and Social Committee in August 2017 and Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and 
‘Autonomous Systems’ was released by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies in March 2018, both of which raise important issues related to the development and 
use of artificial intelligence, including ethics, privacy, and accountability.554 
On robotics specifically, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
on 16 February 2017 informed by the results of the RoboLaw Project. It requested the Commission to 
propose definitions of smart robots and autonomous systems, foster scientific research, study 
necessary legal reform guided by ethical principles, coordinate cooperation amongst Member States, 
and work on safety standards for safety and security.555 
The European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee also commissioned a report in 2016 entitled 
European Civil Law Rules in Robotics. The report analysed the definitions of robots, their possible 
consciousness, liability issues arising from their use, and an ethical framework for robotics.556 This 
report took the approach that artificial intelligence is a key component of robotics technology.557 
Liability issues of artificial intelligence was also addressed by the November 2019 report on Liability 
for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Technologies drafted by the Expert Group on Liability 
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and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation.558 The report discusses current civil liability 
regimes and the challenges that may be faced when attempting to apply them to new technologies. 
It is in this context that the current report addresses the issues of safety, regulation, and liability of 
robotics technology for infrastructure inspection and maintenance. It should be noted that this 
report focuses on robots that operate in the air, on land, and in the waters because of the general 
availability of safety and legal regulations concerning these types of technology. Other types of 
robots that are not aerial drones, autonomous vehicles or autonomous vessels/submersibles, 
including crawlers and manipulator arms, are also used for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance. If the particular robots fall under the definitions of the systems focused in this report, 
the safety and legal regulations would also apply. Otherwise, there may be gaps in the regime that 
need to be filled. As for liability issues, the fault-based, strict liability, and product liability regimes 
would all be applicable to robotics technology so long as the elements of the laws are met. 
2.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Aerial drone terminology, much like the technology, is varied and has changed throughout the years. 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle was the term used in the 1960s, but it is now rarely used.559 Other terms 
include unmanned aircraft, remotely piloted aviation systems, remotely piloted aircraft systems, 
unmanned drones, autonomous drones, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).560 The European Union 
uses the term unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to include both the UAV and the remote controlling 
equipment.561 
Though usage of drones in everyday life has been a relatively recent development, language in the 
Paris Convention of 1919,562 which was then incorporated into the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention) that was signed in 1944, refers to the flying of 
aircraft without pilots. Today, all United Nations states are signatories of the Chicago Convention; 
consequently, all European Union Member States are bound by the Convention.563 Article 8 of the 
Convention forbids an ‘aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot’ from operating without state 
authorisation and requires states to take necessary safety measures to prevent accidents resulting 
from pilotless aircraft. Remote control aircraft, which were developed and used for World War I, 
were the original intended targets of this provision.564 Military drones gained widespread usage in 
World War II and the Vietnam War, but civilian use of drones did not start to emerge until much later 
as a result of advancements in sensory and communication equipment, GPS technology, and 
computer processing power.565 While fully autonomous drones that require no human supervision 
are being developed, they are not currently in commercial use.566 If and when they are widely 
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deployed, it is still likely a human pilot would act as a supervisor to ensure the drone is functioning 
properly. Consequently, because drones are currently semi-autonomous at best, the existence of a 
remote pilot is necessary, a fact reflected in the regulatory measures. Non-autonomous drones 
operate ‘on the basis of interpretation of data collected via an on-board camera, radar, satellite or 
other means’, whereas autonomous drones ‘on the basis of preprogrammed instructions or artificial 
intelligence, processing data collected from on-board sensors and from other sources (e.g. radar or 
satellite tracking)’.567 
2.1.1 Standardisation, Assurance and Certification 
 
This section aims to provide existing safety practitioners with a high-level introduction to the 
application of safety and risk management processes to unmanned aircraft systems to reduce the 
complexity of the open challenges problem of UAS operations where the safety model requires more 
than a solid safety case.  
As UAS software-intensive systems become more pervasive and critical, more and more new safety 
solutions are being developed to solve the UAS open challenges. Safety criteria are a set of high-level 
goals to define the minimum behavioural properties which must be fulfilled to enforce the safety 
context. Safety criteria are divided into two categories: qualitative and quantitative, based on ISO 
2018 safety criteria are term of references used to determine whether a specified level of risk is 
acceptable or tolerable. Authors in568 summarised examples of both categories of safety criteria 
specification which will be presented in the following table. 
 






“The principal objective of the aviation regulation framework is to 
achieve and maintain the highest possible uniform level of safety. 
In the case of UAS, this means ensuring the safety of any other 
airspace user as well as the safety of persons and property on the 
ground.” … will provide, at a minimum, an equivalent level of safety 
for the integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace and at 
aerodromes.”  “The introduction of RPA *remotely piloted aircraft+ 
must not increase the risk to other aircraft or third parties and 
should not prevent or restrict access to airspace.”569 
P.4 and P.17 ICAO circular 
(ICAO 2011) 
“UAV operations should be as safe as manned aircraft insofar as P.11 and P.18 CASA 
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they should not present or create a hazard to persons or property 
in the air or on the ground greater than that created by manned 
aircraft of equivalent class or category.” “When considering a 
request for approval to conduct a particular operation with a UAV, 
CASA must ensure that the operation of the UAV will pose no 
greater threat to the safety of air navigation than that posed by a 
similar operation involving a manned aircraft. This characteristic 




“… UAS operations must be as safe as manned aircraft insofar as 
they must not present or create a greater hazard to persons, 
property, vehicles or vessels, whilst in the air or on the ground, 
than that attributable to the operations of manned aircraft of 
equivalent class or category.”571 
Section 1, 




“A civil UAS must not increase the risk to people or property on the 
ground compared with manned aircraft of equivalent category.”572 
P.4 EASA Policy 
statement   
“Enable the operation of small UAS by mitigating, to an acceptable 
level of risk, the hazards posed to manned aircraft and other 
airborne objects operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) as 
well as the public on the surface.”  “Any sUAS may be operated in 
such a manner that the associated risk of harm to persons and 
property not participating in the operation is expected to be less 










Table 4. Safety Qualitative Specifications for UAS Systems 
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Qualitative specifications are also proposed to quantify safety criteria. These quantitative measures 
are calculated from historical data. U.S. Range Commanders Council (RCC 1999; RCC 2001)574 and 
Dalamagkidis et al. (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis et al. 2008)575 proposed a metric of number of ground 
fatalities per flight hour,          and           respectively. Another measure, the number of 
involuntary ground fatalities per flight hour, has been proposed by Clothier et al. (2006)576  and 
Weibel et al. (Weibel and Hansman 2004)577. Australian Defence Force airworthiness regulations 
(ADF 2009)578 and ADF airworthiness regulations (ADF 2009)579 proposed the nominal likelihood of 
a mishap causing serious injury, loss of life or significant damage per flight hour          .  These 
measures are based on the historical data which makes the measure very sensitive to the targeted 
period.580.  
 
Figure 2. Risk Management Life Cycle 
 
 Functional Hazard Analysis –  
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A predictive risk identification which analyses the safety at different levels of the aircraft system, the 
identification aims to identify the functional failure of the aircraft system components.581  
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) –  
FMEA is the process of reviewing how the different subsystems (Components) can fail by identifying 
the possible failure modes and their interactions. The process also identifies the effects of failure 
modes on other components, and these analysis can be qualitative or quantitative by using the 
failure rates. 582 
 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) – 
This is a structured, systematic and qualitative technique for system examination and risk 
management. HAZOP is a brainstorming approach which identifies the contribution of identified 
hazard to a system failure. 583 
 Common Cause Analysis (CCA)–  
CCA identifies the common events which contribute to single system failure and aggregates causes 
from different events to identify the failure causes.584 
 Fault Tree Analysis –  
A top-down graphical risk identification based on boolean logic, FTA is a deductive method which 
provides information on how the undesired event can contribute to system failure.  
2.1.2 Meeting standards: ARP4754 (Aerospace Recommended Practice) 
 ARP4754 
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) ARP4754A (Guidelines For Development Of Civil Aircraft 
and Systems). ARP4754 is a set of guidelines provided by SAE International (Society of Automobile 
Engineers) to support the development processes of aircraft system, which led to certification of 
those systems, it addresses the complete aircraft development cycle, including systems 
requirements, system design and system verification585. SAE ARP 4754 has been applied to certify 
complex electronic systems of civil aircraft since 1996. 
 
 Aircraft development process and assurance level 
The next figure is a general illustration of an aircraft system development from conceptual definition 
to certification. The first phase contains research and preliminary development steps which 
describes the full configuration of the system, the following step will be based on this overall 
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configuration of the system. The development phase contains four steps which start by defining each 
function from the concepts phase and ends with the implementation step, this process is repetitive 
after any changes or improvements on the overall functions of the system. The Production/operation 
phase is the final phase which is readying the implementation of the development phase. 
 
 
Figure 3.Aircarft System General Development Life Cycle 
 
Each function of the aircraft system has a development assurance level (DAL), which indicates the 
level of rigor of the development of a function of an aircraft system. DALs are divided in five classes 
of failure condition:  
● Catastrophic:  
Failure may cause a crash. Error or loss of critical function required to safely fly and land aircraft. 
● Hazardous: 
Failure has a large negative impact on safety or performance, or reduces the ability of the crew to 
operate the aircraft due to physical distress or a higher workload, or causes serious or fatal injuries 
among the passengers. (Safety-significant) 
● Major: 
Failure is significant, but has a lesser impact than a Hazardous failure (for example, leads to 
passenger discomfort rather than injuries) or significantly increases crew workload (safety related) 
● Minor:  
Failure is noticeable, but has a lesser impact than a Major failure (for example, causing passenger 
inconvenience or a routine flight plan change) 
● No Effect: 
Failure has no impact on safety, aircraft operation, or crew workload. 
These five assurance levels are classification of any potential software failure. The software 
components are divided in their development to classes based on the severity of the effect on safety. 
The following table shows the amount of rigor required in the software development life cycle. 
Concept 
Function Architecture  Design Implementation 
Production, test, and operation 
data
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Level Failure condition Failure rate Objectives With independence 
A Catastrophic ≤ 1x10-9 71 33 
B Hazardous ≤ 1x10-7 69 21 
C Major ≤ 1x10-5 62 8 




N/A 0 0 
Table 5. Design Assurance Levels (DAL) 
2.1.3 Legislation and Policy  
 
It is now important to consider the legislation and policy that is applicable to the use of drone 
technology. First, the relevant international regime will be considered briefly. Second is a discussion 
of relevant EU regulation. Third, examples of national laws which regulate drones in a handful of EU 
Member States will be considered. This is done in order to highlight the variance which exists 
between them. Finally, liability issues which could arise through the use of drone technology will be 
outlined. 
 
2.1.3.1 International Regime 
The Chicago Convention led to the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), which is a United Nations body that aims to achieve uniformity in international civil aviation 
regulation.586 ICAO considers drones aircraft and existing references to aircraft in its documents are 
applicable to drones.587 Nonetheless, ICAO has established an RPAS panel to systemically amend the 
Annexes to the Chicago Convention to reflect the reality of the widespread use of UAVs.588 The 
approach to not segregate the regulatory frameworks for manned and unmanned aircraft means 
that there is not a total lack of regulations to accommodate the newly developed technology 
because existing regulations on manned aviation would also be applicable to drones.589 However, 
there remains gaps to be filled. Importantly, the lack of harmonisation may cause difficulties even if 
drones were to operate within domestic airspace or on the high seas, as they may be in the vicinity 
of aircraft registered in other states.590 ICAO has also developed a toolkit for drones. 
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2.1.3.2 The EU Position 
The European Union has taken the development and regulation of drones very seriously. As far back 
as 2002, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the predecessor of the EASA, cooperated with the 
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) to form a UAV Task Force.591 
Its aim was to develop guidelines for regulating drones for civil use.592 Consultation meetings were 
held on this subject. One such meeting, the Riga Conference, resulted in the Riga Declaration on 
remotely piloted aircraft (drones) in 2015, which included five guiding principles for the development 
of a European regulatory framework: 1. Drones should be treated as new types of aircraft with risk-
based regulation; 2. safety measures governing drone use must be developed forthwith; 3. 
investment in technological advances is necessary to achieve full integration of drones into the 
European airspace; 4. public acceptance of drone usage is a key consideration; and 5. The drone 
operator is ultimately responsible for its usage.593 
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released its Concept of Operations for Drones: A risk 
based approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft in 2015, which first categorised the types of 
drone operations as open, specific, and certified. This three-pronged approach forms the basis of the 
eventual European-wide regulation.594 Later in the same year, the EASA also released a Technical 
Opinion, which it was tasked with at the Riga Conference.595 The Opinion consists of twenty-seven 
proposals for a framework to regulate the use of drones in Europe. The EASA collaborated with the 
Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS), consisting of international aviation 
regulatory experts, to devise a single set of guidelines for the certification of UAS.596 
The attention paid to UAVs by the EU has resulted in a much more developed regulatory regime 
compared to other types of robots. Regulatory measures currently exist in most Member States, all 
of which will be replaced by a common rule in July 2020 with the publication of the Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 and the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 in 
June 2019. This means that once a drone is certified for usage in one Member State, it can be legally 
operated throughout the European Union. It should be noted that the European Union regulations 
are not applicable to UAS ‘intended to be exclusively operated indoors’, which may mean that 
certain RIMA technologies may be exempt if the inspection and maintenance occur indoors.597 
● Risk-based Categorisation 
Under the new common rule, UAS operations are divided into three risk-based categories: open, 
specific, and certified, and each category has its own requirements operators of drones must meet 
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before they can be deployed.598 This risk-based approach and proportional risk mitigation measures 
for each category is a hallmark of retaining the flexibility of the regulations in a comprehensive 
regulatory approach.599 Open operations do not require prior authorisation or operational 
declaration.600 Specific operations require authorisation or declaration, depending on the 
circumstances, and certified operations require certification of the UAS and certification of the 
operator and licensing of the pilot before the drones can be operated.601 The operator is the legal 
entity responsible for the UAV, whereas the pilot is the actual person in control of the drone.602 
Operations are considered open, or low risk, when six conditions are met. First, the ‘UAS belongs to 
one of the classes set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 or is privately built’,603 or while not 
complying with the Delegated Regulation, meets the definition of Decision No 768/2008/EC and was 
‘placed on the market before 1 July 2022’.604 There are five classes, ranging from 0 to 4, which are 
divided by the maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of the UAV.605 A class C0 UAV has a MOTM of less 
than 250 g including payload,606 while a class C4 UAV has a MOTM of less than 25 kg including 
payload.607 
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Second, the maximum take-off mass is less than 25 kg.608 Third, the pilot maintains a safe distance 
between the drone and people and does not fly over ‘assemblies of people’.609 Assemblies of people 
is defined as ‘gatherings where persons are unable to move away due to the density of the people 
present’.610 Fourth, the remote pilot must keep the drone in visual line of sight unless the drone is 
‘flying in follow-me mode or when using an unmanned aircraft observer as specified in Part A of the 
Annex’.611 Follow-me mode is when the UAV ‘constantly follows the remote pilot within a 
predetermined radius’.612 Fifth, the drone is ‘maintained within 120 metres from the closest point of 
the surface of the earth, except when overflying an obstacle, as specified in Part A of the Annex’.613 
And finally, the drone ‘does not carry dangerous goods and does not drop any material’.614 Open 
categories operations are further divided into three categories ‘on the basis of operational limitation, 
requirements for the remote pilot and technical requirements for UAS’.615 The subcategories are A1, 
A2, and A3 and trigger different requirements.616 
Figure 4. Aerial Drone Classifications (Credit: https://dronerules.eu) 
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Operations that do not meet one or more of the above requirements are categorised as specific, 
which is considered moderate risk, and operators must obtain authorisation prior to flying the 
drones.617 The application for authorisation must include a risk assessment of the operation.618 This 
risk assessment should be detailed and must ‘describe the characteristics of the UAS operation’, 
‘propose adequate operational safety objectives’, ‘identify the risks of the operation on the ground 
and in the air’, ‘identify a range of possible risk mitigating measure’, and ‘determine the necessary 
level of robustness of the selected mitigating measures in such a way that the operation can be 
conducted safely’.619 The risks identified must take into account the possibility of endangering life or 
property on the ground, the characteristics of the drone, the purpose of the operation, the type of 
drone, and weigh ‘the probability of collision with other aircraft and class of airspace used’.620 
Operators must also consider ‘the type, scale, and complexity of the UAS operation or activity’ and 
‘the extent to which the persons affected by the risks involved in the UAS operation are able to 
assess and exercise control over those risks’.621 The regulations also require the inclusion of specific 
information on the operation,622 ‘target level of safety’,623 the risks,624 and the measures sufficiently 
proportionate to mitigate the risks.625 
In October 2019, the EASA released guidelines on how drone operators could comply with the risk 
assessment for the specific category by utilising the SORA (Specific Operation Risk Assessment) 
methodology, which was first drafted by JARUS.626 The guidelines also include the first pre-defined 
risk assessment (PDRA) of many to be released in the coming years, which will streamline the 
process for operators when applying for authorisation.627 
The competent authority evaluates the risk assessment and either grants the operational 
authorisation or denies the application with reasons for the rejection.628 Should the operator wish to 
operate outside the state of registration of the UAS or conduct cross-border operations, it must 
submit details of the operations including the location and ‘updated mitigation measures, if needed, 
to address those risks...which are specific to the local airspace, terrain and population characteristics 
and the climatic conditions’.629 
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Figure 5. Open vs Specific Categories of Aerial Drones 
Operations are high risk and must be certified if one of three conditions for the drone and one of 
three conditions for the operation are met. For the UAS, the drone has a ‘characteristic dimension of 
3 m or more, and is designed to be operated over assemblies of people’, ‘is designed for transporting 
people’, or ‘is designed for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods and requiring a high level of 
robustness to mitigate the risks for third parties in case of accident’.630 In terms of the operation, it is 
conducted ‘over assemblies of people’, involves the transport of people’, or ‘involves the carriage of 
dangerous goods, that may result in high risk for third parties in case of an accident’.631 In addition, 
the certification authority can also require certification for operations that do not meet the above 
criteria based on the risk assessment submitted by the drone operator.632 For robotics for I&M, the 
most likely scenario where an operation would be considered certified would be where the drone 
would be carrying dangerous goods for the purpose of maintenance and operators should take 
prudent care to determine whether certification of the operation is necessary. 
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Figure 6. Determination of Certified Aerial Drone Category  
 
● Geographic limits 
While the EU regulation is meant to harmonise the regulation of drones throughout the EU, it is also 
designed with flexibility in mind for the Member States.633 One example of this is that the Member 
States are allowed to define geographical zones for ‘safety, privacy or environmental reasons’.634 It is 
therefore important for operators to understand whether the area is legal for their operations. This 
should not be an independent concern for specific and certified operations as the risk assessment 
would have already taken into account the location of the operations and the application would have 
been rejected should the geographical area the operators want to deploy the drones was deemed 
off limits by the Member State. 
● Pilot qualifications 
Remote pilots of drones must meet minimum requirements as set forth. For the open category, the 
requirements differ for the type of operation and the class of aircraft, which includes different 
trainings and examination on different subjects.635 For operations in the specific category, the 
following competencies are the bare minimum required: 
(a) ability to apply operational procedures (normal, contingency and emergency 
procedures, flight planning, pre-flight and post-flight inspections); 
(b) ability to manage aeronautical communication; 
(c) manage the unmanned aircraft flight path and automation; 
(d) leadership, teamwork and self-management; 
(e) problem solving and decision-making; 
(f) situational awareness;  
(g) workload management; 
(h) coordination or handover, as applicable.636 
 
The minimum age requirement for remote pilots for open and specific categories is 16, though this is 
waived if the drone is a toy, is privately-built with a MTOM of less than 250 g, or if the pilot is directly 
supervised by another remote pilot who is 16 years or older.637 Another example of flexibility is that 
Member States may also lower the minimum age for the open and specific categories to 12 and 14 
respectively should the risk assessment of the specific situation of the state deem this suitable, but 
these remote pilots would be unable to pilot operations in other Member States.638 As robots used 
for I&M will be operated by professionals in the respective industries with the relevant training and 
experience, it is highly unlikely the pilots would be disqualified due to lack of competence or age. 
● Registration 
Certain UAVs and operators must be registered with the relevant authority. The European Union 
mandates Member States establish a system of registry to keep track of the drones being operated 
within their jurisdictions that are subject to certification and ‘operators whose operation may 
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present a risk to safety, security, privacy, and protection of personal data or environment’.639 
Operators need to register when they operate within the specific category or when they operate 
within an open category a drone ‘with a MTOM of 250 g or more, or, which in the case of an impact 
can transfer to a human kinetic energy above 80 Joules’ or one that is ‘equipped with a sensor able 
to capture personal data’.640 Operators are exempt from registration for the latter if the drone 
complies with Directive 2009/48/EC and is considered a toy.641 
While drones or operators of drones in the open category do not have to be registered, operators in 
the specific category must provide their full name and date of birth (or identification number if the 
operator is a legal person), address, email address, telephone number, insurance policy number for 
the UAS if applicable, a declaration of competence, and the operational authorisations, light UAS 
operator certificates issued, and the confirmation of receipt and completeness for submitting a 
declaration for ‘an operation complying with a standard scenario’.642 The regulations also mandate a 
registration system for drones ‘whose design is subject to certification’.643 The operators must 
submit the name of the drone manufacturer, the manufacturer designation of the drone, its serial 
number, and the details and contact information of the person, natural or legal, to which the drone 
is registered.644 
● Data protection 
Drones must operate within the confines of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which 
came into force in May 2018. As a result, although the main purpose of I&M drones is not to collect 
personal data, compliance with the GDPR is still necessary should data where a person is identified 
or identifiable is captured in the course of its work.645 However, if the captured data is, for example, 
power lines or oil rigs, operators need not worry as there is no personal data involved.646 Care must 
still be taken to ensure that the drone is not inadvertently capturing personal data on its way or back 
from inspections, otherwise GDPR obligations would be triggered and the data would need to be 
secure and regularly deleted.647 Such data should also not be used for other purposes that are 
unrelated to the operation of the drone.648 The DroneRules PRO project, which is EU-funded and 
focuses on privacy issues regarding drones, has published the Privacy Code of Conduct: A practical 
guide to privacy and data protection requirements for drone operators and pilots, which serves as 
guidance for compliance with the GDPR by drone operators.649 
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2.1.3.3 National Laws 
All EU Member States have existing laws regulating the use of drones in their jurisdictions in one 
form or another. States were eager to develop regulatory measures due to a combination of the 
dangerousness of the use of the technology and the slow and deliberative process of the EU.650 
Existing laws that do not conform to the European common rule will have to be amended 
accordingly prior to June 2020. Before the deadline, the current national laws will still be applicable. 
Because of the different regulations in different jurisdictions, operators must conform to and apply 
for authorisation, if necessary, in each state in which they intend to operate, an obstacle that has 
been seen to inhibit the growth of done usage.651 Relevant laws on UAVs range from welcoming to 
restrictive, though there are many common aspects that appear to have emerged without official 
coordination, such as UAV weight limits, distance and height limits, and the need for registration.652 
As noted in the previous section, as the European common rules only apply to outdoor operations, 
drones that are used indoors will still be required to abide by national laws even after June 2020. The 




Belgium’s approach to the regulation of drone technology stems for The Royal Decree of the 10th of 
April 2016. These regulations apply to all drones except where the drones are to be used for 
recreational purposes, which are exempt under strict conditions set out in article 3 of the decree. 
Such drones will have a maximum take-off mass of no more than 1kg, be flown no higher than 10 
meters above the ground and must be flown within the eyesight of the pilot at all times. They must 
not be used in public space, meaning that they should be flown over private properties where 
permission has been granted by the owner. Relevant safety recommendations must also be 
followed. It is also notable that drones may not be used for freight type purposes.653 
 Italy 
In Italy, drones are regulated by the ENAC Regulation. Having previously been defined under the 
blanket term of aircraft, they are categorised as either an ‘Areomodel’, intended to be used 
recreationally, or an ‘SAPR’, intended to be used in more specialised areas (such as scientific 
research).654 SAPRs are classified based on take-off mass (whether above, or below 25kg).655 Further, 
when that weight exceeds 25kg they must be registered with Registry of Aero-Vehicles.656 In 
addition, even where the weight is below 25kg, a proposed pilot must obtain certificate 
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demonstrating their competence.657 For those weighing in excess of 25kg a full pilot’s license is 
required.658 
 France 
In France, the UAV regulatory measures are the Arrêté du 17 décembre 2015 relatif à l’utilisation de 
l’espace aérien par les aéronefs qui circulent sans personne à bord (Order of December 17, 2015, 
Regarding the Use of Airspace by Unmanned Aircraft) and the Arrêté du 17 décembre 2015 relatif à 
la conception des aéronefs civils qui circulent sans personne à bord, aux conditions de leur emploi et 
aux capacités requises des personnes qui les utilisent (Order of December 17, 2015, Regarding the 
Creation of Unmanned Civil Aircraft, the Conditions of Their Use, and the Required Aptitudes of the 
Persons That Use Them). The regulatory authority for UAVs is the French Civil Aviation Authority. 
Drones that are over 800 g must be registered, at which time a registration number that must be 
affixed on the UAV is issued.659 For commercial purposes, remote pilots must pass a written exam 
and be provided adequate training by the operator for the specific aircraft and type of operation.660 
Usage of commercial drones are categorised into four scenarios: 
 
S-1: Using a drone outside a populated area, without flying over any third party, 
staying within the pilot’s line of sight, and within a horizontal distance of no more 
than 200 meters from the pilot. 
S-2: Using a drone outside a populated area, where no third party is within the area 
of operation, within a horizontal distance of no more than 1 kilometer from the pilot, 
and not falling within the definition of S-1. 
S-3: Using a drone in a populated area, but without flying over any third party, 
staying within the pilot’s line of sight, and within a horizontal distance of no more 
than 100 meters from the pilot; 
S-4: Using a drone outside a populated area, but not in a manner falling within the 
definitions of S-1 or S-2.661 
 
To fly over 50 m in S-2, the drone must be under 2 kg.662 For S-3, untethered drones must be less 
than 8 kg.663 For S-4, the drone must be under 2 kg and are restricted to passive activities such as 
measurement taking or observation.664 In all scenarios, if the drone is untethered, they cannot be 
operating autonomously.665 Drones that meet certain specifications - drones over 25 kg, drones used 
outdoors (S2 and S4 scenarios), and drones used in the S-3 scenario that are over 2 kg - must submit 
a certification of design before operations can commence.666 This submission must include specific 
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details about the UAV itself and the operation, including potential dangers and mitigation measures 
for third parties.667 There are also basic safety requirements that apply to all scenarios and particular 
ones for each scenario. Non-compliance could result in a one-year sentence and a fine of €75,000.668 
The operator must make a declaration describing the activities of the drone every two years and 




In Germany, the key legislation in the context of drones is the German Civil Aviation Act (LuftVG), as 
well as the Air Traffic Order (LuftVO). Drones that are used for sport or leisure type activities are not 
considered to be ‘aircraft’.670 The result is that they are subject to less stringent regulations than is 
the case for drones used for other purposes. For example, these drones must not exceed 5kg in 
weight671 and must be operated within the eyesight of the operator.672 Drones used for other 
purposes are subject to more stringent regulations.673 For example, drones used for commercial 
purposes, such as for parcel deliver, would be treated as aircraft.674 
 Greece 
Greece is ahead of its European peers in terms of conforming to the upcoming EU-wide standard. Its 
2016 Regulation - General Framework for Flights of Unmanned Aircraft Systems - UAS follows the 
three-tiered categorisation first proposed in the Riga Declaration and subsequently in the draft EU 
regulation in 2015. UAV flights are categorised as open, specific, or certified, and each category 
requires different levels of supervision from the regulatory authority, the Hellenic Civil Aviation 
Authority (HCAA).675 The open category is only for drones with a MTOM of under 25 kg that are flying 
less than 500 metres from the pilot.676 To fly over a crowd of people, the pilot must be commercially 
licensed and registered to conduct such manoeuvres and the drone must be equipped with 
appropriate safety devices.677 Operators and pilots in the open category must be registered if the 
control range is over 50 meters.678 Like the EU regulation, drone flights in the open category are 
further subdivided into three categories depending on the MOTM.679 
When registering, the HCAA may decide that a flight should be placed in the specific category, which 
requires the operator to file an Operation Authorisation. This filing must include a risk assessment, 
the operator’s manual, and proof of insurance.680 The HCAA could further classify the operation as 
certified after the aforementioned application. This triggers further requirements, including the 
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implementation of a Safety Management System, and the issuance of a Special Certificate of 
Airworthiness after approval.681 
 Croatia 
Similar to Greece, Croatia also amended its regulatory regime to comply with the EU regulations. 
  Spain 
Spain was one of the first European states to implement laws to regulate the use of UAVs.682 The 
governmental body in charge of drones is the State Agency for Air Safety, which is tasked with the 
‘supervision, inspection, and management of air transport, air navigation, and airport security’.683 
The first form of regulation was through Royal-Decree Law 8/2014, which was passed into law as Law 
18/2014 in October 2014.684 The law was subsequently updated in 2017.685 The new law applies to 
drones under 150 kg that are for commercial use.686 It allows for drone operations during night-time, 
over crowds of people and buildings, and in controlled airspace so long as a security analysis is 
performed and prior authorisation of the flight obtained.687 The security analysis is similar to the 
risk assessment required under the EU regulations and must include mitigation measures.688 
 
 
 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has also developed a substantial amount of regulation to address the use of 
drones. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is the regulatory body, and the principal regulatory 
measure is Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO 2016). The scope is limited to outdoor usage, and drone 
operating indoors would have to abide by relevant Health and Safety at Work regulations.689 
Commercial usage of drones, which is defined as ‘any flight by a small unmanned aircraft…in return 
for remuneration or other valuable consideration' is only allowed if permission is granted by the 
CAA.690 The permissions are valid for one year and must be renewed if the drone is to be used past 
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the expiry date.691 For an application to operate UAVs under 20 kg, the operator must demonstrate 
the competence of the remote pilot through knowledge of aviation principles and a flight test and 
submit an Operations Manual detailing the procedures for the type of flight planned.692 For more 
complex flights that may involve additional safety concerns, an Operating Safety Case, or risk 
assessment, is also required.693 UAVs with an operating mass of over 20 kg must meet all aviation 
requirements, and not only those particular to drones, so operations must apply for specific 
authorisation with the CAA before commencing flight. A risk assessment detailing the safety 
concerns and mitigating measures must be included in the application.694 
 
2.1.3.3 Liability Issues  
Liability issues regarding the operation of drone technology, otherwise known as Remotely Piloted 
Air Systems (RPAS) were highlighted as early as 2014. A communication from the EU commission 
outlined that ‘progressive integration of RPAS into the airspace from 2016 onwards must be 
accompanied by adequate public debate on the development of measures which address societal 
concerns including safety, privacy and data protection, third-party liability and insurance or 
security’.695 Importantly, it was acknowledged that ‘even with the highest safety standards, accidents 
may happen and victims need to be compensated for any injury or damage’.696 This would require 
‘that those liable can be easily identified and are able to meet their financial obligations’.697  
In addition, it was also outlined that the third-party insurance regime that was in place would be in 
need of amendment on the basis that mass (or total weight) of the aircraft in question determined 
the minimum level required with respect to insurance. This was set at 500kg, a problematic level as 
many RPAS would weigh well below that threshold.698 With that in mind, there was a need to update 
the approach in order to accommodate and regulate a rapidly developing and increasingly 
widespread area of technology.  
Next, a report commissioned by the European Commission and prepared by Steer Davis Gleave 
highlighted a number of potential issues related to the use of drone technology. These included first, 
the importance of insurance,699 as well as the indemnification of parties that have suffered damage. 
The way that this would be covered by insurance policies for third-party liability was also considered, 
with the suggestion made being that where ‘the operator did not have third-party liability insurance 
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or operated in conditions outside its insurance terms (meaning that its insurance policy would be 
void) then the operator would be required to pay the full extent of the liability itself, again including 
through liquidation of its assets if required’.700 
Whether variation in third-party liability frameworks within the EU was the next consideration. Key 
suggestions were that there was no evidence that variation in those frameworks had at that time 
‘hindered the development of the market or creates a problem in ensuring the adequate 
compensation of victims, although it does complicate the work of the RPAS insurance and legal 
industry’.701 Also, there was no visible desire for a harmonised regime of this type. With this in mind 
it was noted that ‘there is no harmonised liability framework across the EU for motor vehicles and 
that this does not stop the Motor Insurance Directive from offering a high level of protection to 
third-parties’.702  The conclusion of the report was the chance of reaching an agreement on a 
harmonised regime within the EU was very low and thus, such harmonisation should not be 
pursued.703 However, as will become clear later, this view has since been disputed. 
The 2015 Riga declaration outlined that drone accidents were an inevitable symptom of their 
widening use, and also that ‘Member States should clarify the applicable insurance and third-party 
liability regime and monitor the compensation mechanisms for potential victims’.704 Other issues, 
including the establishment of compensation funds to cover loss caused by uninsured drone users, as 
well as the need for a coherent system for incident reporting were also highlighted.705 Next, a 2016 
SESAR study featured a focus on liability insurance, balanced alongside economic viability.706 It 
outlined that liability should be addressed, both at a national, and EU level, keeping in mind the 
provision of affordable insurance rates within a 2-5 year period (from publication).707 This would 
include a harmonisation across Member States.708 Variation in liability insurance premiums based on 
drone type was also noted, with the distinction between certified and specific drones being 
highlighted.709 This is particularly relevant ‘as current standards are established mostly for manned 
aircraft’.710 However, it has been suggested that the legal system is ‘adequately equipped to deal 
                                                          
700
 ‘Study on the Third-Party Liability and Insurance Requirements of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) 
European Commission’ a November 2014 report prepared by Steer Davies Gleave for the European 
Commission, Para 4.6. 
701
 Study on the Third-Party Liability and Insurance Requirements of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) 
European Commission’ a November 2014 report prepared by Steer Davies Gleave for the European 
Commission, Para 4.83. 
702
 ‘Study on the Third-Party Liability and Insurance Requirements of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) 
European Commission’ a November 2014 report prepared by Steer Davies Gleave for the European 
Commission, Para 4.83. 
703
 ‘Study on the Third-Party Liability and Insurance Requirements of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) 
European Commission’ a November 2014 report prepared by Steer Davies Gleave for the European 
Commission, Para 4.84. 
704
 RIGA DECLARATION ON REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT (drones) “FRAMING THE FUTURE OF AVIATION” Riga 
- 6 March 2015. 
705
 RIGA DECLARATION ON REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT (drones) “FRAMING THE FUTURE OF AVIATION” Riga 
- 6 March 2015. 
706
 SESAR ‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe, November 2016, See page 16, and 
page 33. 
707
 SESAR ‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe, November 2016, 48. 
708
 SESAR ‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe, November 2016, 48. 
709
 SESAR ‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe, November 2016, 78. 
710
 Michael Calvo, ‘Uncertainty and Innovation: The Need for Effective Regulations to Foster Successful 
Integration of Personal and Commercial Drone’ (2016) 22 Southwestern Journal of International Law 189, 204-
205; See also SESAR ‘European Drones Outlook Study: Unlocking the value for Europe, November 2016, 78; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A New Era for Aviation: 
Opening the Aviation Market to the Civil Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in a Safe and Sustainable 
Manner, at 3-4, COM (2014) 207 final. 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 91/151 
with liability issues related to the deployment of unmanned aircraft. Proven negligence (errors, 
mistakes, shortcomings, omissions) of humans involved in their operation may trigger civil, 
disciplinary and criminal liability’.711 It was noted that within the EU, ‘commercially operated drones 
equal or superior to 20 kg are required to have a third-party liability insurance proportional to their 
weight’.712 However, the problem that ‘most commercially operated drones in EU Member States 
have a weight under 20kg, and can still cause major damage such as a collision with a passenger 
plane’ was highlighted.713 
 More Recent Developments 
The position taken within a 2018 study focused on liability rules for drones that was commissioned 
by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the 
Request of the JURI Committee was that rules concerning liability, as well as requirements 
concerning insurance ‘ought to be regulated at EU level in order to avoid excessive fragmentation’.714 
In addition, it was argued that hard law should be adopted to achieve this.715 The report’s findings 
regarding liability rules across Member States were outlined in the table included below. Fault is 
categorised by relevant legislation, liable party, as well as by the nature of liability, whether strict, or 
fault-based in nature. Limits and exemptions on liability are also noted, as well as whether there is a 
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Spain 
  
Real Decreto  
1036/2017 (Article 15, 
Article 16) & 
Navegacion Aerea 
(Article 119, Article 120) 













Arrête du 17 decembre 







Strict Unlimited Yes 
Belgium 
  
Arrête royal 10 Avril 











Civil Aviation Act 1982, 
Air Navigation Order 
2016 (Article 94, Article 
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Italy 
  
Regolamento ENAC & 
Codice della 
Navigazione (r.d. 
327/1942, Article 965, 
Article 971) & Rome 
Convention (Article 1) 
Operator/U
ser 














Air Navigation Act 
(Chapter 9, paragraph 




Strict Unlimited Yes 
Sweden 
  
Swedish Aviation Act 
2010:500 (Chapter 9) & 
Swedish Act on Liability 









Czech Aviation Law 
49/1997 (Article 3.1.1, 









even if < 20kg 
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Poland 
  
Regulation of 26 March 
2013 (Annexes 6 and 7) 





drones > 5kg 










2016 t/m 06-10-2017 & 
Wet luchtvaart Geldend 
van 28-07-2018 t/m 
heden 








as for <4kg 
but with €1 
million 
coverage 
Austria Paragraph 146 ff of the 
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Ireland Irish Aviation Authority 
Small Unmanned 
Aircraft (Drones) and 









Table 6. Civil Liability Rules for Drones by Country.716 
 
It was highlighted that there is a lack of consistency in the way liability issues pertaining to the use of 
drones is dealt with across Member States. This is perhaps most notable with respect to the variance 
in terms of identifying the liable party where a remotely piloted drone causes damage to an 
individual or their property.  
Ultimately, the study made a number of policy recommendations. It outlined that: 
● Liability rules should be strict, not fault-based, and burden one party 
specifically, pursuant to a one-stop-shop approach. 
● Said Party should also be prima facie responsible for damages deriving from a 
defect in the device, or human errors in the operation of the drone. In such 
cases the party should then be allowed to sue in recourse the manufacturer 
and the pilot respectively. 
● If more parties were held liable they should be jointly and severally liable for 
the same damages. 
● The operator is the party best positioned to be held liable because he is best 
positioned to identify and manage the risk and acquire insurance.  
● In the case of a non-commercial use of drones, the owner might be more 
easily identifiable and thence be held responsible as opposed to the operator 
or jointly and severally obliged with him.717 
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The need to adapt to the increasingly widespread use of drone technology has also been noted 
within the relevant academic literature. Questions have been raised regarding liability issues, 
particularly with respect to harm caused to third parties, and the question of who should be 
responsible.718 Notably, it has been outlined that ‘international conventions that apply to drones are 
limited in their ability to effectively regulate drones’,719 highlighting that this is an issue with 
international significance. For example, on the Rome Convention, Hodgkinson and Johnston outline 
four relevant issues. First, it is not universally ratified, meaning that ‘it is not able to effectively 
regulate an internationally recognised framework for liability’.720 Second, it is outdated with respect 
to calculating levels of compensation.721 Third, under this convention ‘liability is determined 
according to the weight of aircraft (manned or unmanned)’.722 This is problematic because it could 
lead to a ‘significant imbalance between the damage caused and the extent of liability that attaches 
to that damage as even small drones can cause significant harm’.723 The fourth issue that is outlined 
is that ‘the strict liability regime may not be appropriate for remotely piloted aircraft. For example, if 
a drone is operating using defective software, the question arises as to whether the manufacturer or 
the remote operator is liable’.724 
It is also noted that despite the fact that the: 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
2009 (General Risks Convention) and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 2009 (Unlawful Interference Compensation 
Convention), modernised the Rome Convention, their applicability to drone 
regulation is limited because issues relating to strict liability and weight-based liability 
continue to be a part of these conventions.725  
In addition, these conventions are not, as yet, in force. The issue of mandatory insurance for drone 
use was also noted, highlighting significant variation of such requirements worldwide.726  
Hodgkinson and Johnston also noted that any level of liability that is to be imposed on the operators 
of a drone technology may need reassessing on the basis that ‘they require little human input to 
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operate’.727Also,  attempting to apply the law which relates to manned aircraft, to done technology is 
problematic because ‘[g]iven the drone and its operator are at some remove, there are potential 
issues associated with the application of a strict liability regime (such as the one currently applicable 
to some manned aircraft) to drones’.728 
More broadly, the importance of improving both the legal framework, as well as the technology itself 
was noted. It is intuitive that the development of technological solutions would ‘help minimize 
liability and provide solutions to issues such as bodily injury, property damages, and personal liability 
caused by crashes’.729 With this in mind, it was outlined that ‘as drone technology continues to 
develop and is used more in public and commercial applications, it is important that manufacturers 
create technical solutions to avoid liability, legislators create clear laws governing drone liability’.730 
Most recently, Pusztahelyi has suggested that in situations where injuries are sustained, ‘the EU 
policymakers prefers product liability in situations when the injured person can claim compensation 
on more bases of liability’.731 This falls under the provisions included within Council Directive 
No.85/374/EEC which concern liability for defective products which requires harmonisation across 
EU member states.732 However, with a focus on the approach that has been adopted in Hungary, it 
was outlined that ‘recently published judgments hold the operators (owners) liable more and more 
frequently and for less and less dangerous activity’.733 Further, it was noted that ‘most types of 
drones and their usage seem to be dangerous “enough” to establish the strict liability of the pilot’.734 
Finally, the potential for a third party’s right to privacy to be infringed by the use of drones is another 
potential liability issue. It is outlined that: 
 The operator and the remote pilot of an unmanned aircraft must be aware of the 
applicable Union and national rules relating to the intended operations, in particular 
with regard to safety, privacy, data protection, liability, insurance, security and 
environmental protection. The operator and the remote pilot must be able to ensure 
the safety of operation and safe separation of the unmanned aircraft from people on 
the ground and from other airspace users. This includes good knowledge of the 
operating instructions provided by the producer, of safe and environmentally-friendly 
use of unmanned aircraft in the airspace, and of all relevant functionalities of the 
unmanned aircraft and applicable rules of the air and ATM/ANS procedures.735 
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Consequently, it is clear that the ‘risk of infringement of privacy creates a need to establish a rule of 
strict liability to successfully protect these rights’.736 It is suggested that a ‘strict liability rule for 
drone usage would be a possible way to allocate fairly the damages and react to the above-
mentioned risk of immaterial harms of personal rights’.737  
 Insurance 
Commercial usage of drones must comply with Regulation (EC) 785/2004 on insurance for air carriers 
and aircraft operators.738 The regulation requires operators to purchase insurance in order to 
adequately compensate victims should the drone be involved in an accident. The minimum cover for 






1 < 500 0,75 
2 < 1 000 1,5 
3 < 2 700 3 
4 < 6 000 7 
5 < 12 000 18 
6 < 25 000 80 
7 < 50 000 150 
8 < 200 000 300 
9 < 500 000 500 
10 ≥ 500 000 700 
Table 7. Compulsory Insurance for Drones (Source: Regulation (EC) 785/2004) 
 
Third party liability insurance is designed to cover property damage on the ground or another aircraft 
or loss or bodily injury or death of people on the ground. Though some current general liability 
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policies may cover the liabilities that arise from the use of drones, the policy must still comply with 
Regulation (EC) 785/2004. Insurers are increasingly developing drone specific third-party insurance 
products. In addition to indemnity for bodily or property damage or losses, policies to cover GDPR 
breaches are also available.739 In some ways, the insurance industry has regulatory power over the 
drone operators who must comply with the policy terms to ensure continued coverage, and it would 
be likely that insurers would want operators to take all the necessary safety precautions available to 
them.740 Nonetheless, because these products are relatively new, it is likely that there may be 
uncertainty in the scope of coverage, resulting in commercial disputes should accidents occur.741 
Regulation (EC) 785/2004 also specifies minimum cover for passengers, baggage, and cargo, though 
it is unlikely drones for I&M would require these types of insurance cover because they would not be 
transporting any of the above.742 Though first-party insurance is not currently required for operating 
drones, I&M drone operators should consider purchasing such cover to cover damage or 
replacement of the drone.743 Furthermore, the pilot or operator may be the injured party in an 
operation, so this should also be a consideration.744 
To ensure that the insurance would cover each operation, the operator should inform the insurer or 
broker of all activities in which the drone may partake, check the policy language to see whether the 
proposed product would be sufficient, look out for any exclusions under which the insurance would 
not indemnify or conditions that must be fulfilled to maintain cover, and ensure the liability limit is 
sufficient for the risk of damage instead of purchasing the minimum amount required. Operators 
should also inform the insurer of any changes in circumstances to avoid the possibility that cover 
may be voided after having gone into effect.745 
 
2.2 Autonomous Road Vehicles 
Autonomous vehicles were first proposed in the 1940s, with serious research starting in the 1950s 
and 1960s.746 GM worked with RCA to develop a system where sensors were installed at the front of 
vehicles which interacted with wires laid on the road to create a steering system.747 In 1977, a team 
led by Sadayuki Tsugawa at the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory ‘presented the first visually 
guided autonomous vehicle that could record and process (on-board) pictures of lateral guide rails 
on the road via two cameras’.748 Around the same time, Hans Moravec and the Artificial Intelligence 
Lab at Stanford University successfully navigated a cart with camera onboard in an obstacle-filled 
room without human operation, though the vehicle only moved one metre every ten to 15 
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minutes.749 Technological advancements in the 1980s and cooperation between academia and 
industry led to rapid development.750 Industry preferred a system of ‘lateral guidance of cars using 
electromagnetic fields generated by cables in the road’ but the successful demonstration of 
autonomous lane changing and passing capability by Ernst Dickmanns of the University of the 
Federal Armed Forces in Munich and subsequently researchers in the United States and Italy shifted 
the focus to the type of autonomous driving that is being tested today.751 
Various benefits would stem from the development and availability of autonomous vehicles. For 
example, it is suggested that benefits would include a reduction in the number of ‘traffic fatalities 
and injuries, significant gains in individual productivity, unprecedented mobility for the elderly and 
disabled populations, greater flexibility in urban planning, and a reduction in harmful vehicle 
emissions’.752 With this in mind, it is important that this technology is both effectively developed, as 
well as regulated. 
It should be noted that land-based robots do not necessarily have to be in the form of what is 
popularly considered a vehicle that has wheels. As robots for infrastructure inspection and 
maintenance are likely to operate in commercial and off-road settings, many of the regulations 
concerning autonomous vehicles may not apply. Further, some robots that operate on land are not 
even considered vehicles and are crawlers that move with robotic limbs.753 A motor vehicle is 
defined as ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle, intended or adapted for use on roads’ under English 
Road Traffic Act 1988 section 185(1) and ‘any power-driven vehicle which is normally used for 
carrying persons or goods by road or for drawing, on the road, vehicles used for the carriage of 
persons or goods’ under Article 1(p) of the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic. While neither require 
wheels, they do limit the definition to those that travel on the roads and be carrying passengers or 
cargo. Insofar as the crawler is designed to travel the roads and carry passengers or goods, the laws 
and regulations on autonomous vehicles would apply to them. Otherwise, they are likely currently 
largely unregulated or regulated only by industry standards. Nonetheless, this section provides an 
overview of the current safety, regulatory, and legal liability issues concerning autonomous vehicles 
because even if they may not apply to all robots for infrastructure inspection and maintenance, they 
offer useful guidance and may be helpful in determining the specific measures that need to be 
developed to regulate and allocate liability for robots that operate in specific commercial domains. 
 
2.2.1 Achieving Safety Assurance  
Autonomous vehicles are being developed by many traditional car manufacturers and technology 
companies worldwide, and Europe is not an exception.754 As roughly 95% of road traffic accidents 
involve human error, the use of autonomous vehicles where the computer is responsible for driving 
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may significantly increase the safety of road travel.755 The technology may also facilitate mobility for 
people with disabilities or the elderly.756 Autonomous vehicles are also likely to be more 
environmentally friendly due to the decrease in congestion and the associated development of 
electrical cars.757 
 
Because of their imminent introduction onto the roads, whether as consumer products or for 
commercial purposes such as I&M, Europe has been engaged in determining the appropriate 
regulations for vehicles that traverse the roadways. Although autonomous cars and connected cars 
are both being developed and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there is a distinction 
between the two. Connected cars are those that can communicate with other vehicles (Vehicle-to-
Vehicle) or specialised infrastructure (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) to adapt its driving based on outside 
conditions and avoid collisions.758 Autonomous vehicles refer to cars that are driven by the on board 
technology, which does not necessarily need to communicate with others.759 While the two terms 
are not synonymous and need not exist simultaneously, manufacturers have found network 
connections to essential for autonomous vehicles to function properly.760 Understanding the 
intimate connection between the two, the European Commission has taken an ‘integrated approach 
between automation and connectivity in vehicles’.761 
 
Vehicles can be divided into six levels of autonomy: 
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Figure 7. Levels of Driving Automation (Credit SAE) 
While fully autonomous vehicles are not available to the public, Level 2 cars are currently being 
driven on public roads.762 In 2017, the EC estimated that Level 4 vehicles will be available in 2020 but 
fully autonomous vehicles would not be deployed for up to another decade.763 
Safety assurance, the aim of avoiding collision, of autonomous vehicles is a difficult task. The vehicle 
should be safe to use and keep a safe distance from all other objects which share the same road with 
the vehicle. Using machine learning and non-deterministic based decision making approach for 
autonomous systems led to the new question of whether the vehicle is safe enough. As such, 
researchers for autonomous systems now try to answer the question of “How safe is safe enough?”. 
Figure 8 displays the geographical distribution of autonomous safety projects throughout the world.  
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Figure 8. World Map Showing Projects by Country (State for US-based Projects) Source: CAR 2015. 
Mainly, there are two families of approaches to making autonomous vehicles safe: the first approach 
learns from previous accidents and tries to put barriers for the safe state, and the second category is 
based on dynamic risk assessment.764 
2.2.2 Standard and Certificate 
 2.2.2.1 ISO 26262 
ISO 26262, an international standard for road vehicles (Functional safety), was defined by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) in 2011. ISO 26262 covers the entire product 
development of EE (Electrical/Electronic) automotive products.765 
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 Wardzioski, A. (2008, September). Safety assurance strategies for autonomous vehicles. In International 
Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (pp. 277-290). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
765
 Palin, R., Ward, D., Habli, I., & Rivett, R. (2011). ISO 26262 safety cases: Compliance and assurance. 
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Figure 9. ISO26262 Parts (ISO 26262). 
The ten parts of ISO 26262 are as follows: 
1. Vocabulary: define abbreviations, terms and acronyms of the different used 
terminologies. 
2. Management of functional safety: treats both aspects of the management of 
safety requirements:  projects and organizational point of view. 
3. Concept phase: This part initiate the safety lifecycle, by describing the project 
definition and the safety requirements and criteria for the whole project. 
4. Product development at the system level: detailed requirements analysis, 
system synthesis, functional allocation, and V&V (Validation and verification). 
5. Product development at the hardware level: covers the system design and 
implementation of hardware. 
6. Product development at the software level: covers the system design and 
implementation of software. 
7. Production and operation: defines the requirements for system production, 
operation installation, servicing, and decommission. 
8. Supporting processes: defines the requirement of the development effort 
form support part, including the used tool, the documentation and 
management process.  
9. Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-oriented and safety-oriented 
analysis: defines and the process of safety requirement allocation and things 
related to the ASILs. 
10. Guideline on ISO 26262 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 105/151 
 
2.2.2.2 J3016: Taxonomy and Definition for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems 
for On-Road Motor Vehicles 
The SAE international's new standard J3016 is a new standard aimed to define a taxonomy for terms 
and concepts related to On-Road vehicles automated systems. Standardising the levels of driving 
automation and supporting terms serves several purposes, 766 including: 
 
1- Clarifying the role of the (human) driver, if any, during driving automation system 
engagement. 
2- Answering questions of scope when it comes to developing laws, policies, 
regulations, and standards. 
3- Providing a useful framework for driving automation specifications and technical 
requirements. 
4- Providing clarity and stability in communications on the topic of driving 
automation, as well as a useful short-hand that saves considerable time and effort. 
 
The J3016 refers to the human as the main actor of the system which contains the driving system 
and other objects.   
2.2.2.3 Future Certification of Automated/Autonomous Driving Systems 
 
The vehicle safety certificate label certifies that the vehicle meets the current operational country 
safety standards. The certificate is mainly used by technicians to identify the safety related 
information and guarantees that the developed system meets the safety requirements. The 
objectives of the certificate are to maintain safety, protect consumers and certify industry standard.  
Traditional safety standards define a set of performance criteria and approve test methods to 
evaluate the safety level of the car. The following figure represents an example of a tyre test with 
traditional approach.767 
 
                                                          
766
 Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles 
J3016_201806. 
767
  Informal document GRVA-02-09 2nd GRVA, 28 January – 1 February 2019 Agenda item 5 (a), OICA 
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Figure 10. Vehicle Tyre Test With Traditional Approach 
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Table 8. Comparison of Safety Principles in Different Countries (OICA). 
Experts from the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA) proposed a 
new vision for certification of autonomous cars.768 The approach is called Three Pillars: the 
Audit/assessment, Physical certification and Real world test drive (APR).  
 
2.2.3 Legislation and Policy 
As was the case when discussing drone technology, it is now important to consider the legislation 
and policy that apply to the autonomous vehicles. Once more, the first issue that will be considered 
is the relevant international regime that is in place. Second will be a discussion of relevant EU 
regulation. Third is a discussion of national laws which regulate autonomous vehicles in a handful of 
EU Member States. Finally, issues relating to the apportionment of liability which could stem from 
the use of autonomous vehicles will be considered. 
 
2.2.3.1. International Regime 
The Convention on Road Traffic, otherwise known as the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic (Vienna 
Convention), was concluded in 1968 and came into force in 1977.769 All EU Member States are 
signatories except Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta.770 The Vienna Convention requires that ‘[e]very 
moving vehicle or combination of vehicles shall have a driver’,771 and a driver is defined as ‘any 
person who drives a motor vehicle or other vehicle (including a cycle), or who guides cattle, singly or 
in herds, or flocks, or draught, pack or saddle animals on a road’.772 A plain reading of the language 
indicates a human needs to be the driver of a vehicle to conform to the Convention and an artificial 
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 Informal document GRVA-02-09 2nd GRVA, 28 January – 1 February 2019 Agenda item 5 (a), OICA 
769
 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic (8 November 1968) 1042 UNTS 17. 
770
 United Nations Treaty Collection <treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-B-
19&chapter=11>. 
771
 Vienna Convention Article 8(1). 
772
 Vienna Convention Article 1(v). 
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agent would not suffice, which would exclude autonomous vehicles.773 However, it has also been 
argued, whether persuasively is another matter, that a legal person would also satisfy the definition 
of a person.774 While it was considered relatively detailed and advanced at the time of its drafting, 
the Vienna Convention was unable to foresee the creation of autonomous vehicles without human 
drivers facilitated by the ‘jump in technological evolution in parallel with the appearance of new 
tendencies in the field of motor vehicle improvements’.775 European states realised this provision 
was causing them to lag behind the United States in creating a regulatory environment conducive to 
developing autonomous cars as the latter is not a signatory.776  To keep up with technological 
advances, this provision was amended in 2016 to allow for the use of autonomous vehicles on the 
roads.777 The additional language states: 
5bis. Vehicle systems which influence the way vehicles are driven shall be deemed 
to be in conformity with paragraph 5 of this Article and with paragraph 1 of Article 
13, when they are in conformity with the conditions of construction, fitting and 
utilization according to international legal instruments concerning wheeled vehicles, 
equipment and parts which can be fitted and/or be used on wheeled vehicles* 
Vehicle systems which influence the way vehicles are driven and are not in 
conformity with the aforementioned conditions of construction, fitting and 
utilization, shall be deemed to be in conformity with paragraph 5 of this Article and 
with paragraph 1 of Article 13, when such systems can be overridden or switched 
off by the driver.778 
Under this new provision, as long as the autonomous vehicle technology meets international 
standards or if the automated mode can be switched off, autonomous vehicles would be allowed to 
be driven on public roads of states that are members of the Convention as long as there is a human 
driver ready to take over. It has been noted that further technological developments leading to Level 
5 autonomous vehicles that do not expect humans to be attentive becoming the norm would 
necessitate future amendments to the Vienna Convention.779 
Though most of the research on autonomous vehicles has been on the carriage of passengers, 
driverless cars will also be able to be used to transport cargo. In this situation, the Convention on the 
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) signed in 1956 may become 
relevant. The CMR ‘appl*ies+ to every contract for the carriage of goods by road in vehicles for 
reward, when the place of taking over of the goods and the place designated for delivery, as 
specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting 
country, irrespective of the place of residence and the nationality of the parties’.780 The definition of 
vehicle in the CMR does not explicitly require human drivers, but it has been argued persuasively 
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 Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Seventy-third session, Automated Driving, 
Informal document No. 4, 14 September 2016. 
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 Agnes B Juhasz, ‘The Regulatory Framework and Models of Self-Driving Cars’ (2018) 52 Zbornik Radova 
1371, 1374. 
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that based on an evolutionary interpretation of the CMR, the Convention would be applicable to 
autonomous vehicles carrying goods internationally.781 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which includes states in Europe, Asia, 
and Africa, has been involved in fostering the development of  autonomous vehicles since 2014.782 In 
June 2019, the UNECE World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), under the 
leadership of the EU, China, Japan, and the US, issued a framework to guide the future work of the 
UN on autonomous vehicles.783 It states: 
This Framework document’s primary purpose is to provide guidance to WP.29 
subsidiary Working Parties (GRs) by identifying key principles for the safety and 
security of automated/autonomous vehicles of levels 3 and higher. The framework 
document also defines the work priorities for WP.29 and indicates the deliverables, 
timelines and working arrangements for those certain work products related to 
those priorities.784 
The World Forum’s Working Party on Automated/Autonomous and Connected Vehicles is continuing 
the work with the establishment of technical groups tasked to explore issues related to autonomous 
vehicles, including cybersecurity and event data recorders.785 
The lack of binding regulations on the international level allows for flexibility at the regional and 
national levels but could also create divergences that would need to be harmonised especially when 
data generated and collected by robots would inevitably cross national borders. Efforts to harmonise 
regulations internationally would need to understand and respect the values and principles of the 
jurisdictions that led to the frameworks and rules they created in order to reach a shared buy-in that 
would result in consistent implementations and interpretations.786 
 
2.2.3.2 The EU Position 
Although the EU was late to enter the development of autonomous vehicles, it has since been 
keeping pace or leading the pack globally.787 In April 2016, EU Member States signed the Declaration 
of Amsterdam on cooperation in the field of connected and automated driving, memorialising the EU 
Commission and the Member States’ shared objective of developing autonomous vehicles in the 
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EU.788 However, it has been suggested that its ‘indications on the future legal framework are rather 
generic’.789  
GEAR 2030, also known as the High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of 
the Automotive Industry in the European Union, drafted a discussion paper for the European 
Commission detailing the need to create a legal framework for automated vehicles.790 In October 
2017, the High Level Group released its final report on the future of the automotive industry in the 
EU and the need to foster the development of new technologies with a ‘shared strategy on 
automated and connected vehicles’.791 
Beyond EU Member States, in March 2017, EEA members Norway, and Switzerland signed a Letter of 
Intent ‘to intensify cooperation on testing of automated road transport in cross border test sites’.792 
In May 2017, the European Commission signalled its commitment to connected and automated 
mobility as part of a grand plan for European transport.793 As part of this initiative, the Juncker 
Commission, in May 2018, reiterated the EU’s aim to ‘make Europe a world leader in the deployment 
of connected and automated mobility, making a step-change in Europe in bringing down the number 
of road fatalities, reducing harmful emissions from transport and reducing congestion’ in a 
communication entitled On the road to automated mobility: An EU strategy for mobility of the 
future.794 
One of the most instrumental acts by the EU was the overhaul of the approval of vehicles in the EU 
and combining it with market surveillance in 2018.795 Vehicles after September 2020 that are 
certified in one Member State do not need to undergo another certification within the EU.796 This 
new approach will allow the EU Commission to harmonise technical standards on safety across the 
EU, including those relevant to autonomous vehicle technology. While new vehicular technologies 
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such as autonomous cars were already able to go through a certification process prior to the new 
regulation, this overhaul requires Member States to be consistent in their processes.797 It has been 
noted that the increased complexity of the autonomous vehicle technology may lead to growing 
technical errors, which highlights the need for harmonisation of standards.798 
 Testing 
Testing of autonomous vehicles in Europe has been seen as lagging behind other major markets such 
as the US and China.799 This lag has been attributed to the fact that ‘Europe emphasises more on 
protecting citizens from technological risks’.800 It was not until the Vienna Convention as amended 
that autonomous vehicles could be tested on public roads, and even now, unlike in other 
jurisdictions, there must be a driver in the vehicle during the testing.801 Because of the requirement 
that there be a driver in the vehicle except for a few exceptions such as the UK, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, fully autonomous robots for I&M could not currently be tested on public roads. 
Manufacturers would need to either design the robots to fit a driver who can take over or limit their 
testing to private property. Consequently, in most jurisdictions, autonomous vehicles for I&M that 
are meant to operate without humans on board must be tested on private property for the time 
being.802 
 Data Privacy 
There are no specific regulations concerning data privacy and the use of autonomous vehicles, but all 
autonomous vehicles will have to abide by the GDPR once they are deployed on the roads.803 
Although many European automotive trade associations attempted to distinguish between personal 
data and technical data and argued that only the former would be protected by data privacy laws, 
this position has been refuted because technical data could still be linked to individual users, 
however indirectly.804 The use of autonomous vehicles lead to the collection of various types of 
information not required for traditional vehicles because of the need for interactions with the 
environment.805 Autonomous vehicles capture data in order to determine the best course of action 
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to take while driving, such as steering and braking.806 Data that autonomous vehicles could 
potentially capture can be divided into external and internal. External data include the road 
conditions and the presence of pedestrians or other vehicles, while internal data can include 
identifiable information about the drivers or passengers.807 The latter could lead to profiling and 
prediction that could potentially be used to manipulate the vehicle user’s behaviour.808 The security 
of the data is a particular concern when vehicle technologies have to be compatible with each other 
or the infrastructure in order to communicate, which could lead to the use of widely accepted and 
stable software that is outdated and full of vulnerabilities.809 In addition to data collection, the 
storage of the data is also a privacy issue that needs to be addressed.810 The threat of not having 
ownership and control of one’s data is a real concern, even if the data is used to create a better 
experience for the user.811  
In the context of autonomous vehicles for I&M, privacy concerns with internal data should not be a 
concern because the vehicles would not be occupied by people. External data would also be unlikely 
to infringe on privacy rights because the sensors would be capturing data on the infrastructure on 
which the robot is working and not unrelated third parties. However, like the case with drones, it 
may be possible that the autonomous vehicle could inadvertently capture data of people it 
encounters to and from the work site. Any data gathered in this manner would have to be treated in 
accordance with the GDPR. 
In October 2017, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), the French data 
privacy authority, published a compliance package for connected cars and data privacy.812 The 
guidelines cover the ‘processing of personal data collected via vehicle sensors, telematics boxes, or 
mobile applications, whether the data are processed inside the vehicles or exported to a centralised 
server’.813 It provides guidance on how to comply with the provisions of the GDPR in different 
scenarios depending on whether the data is processed by the vehicle, transmitted to a service 
provider with no automatic actions triggered in the vehicle, and transmitted to a service provider 
that triggers automatic action by the vehicle.814 
The International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications of the International 
Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners also published a Working Paper on 
Connected Vehicles in 2018 that specifically addresses ways autonomous vehicle manufacturers can 
maintain data privacy though it does not specifically reference the GDPR.815 
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2.2.3.3 National Laws 
As shown in the previous section, although the EU has shown its commitment to play an 
instrumental role in facilitating the development of autonomous vehicles in Europe, much of its work 
has not been in the direct regulation of manufacturers or operators of autonomous vehicles. Rather, 
European institutions have been engaged in attempting to bring together the relevant parties and try 
to harmonise the efforts throughout the EU. 
To encourage the development of autonomous vehicle technology in the EU while ensuring the 
safety of the public, Member States have drafted their own legislation and guidelines to regulate 
autonomous vehicles within their borders.816 Because of the nature of technological development, 
much of the regulatory measures are designed as what can be termed ‘responsive regulation’ that is 
flexible and can accommodate advances in technology rather than the traditional command-and-
control approach.817 
 Austria 
In June 2016, the Austrian Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology released the Action Plan 
for Automated Driving.818 In the same year, the Austrian Motor Vehicles Amendment Act and the 
Automatic Driving Regulation were passed to respond to the development of autonomous 
vehicles.819 The new laws allowed for the trialling of autonomous vehicles in limited cases provided 
applications with information such as the system being tested, testing site, testing driver, and 
insurance are submitted prior to the testing.820 Only self-driving buses and highway lane changing 
assistance systems could be trialled.821 During the trial, the driver must be vigilant and is responsible 
for taking over controls when necessary.822 The Ministry for Traffic, Innovation and Technology 
published a Code of Conduct for further guidance on testing.823 In March 2019, the regulations were 
amended for trialling of more functions by the automated system and of autonomous parking.824 
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 Belgium 
In 2016, the Ministry of Mobility of Belgium published a Code of Good Practice for companies wishing 
to conduct trials of autonomous vehicles on public roads.825 The code was based on the Code of 
Conduct for Testing issued by the UK the previous year.826 The testing driver must have the 
appropriate license for the type of vehicle and training, and the trialling organisation must conduct a 
risk analysis and develop risk management strategies.827 The vehicle and driver must also be 
insured.828 The Code of Conduct requires that when conducting trials, ‘a fully automated vehicle has 
the facility to resume manual control at any time’.829 
Prior to May 2018, Belgian law requires all vehicles to have drivers.830 And driver is defined as 
anyone who drives a vehicle.831 De Bruyne and Tanghe conclude that based on interpretations of the 
Belgian Court of Cassation, for autonomous vehicles, ‘the person who is responsible for driving is the 
person whose task it is to supervise the operating system…*and+ must at least have the possibility to 
influence the movements of his vehicle’.832 In general, the driver may be liable for accidents even if 
the conduct was performed by the automated system, ‘as art 8.3 of the Code stipulates that the 
driver needs to have his vehicle well under control at all times’.833 
A Royal Decree came into force in May 2018 that allowed for time limited exemptions to the 
provision mandating a human driver inside the vehicle subject to approval by the Ministry of 
Mobility and monitoring of the vehicle remotely.834 As such, autonomous vehicles without humans 
inside are now allowed on Belgian public roads for the purpose of trialling. 
 Czech Republic 
The Ministry of Transport released the Action Plan for the Deployment of Intelligent Transport 
Systems (ITS) in the Czech Republic until 2020 (with the prospect of 2050) in June 2016.835 The report 
specifically cites supporting the development of autonomous vehicles as one of its objectives.836 
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In 2018, an amendment to the Act on Operation Surface Communications was introduced.837 The bill 
would widen the definition of ‘driver’ to include an operator of an autonomous vehicle who is ready 
to take over the controls.838 It also included safety specifications the vehicle must meet.839 While the 
Ministry of Transport and private companies have been supportive of closed testing sites, it is 
unclear whether there have been any testing performed on public roads thus far.840 
 Germany 
Germany was the first European state to amend its regulatory framework to welcome the 
introduction of autonomous vehicles.841 Although the SAE classification of autonomous vehicles has 
been largely accepted by governments, industry, and academics, the German Association of the 
Automotive Industry uses a slightly different standard: 
 
 0 Driver only 
 1 Assisted 
2 Partial driving automation 
3 High driving automation 
4 Full driving automation 
5 Driverless842  
 
In July 2016, a committee of 14 members appointed by the German Federal Minister of Transport 
and Digital Infrastructure was tasked with developing a code of ethics for Level 4 and Level 5 
autonomous vehicles in Germany.843 The code was released in June 2017 and consists of 20 ethical 
guidelines designed to influence future regulation in Germany.844 One committee member notes that 
‘no legislation in Germany will be able to completely neglect or circumvent it’.845 Nonetheless, the 
ethical guidelines have been criticised for missing two major principles: 
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Two glaring omissions from the guidelines are the principles of transparency and 
trust in the development of autonomous vehicle software. Both transparency and 
trust are critical and related: transparency will lead to an entry level of trust, both for 
regulators and the general public.846 
 
The German government has also been active in facilitating the development of autonomous 
vehicles through legal amendments. In order to conform domestic law to the newly amended Vienna 
Convention that permits autonomous vehicle technology to be used on public roads, the German 
government enacted a law on December 13, 2016.847 In 2017, the Road Transportation Act was 
amended, which now ‘sets legal requirements for the operation of highly and fully automated 
vehicles and mainly preserves the existing liability and insurance framework, characterised by a 
combination of strict liability of the vehicle owner and fault-based liability of the (human) driver’.848 
Autonomous vehicles are more clearly defined in this law than in the UK and have the following 
characteristics: ‘with full control of the driving task’, ‘capable of conforming to traffic regulations in 
full automation’, ‘that allow the driver to manually override or deactivate the automation at any 
time’, ‘with the capacity to recognize that it is necessary for the driver to take control and deactivate 
the automation’, ‘with the visual and acoustic and tactual indication that the driver shall take control 
with sufficient time for the driver to take control’, and ‘with the capacity to indicate wrong use to 
one of the system descriptions’.849 
 
While testing an autonomous vehicle, there must be a driver who can take over control from the 
computer.850 The driver is obligated to be attentive and ‘must not rely entirely on the automated 
driving system’.851 The trialling driver is required to have insurance cover and would be liable for 
accidents while the vehicle is under human control, but unlike the clarity offered in the UK, the law is 
not specific on who would be liable if an accident were to occur while the vehicle is in autonomous 
mode.852 It has been suggested, however, that the manufacturer would be liable under such 
circumstances per general product liability law.853 The law requires the installation of a black box in 
the autonomous vehicle to collect data that would aid the determination of the cause of accidents, 
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including whether the technology or human was in control.854 To assuage data privacy concerns, the 
law requires data to be deleted after six months unless there were an accident.855 
 Lithuania 
The Lithuania government has been eager to have organisations and developers test autonomous 
cars in the state with ongoing discussions with Poland, Latvia, and Estonia to create a corridor for 
testing.856 In December 2017, a new law was passed that allows for autonomous vehicles to operate 
without a human driver in the car.857 The new legislation was designed to encourage testing in the 
state.858 The Road Administration has also touted the country’s highway as an ideal place for 
autonomous vehicles testing.859 
 Poland 
In January 2018, the Law on Electromobility and Alternative Fuels was passed. It amends the Polish 
Road Transport Act to define an autonomous vehicle as one that is ‘equipped with technology and 
systems which control the vehicle's movement and...allows the vehicle to drive without any driver 
interaction’.860 As a result, only electric or hybrid cars could meet the definition.861 To conduct trials 
on public roads, the developer must submit an application, which includes proof of insurance.862 The 
owners of property along the planned testing route are given an opportunity to voice their 
objections.863 During the actual test, a driver must be in the vehicle ready to take control at any 
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time.864 The road on which the test is conducted must also be fitted with signs warning others of the 
ongoing tests.865 
 Netherlands 
In 2015, the Decree on Exemption of Exceptional Transport was amended.866 This is a different 
approach from other jurisdictions because ‘instead of drafting extensive new laws or formulating 
non-binding regulations, the Dutch Vehicle Authority (RDW) has been given the competence to grant 
exemptions from certain laws if these exemptions are useful for the testing of automated vehicle 
functions’.867 There are no set criteria for the granting of exemptions, but the RDW would review the 
application, including the test plan, risk analysis, and insurance.868 If it is satisfied, the vehicle would 
be permitted to be tested on a closed site first.869 If successful, then an exemption is granted for 
trialling on public roads subject to conditions set by the RDW, which could include ‘type of road and 
the weather conditions under which testing is allowed’ or ‘additional insurance’.870 Traditionally 
under Dutch case law, the definition of driver is relatively wide and could include passengers or 
pedestrians who influence the speed or direction of the vehicle by operating the controls.871 
However, for the sake of clarity, the Dutch Road Traffic Act was amended in October 2018 to allow 
autonomous vehicles to be tested without the presence of a human driver on board.872 
 Hungary 
In 2017, the Ministerial Decree K6HEM No. 5/1990 of 12 April 1990 on the technical inspection of 
road vehicles and the Ministerial Decree K6HtM No. 6/1990 of 12 April 1990 on the technical 
conditions for placing and keeping road vehicles in circulation were amended to accommodate the 
testing of autonomous cars.873 The term used in the Hungarian regulations is ‘autonomous vehicle for 
experimental purposes’.874 These vehicles are ‘aimed at the development of partially or fully 
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automated operation’ and must have a qualified driver who can take over control of the vehicle.875 
To conduct trials on public roads, the organisation must apply for approval and the vehicle can only 
be registered if it meets ISO Standard 26262, titled Road vehicles – Functional safety.876 The software 
for the automated system must also pass a tested via simulation, test bench, and at a closed road or 
site before the vehicle can go on public roads, and there must be comprehensive insurance cover for 
the entire period.877 
 United Kingdom 
In 2015, the UK established a new governmental agency to oversee the development of autonomous 
vehicles. Named the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAV), it is part of both the 
Department for Transport and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy.878 CCAV 
‘aims to make the UK a premier development location for connected and automated vehicles’.879 
The CCAV has thus far released four guidance and regulations: Prototype vehicles: Regulations for 
manufacturers on constructing and testing prototype vehicles on roads, Trialling automated vehicle 
technologies in public, Connected and autonomous vehicle research and development projects, and 
Principles of cyber security for connected and automated vehicles.880 The eight cyber security 
principles that are designed ‘for use throughout the automotive sector’881 are: 
1. Organisational security is owned, governed and promoted at board level 
2. Security risks are assessed and managed appropriately and proportionately, including 
those specific to the supply chain 
3. Organisations need product aftercare and incident response to ensure systems are secure 
over their lifetime 
4. all organisations, including sub-contractors, suppliers and potential 3rd parties, work 
together to enhance the security of the system 
5. Systems are designed using a defence-in-depth approach 
6. The security of all software is managed throughout its lifetime 
7. The storage and transmission of data is secure and can be controlled 
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8. the system is designed to be resilient to attacks and respond appropriately when its 
defences or sensors fail882 
On 19 July 2018, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 received royal assent.883 It is a 
forward thinking law because it will not be in force until a later date deemed by the Secretary of 
State for Transport when secondary legislation is issued.884 When autonomous vehicles are ready to 
hit the road, the law will be ready to ensure there is certainty on insurance issues related to the use 
of autonomous vehicles. The Act does not transform the current regime but instead clarifies the 
insurance liability allocation in the current regulatory environment.885 The Department for Transport 
and the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles conducted a consultation on autonomous 
vehicles and decided that this would be the more suitable model instead of the originally proposed 
product liability regime.886 The product liability model would have compelled the driver to purchase 
product liability insurance in addition to traditional motor insurance.887 
The Act provides for a ‘single insurer model’ where the driver would continue to only deal with the 
motor insurer.888 Vehicles are ‘automated vehicles’ subject to this Act if they are determined by the 
Secretary of State to be  ‘designed or adapted to be capable, in at least some circumstances or 
situations, of safely driving themselves’ and ‘may lawfully be used when driving themselves, in at 
least some circumstances or situations, on roads or other public places in Great Britain’.889 This 
language was meant to cover Level 4 and Level 5 autonomous vehicles.890 When an automated 
vehicle ‘driving itself’ causes an accident, ‘the vehicle is insured’, and ‘an insured person or any other 
person suffers damage’, the insurer is liable.891 This means that the insurer would pay for the loss at 
the outset, but if it determines that the vehicle technology is at fault and the manufacturer should be 
liable, then it could claim the damages with the manufacturer.892 The insurer can also seek 
contribution from the injured party based on the theory of contributory negligence or from the 
person responsible for altering the vehicle software or failing to install critical updates if they were 
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the causes of the accident.893 If the accident occurred ‘wholly due to the person’s negligence in 
allowing the vehicle to begin driving itself when it was not appropriate to do so’, then the insurer 
would also not be liable.894 The law is silent on how liability would be determined, and there is 
concern that more clarity is needed regarding contributory negligence, causation, and the type of 
data collected by the vehicle to assist with this task and how long to retain them, issues that will 
need to be addressed.895 As technology advances, the law may need to be amended, as ‘*i+n the 
more distant future - when fully driverless vehicles dominate - insurance taken out by the individual 
might complete its evolution into a transport policy for first-party loss only’ as only the car 
manufacturer would require third-party insurance to cover product liability.896 
As this law is not yet in force, it would not be applicable to autonomous vehicles currently being 
trialled on public roads. Parties trialling autonomous vehicles would still have to purchase 
appropriate insurance, ensure the vehicle is roadworthy by first testing on closed roads, and make 
sure there is a human driver inside the vehicle or outside who can remotely take control at any 
moment per the Code of Practice: Automated vehicle trialling published by the CCAV in February 
2019, which  was an update to The Pathway to Driverless Cars: A Code of Practice for Testing 
published in 2015 by the Department of Transport.897 The vehicle must also be fitted with a black box 
to record data in case of accidents.898 Human drivers are not required to be in the autonomous 
vehicles in the UK because it is not bound by the Vienna Convention, having signed but not ratified 
the instrument.899 The trialling organisation should inform the CCAV before road testing and need to 
develop a safety case and safety contingency before the actual testing.900 Though exemptions can be 
granted for prototypes, test vehicles must, in general, comply with the Road Vehicles (Construction 
and Use) Regulations 1986, Road Vehicles Authorised Weight Regulations 1998, and Road Vehicles 
                                                          
893
 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 Sec 3(1); Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 Sec 4. 
894
 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 Sec 3(2). Different from the UK regime, Melinda Florina Lohmann 
advocates for ‘a system of strict liability of the vehicle holder for damage caused by the operation of his 
vehicle, paired with mandatory insurance and a direct legal claim of the victim against the insurer’. Melinda 
Florina Lohmann, ‘Liability Issues Concerning Self-Driving Vehicles’ (2016) 7 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 335, 338. 
895
 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Analysis of Responses to the 
Preliminary Consultation Paper’ <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf> 85-98. 
896
 Alex Glassbrook, The Law of Driverless Cars: An Introduction (Law Brief Publishing 2017). 
897





 Lucy McCormick, ‘Testing Autonomous Vehicles’ in Matthew Channon, Lucy McCormick and Kyriaki Noussia 
(eds), The Law and Autonomous Vehicles (Informa Law 2019). 
899Lucy McCormick, ‘Testing Autonomous Vehicles’ in Matthew Channon, Lucy McCormick and Kyriaki Noussia 
(eds), The Law and Autonomous Vehicles (Informa Law 2019). 
900




[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 124/151 
Lighting Regulations 1989.901  In October 2019, high profile testing of Level 4 autonomous vehicles 
were conducted in London.902 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission have been 
commissioned by the CCAV to review the regulatory framework of autonomous vehicles in the UK.903 
Consisting of three rounds of consultations from 2018 to 2021, the final recommendations are due 
to be released in 2021.904 The first consultation focused on safety and civil and criminal liability, the 
second covers ‘remotely operated fleets of automated vehicles and their relationship with public 
transport’ and is awaiting comments, and the third consultation will consolidate the comments to 
form final proposals.905 In the first consultation paper, the Law Commissions introduced the role of 
‘driver-in-charge’ who would be in the vehicle while it is in Level 4 automated mode and be fully 
qualified to intervene if necessary.906 The second consultation paper introduces the idea of Highly 
Automated Road Passenger Services (HARPS), which ‘refers to a service which uses highly automated 
vehicles to supply road journeys to passengers without a human driver or user-in-charge’.907 They 
propose a new national regulatory system using a single safety standard to license operators.908 In 
this transportation model, there would be no driver-in-charge; instead, the vehicles would be 
monitored by remote supervisors.909 Just as with the first consultation paper, the focus of HARPS is 
on passengers, though the Law Commissions are open to comments addressing the transportation of 
freight, which could be relevant to vehicles for I&M that need to transport supplies for 
maintenance.910 
2.2.3.4 Liability Issues 
The development of a coherent, uniform liability regime which applies to the operation of 
Autonomous Vehicles (AV) is unsurprisingly limited when compared with that which applies to RPAS. 
                                                          
901





 James Allen, ‘Autonomous Taxis Have Made Their Driverless Debut in London: Are London Cabbies' Days 
Numbered? (Sunday Times 8 October 2019) <www.driving.co.uk/news/autonomous-taxis-made-driverless-
debut-london/>. 
903
 Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Current Project Status’ <www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-
vehicles/>. 
904
 Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Current Project Status’ <www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-
vehicles/>. 
905
 Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Current Project Status’ <www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-
vehicles/>. 
906
 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Summary of the Analysis of Responses 
to the Preliminary Consultation Paper’ (19 June 2019) <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf>. 
907
 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Summary of the Analysis of Responses 
to the Preliminary Consultation Paper’ (19 June 2019) <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf> 1. 
908Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Summary of the Analysis of Responses 
to the Preliminary Consultation Paper’ (19 June 2019) <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf> 9. 
909Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Summary of the Analysis of Responses 
to the Preliminary Consultation Paper’ (19 June 2019) <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf> 13. 
910
 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Automated Vehicles: Summary of the Analysis of Responses 
to the Preliminary Consultation Paper’ (19 June 2019) <s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf> 2. 
[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 125/151 
This is primarily based on the fact that the state of the technology itself is at a far earlier stage of 
development than is the case for RPAS, which are already widely used.  
This is an important issue to consider on the basis that it is intuitive that ‘decisions made by an AV in 
the face of an unavoidable collision will result in questions of liability that courts and legislatures 
have not heretofore faced’.911 The problem is that ‘unlike conventional vehicles, AV crashes can be 
caused by the software components of the operating system-the hardware and software that 
execute the dynamic driving task’.912 Of particular note is the risk that ‘the algorithms in the vehicles’ 
on-board computers will result in some innocent person being selected as the victim of the crash’.913 
As a result, it is suggested that existing ‘theories of tort ... will not sufficiently address this situation, 
because those theories look for a liable party based upon control of the vehicle's design or 
manufacture, or the use of the vehicle by a consumer, neither of which will apply to an autonomous 
vehicle’.914 However, it is also noted that there is a need to balance the interest of providing 
protection to victims with ‘protecting the autonomous vehicle industry, which will be a clear benefit 
to society, from debilitating absolute liability’.915 On this point, the European Added value 
assessment suggests that:  
 
[I]t is necessary to revise the current legislative EU framework for liability rules and 
insurance for connected and autonomous vehicles. Not only would revision ensure 
legal coherence and better safeguarding of consumers rights but it would also be 
likely to generate economic added value.916 
 
Further, a 2016 report on cross-border road traffic accidents within the EU requested by the JURI 
committee provides examples of liability related issues which could arise in such circumstances.917 
The report highlights a number of ways which accidents involving AVs would interact with existing 
legislation.918 This is likely to lead to a lack of clarity in terms of how such accidents would be dealt 
with from a legal perspective, with the primary focus on where and how parties would go about 
bringing actions against those liable for damage or injury suffered where multiple jurisdictions could 
be available. For example, it is noted that: 
  
For a victim of a traffic accident in which autonomous technologies were involved, it 
may be difficult, costly, and time consuming to identify the exact cause of the 
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accident, to provide proof of that cause, and consequently to decide against whom to 
bring a liability claim (the keeper of a car or its liability insurer on the one hand, or a 




Some European jurisdictions provide very short limitation periods for extra-
contractual liability claims. These might work (well) in a purely national context. 
However, given the particular challenges a victim of a cross-border accident might 
face when new technologies play a role, short limitation periods may end up being 
particularly harsh on victims of cross-border traffic accidents.920 
 
With issues such as these in mind, and in the absence of a coherent, clear EU-wide liability regime 
which applies to AVs, it is necessary to investigate the varying approaches adopted by individual 
Member States.921 For this purpose, an indicative sample of Member States which exhibit varying 




First, Germany is perhaps the most advanced in terms of adapting their liability system with the 
imminent use of AVs in mind. This is illustrated by the German Road Traffic Act (StVG) as amended 
on July 17th 2017 with section 1(a) accounting for ‘motor vehicles with highly or fully automated 
driving function’, and 1(b) dealing with ‘Rights and responsibilities of the driver when using highly or 
fully automated driving functions’.922 Broadly the German approach is one of strict liability,923 with 
scope for liability to be avoided if the accident is caused by force majeure,924 or where it can be 
proven that fault lies elsewhere.925 It is unclear how this regime will function ‘in a highly automated 
system, unless the driver is obliged to monitor the car operation at all times’.926 There is also scope 
for the existing regimes on product liability,927 as well as manufacturer liability,928 to be triggered 
here. 
 
 France  
France exhibits some evidence of an attempt to adapt to the use of AVs in the future. However, this 
is far from comprehensive, particularly when compared to the developments in Germany. An 
obvious example is the provision to allow for the testing of such vehicles. The Law on Energy 
Transition for Green Growth notes liability briefly, outlining that: 
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The Government is authorized to take, by way of ordinance, any measure falling within 
the scope of the law in order to allow the traffic of vehicles with total or partial 
delegation of driving on public roads, whether passenger cars, goods transport vehicles 
or passenger transport vehicles, for experimental purposes, under conditions ensuring 
the safety of all road users and providing, if necessary, an appropriate liability regime.929 
It has been noted that the current liability regime regarding road traffic accidents which makes the 
driver responsible ‘cannot … be applied “as is” to accidents caused by an autonomous or driverless 
car since, in this case, the driver has no direct control of the car’.930 Also, the same issue would arise 
should an accident be caused by a driver assistance feature such as cruise control.931 As a result, it is 
suggested that ‘the future ordinance authorizing the testing of autonomous cars on public roads 
should determine the appropriate liability regime for autonomous cars’.932 However, the route by 
which this would be achieved is unclear.  
 
 United Kingdom 
The UK has no general body of law pertaining to liability issues stemming from the operation of AVs 
that is currently in force.933 Prior to the drafting of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, it 
was considered to be intuitive that the Road Traffic Act 1998 would apply. It was also been 
suggested that the UK’s product liability regime would apply.934 However, it has previously been 
outlined that: 
Certain concepts related to product liability may not be appropriate to deal with liability in respect of 
robots. For instance, it is unclear how the requirements for foreseeability, in order to establish legal 
causation in claims related to breach of contract and the tort of negligence, would be applicable in 
the context of robots with a high degree of automation.935  
Potential Liability issues were acknowledged briefly in a recent Code of Practice document provided 
by The Centre for Connected & Autonomous Vehicles, focused on the testing of AVs on UK roads. 
The document notes that the failure to comply with the Code of Practice ‘may be relevant to liability 
in any legal proceedings; similarly, compliance with the Code does not grant immunity from any 
liability’.936 Importantly, liability issues have been acknowledged within the Automated and Electric 
Vehicles Act 2018, which considers the liability of insurers where an accident is caused by an 
automated vehicle.937 Undoubtedly, this act of Parliament will be of great importance in future. 
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 Italy 
 
In Italy, liability issues arising from the use of AVs are not directly regulated and thus, the 
presumption is that product liability rules will apply.938 Additionally, the EU Directive on Product 
Safety939 has an impact as its implementation that ‘the notion of liability looks not merely at the 
actual manufacturer, but to a number of subjects, i.e. the producer, the importer, all subjects 




In Portugal there is no liability regime that is specifically focused on AVs. As such, it is assumed that 
they would be governed by existing rules on product liability as well as the strict liability system 
which applies to vehicles generally.941 
 
 Spain 
In Spain there is no specific liability framework which applies to AVs. As such, it appears that the 
general rules on civil liability will apply, which includes the fact that liability of a manufacturer is 
strict in the case of a defective product.942 With this in mind, it has been suggested that: 
 
[C]urrent mechanisms of civil liability will certainly not be suitable for advanced 
robotics or autonomous robots. The more the robot will be empowered to take 
decisions freely, on its own, the more difficult it will be to allocate liability among the 
different agents that may be involved (e.g. the artificial intelligent platform designer, 
the manufacturer, the user, the robot itself)’.943 
 
 Belgium 
Similarly, in Belgium there is currently no specific regime in place. As such, the existing system of 
fault-based liability would apply.944 In addition, it has been suggested that there is a need to modify 
the Belgian Road Traffic Act to reflect the development of AV technology.945  
 Insurance 
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The EU Motor Insurance Directive passed in 2009 requires that motor vehicles be covered by 
compulsory third party liability insurance and ensures that insurance cover in a Member State 
extends across the EU when the vehicle is in another Member State. The EU Commission conducted 
a REFIT review of the Directive in 2018 and did not propose any changes to specifically cover 
autonomous vehicles because the impact assessment found the current Directive to already cover 
autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles.946 
Autonomous vehicles used for the purpose of I&M may be exempt from this Directive, which defines 
a vehicle as ‘any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power’.947 
Though the text may indicate that vehicles for I&M operations may be covered because they would 
be traveling on land, the 2017 Rodrigues de Andrade judgement by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union clarified that third party liability insurance is only required for ‘normal use of the 
vehicle as a means of transport’.948 Specifically, the vehicle in the case that was found to not meet 
the definition was an agricultural tractor,949 which is similar to autonomous vehicles for I&M that 
would not be used as ‘a means of transport’. Nonetheless, as commercial operations, operators 
operating on land should purchase insurance coverage even if EU regulations do not make it 
compulsory. 
Although the current insurance scheme has been determined to cover autonomous vehicles, a 
European added value assessment on autonomous and connected cars notes that the new 
autonomous technology leads to novel and distinct risks that could cause problems and create gaps 
should they not be addressed systematically.950 The four main types identified are: 
 
(1) risks relating to the failure of the operating software that enables the AVs to function, 
(2) risks relating to network failures, 
(3) risks relating to hacking and cybercrime, and 
(4) risks/externalities relating to programming choice.951 
 
It has been suggested the liability regime, and consequently the insurance framework be amended in 
order to create certainty over liability if accidents were to occur.952 The liability regime must be 
adjusted first because as one scholar warned: ‘when there is a fundamental disagreement about the 
underlying liability rules, the uncertainty is systemic and cannot be eliminated by the pooling of 












regulation/initiative/1407/publication/237387/attachment/090166e5baec10b7_en Rodrigues de Andrade 
Judgement (C-514/16) The EU Commission proposed that the result of this judgment, along with that of Vnuk 
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individual risks within an insurance scheme’.953 However, another scholar predicted that because 
fault-based liability ‘always depends on human action or inaction’, it will increasingly become of 
limited value when machines are performing the actions.954 
The rapid pace of technological development of autonomous vehicles means that insurers will also 
need to respond quickly in order to accurately price the risk.955 Operators of I&M autonomous 
vehicles should be aware of the developments associated with the type of robot they are using to 
ensure that their insurance needs are consistently being met. 
2.3 Vessels/Submersibles 
Unmanned Marine Vehicles (UMVs) are vehicles that travel in the waters, and they can be divided 
into Unmanned (Water) Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).956 The 
former can also be called surface vessels while the latter submersibles. This report addresses both in 
the same section because for the most part, laws and regulations apply to them equally, though 
there may be question as to whether submersibles would be covered under the same regime in 
some contexts due to the language of the legal instruments. Much more effort has been placed on 
the use of robotics and AI for surface vessels, but in the absence of clear contrary evidence, it is likely 
that the two would be treated similarly. 
The Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) project was one of 
the earlier efforts by the EU to develop research on autonomous vessels. Active from 2012 to 2015, 
MUNIN was focused on ships ‘primarily guided by automated on-board decision systems but 
controlled by a remote operator in a shore side control station’.957 One of the main objects of the 
project was to ‘*p+rovide an in-depth economic, safety and legal assessment showing how the results 
will impact European shipping’s competitiveness and safety’.958 The project concluded that while 
certain current regulations would have to be adapted for unmanned vessels and liabilities would 
have to be allocated, they ‘do not pose an unsurmountable obstacle in legal terms’.959 
Another project, the I2C, focused on ‘partly automated monitoring system for shipping-related 
threats’ and found that further scrutiny of current laws and amendments to accommodate 
autonomous vehicles is necessary.960 The European Commission has also funded the currently 
ongoing Autonomous Shipping Initiative for European Waters project to develop the next generation 
of autonomous vessels in Europe focused on short sea shipping and inland waterways.961 
In addition, the European Defence Agency funded the “Safety and Regulations for European 
Unmanned Maritime Systems” (SARUMS) project.962 The project necessarily had a military bent and 
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focused on smaller autonomous vessels, including submersibles.963 Similar to the conclusions of 
MUNIN, SARUMS founds that while international conventions did not account for the possibility of 
autonomous ships, the new technology can nevertheless fit into the existing legal framework as long 
as issues subject to interpretation are clarified and defined.964 The project also stressed that the 
technological advances and regulatory developments need to proceed simultaneously.965 
2.3.1 Certification of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles/ Vessels 
DNV GL is an international accredited registrar and classification society  for ship certification.966 DNV 
GL defined a set of rules that vessels and any offshore robots must comply, including, safety, 
reliability and environmental requirements. The main objectives of the society are to put 
requirements on classification, verification, risk-management, training and technical advisory to the 
maritime industry on safety, enhanced performance, fuel efficiency, etc. GL provide a certification 
for safety and reliability of all involved parties within a framework of predefined procedures. Today’s 
underwater robot market is on its way to be competitive area (see the following figure967), but still as 
much attractive as other robots. This is one of the main reasons plus security why there is a lake in 
information of underwater robots.  
 




2.3.3 Legislation and policy  
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Once again, relevant legislation and policy issues that apply to the use of UMVs must now be 
discussed. As has been the case in previous sections of this report, the first point for consideration is 
the relevant international regime that applies to UMVs. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
EU position, before moving on to consider national laws that are relevant in this area. The final step 
will involve considering potential liability issues that could arise through the use of UMVs. 
2.3.1.1 International Law 
Autonomous vessels can be divided into four levels of autonomy according to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN agency that is ‘the global standard-setting authority for the 
safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping’:969 
Degree one: Ship with automated processes and decision support: Seafarers are on board to operate 
and control shipboard systems and functions. Some operations may be automated and at times be 
unsupervised but with seafarers on board ready to take control. 
Degree two: Remotely controlled ship with seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and operated 
from another location. Seafarers are available on board to take control and to operate the shipboard 
systems and functions. 
Degree three: Remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and 
operated from another location. There are no seafarers on board. 
Degree four: Fully autonomous ship: The operating system of the ship is able to make decisions and 
determine actions by itself.970 
Ringbom stresses the importance of differentiating between the level of manning and level of 
autonomy for autonomous ships and finds the IMO categorisation lacking in gradation.971 The former 
involves whether there are crew members on board, whereas the latter is ‘the division of tasks 
between humans and automated systems in complex decision-making processes, such as bridge 
watchkeeping functions’.972 He also warns that the level of autonomy on a vessel can change 
depending on the particular operation involved and should not be determined by the equipment.973 
Furthermore, determining the level of autonomy may be important to answering the question of 
whether the current international regulatory framework would apply.974 
Lloyd’s Register divides autonomous vessels into seven levels: 
AL 0) Manual: No autonomous function. All action and decision-making performed 
manually (n.b. systems may have level of autonomy, with Human in/ on the loop.), i.e. 
human controls all actions. 
AL 1) On-board Decision Support: All actions taken by human Operator, but decision 
support tool can present options or otherwise influence the actions chosen. Data is 
provided by systems on board. 
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AL 2) On &Off-board Decision Support: All actions taken by human Operator, but 
decision support tool can present options or otherwise influence the actions chosen. 
Data may be provided by systems on or off-board. 
AL 3) ‘Active’ Human in the loop: Decisions and actions are performed with human 
supervision. Data may be provided by systems on or off-board. 
AL 4) Human on the loop, Operator/ Supervisory: Decisions and actions are performed 
autonomously with human supervision. High impact decisions are implemented in a way 
to give human Operators the opportunity to intercede and over-ride. 
AL 5) Fully autonomous: Rarely supervised operation where decisions are entirely made 
and actioned by the system. 
AL 6) Fully autonomous: Unsupervised operation where decisions are entirely made and 
actioned by the system during the mission.975 
One of the most salient legal problems raised by autonomous vessels is whether an unmanned ship 
is still considered a ship.976 Various international legal instruments define ships differently or not at 
all due to the fact that they are ‘very much a function of the subject matter concerned’.977 The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not define vessel or ship, and 
customary international law offers no guidance either.978 Other international legal instruments may 
be more useful. Under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), a ship is ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and 
includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating 
platforms’.979 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention) defines a ship as ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently 
attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating 
craft’.980 From the text, it is clear that these two conventions cover both surface vessels and 
submersibles, and autonomous surface vessels and submersibles that do not have passengers or 
cargo could be defined as vessels and possibly be subject to these conventions. 
However, the International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) uses the following 
definition of a vessel: ‘every description of watercraft, including nondisplacement craft and 
seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water’.981 This definition 
introduces some doubt as to its applicability to unmanned vessels because it is unclear whether 
‘transportation’ means there must be passengers, or if the transportation of cargo would be 
sufficient. One scholar suggests that ‘there is no requirement to read into the definition of “vessel” 
any necessity for transporting someone or something characterisable as “separate” from the 
vessel’.982 If this were the case, autonomous vessels for I&M that will most likely not be carrying 
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passengers or cargo would meet the definition of a vessel under COLREGs and may be subject to its 
jurisdiction. The text of the COLREGs definition may also suggest that it does not cover submersibles 
because of its use of ‘on water’, but the convention has been interpreted ‘apply to submarines when 
operating on the surface in the same manner as they apply to surface vessels’.983 One scholar notes 
that while ‘submarines seem to exist in a sort of quasi-vessel status, depending on where they 
operate...for all practical purposes, they are treated like any other ship on the seas’.984 
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships defines a ship as ‘any self-
propelled sea-going vessel used in international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, 
passengers, or both, with the exception of vessels of less than 500 gross registered tons’.985 For the 
purpose of this convention, there is a weight minimum, and the vessel must be for ‘trade’ which 
would undoubtedly exclude vehicles for I&M. Even if there were no stipulation on weight, the 
definition would unlikely be applied to surface ships or submersibles traveling on inland waterways. 
The definitions offered by international conventions have been described as circular and not useful 
for generating ‘a common understanding as to what generally constitutes a ship’ as ‘the correct 
interpretation must be that the definition of a ship is left to individual states’ discretion’.986 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted by scholars that unmanned ships are considered ships for the 
purposes of the law of the sea.987 This would be especially true given the evolutionary approach of 
treaty interpretation that takes into account the ‘object and purpose’,988 which in the context of the 
law of the sea is to provide a legal framework for the oceans that can accommodate advances in 
technology.989 
As ships, autonomous vessels would be subject to the current international framework governing 
manned vessels. The aforementioned UNCLOS is widely considered the ‘Constitution of the Oceans’ 
and creates a framework for ocean governance, including the rights and duties of vessels.990 One of 
the main basic questions for whether autonomous vessels would be lawful under UNCLOS (and other 
maritime instruments such as the Hague Rules991 and the Rotterdam Rules992), is the question of 
seaworthiness of the ship, which flag states must ensure.993 Current understanding of seaworthiness 
is that vessels must be properly manned, and the lack of any crew members on board may raise 
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problems.994 Scholars have suggested that even if there is no crew on board, the obligation of 
seaworthiness could be met as long as the vessel can be operated safely.995 This can include having 
qualified pilots onshore to operate the vessel remotely.996 
The IMO is the agency in charge of setting standards for international shipping through drafting 
international conventions and offering other guidance.997 It ‘functions as a legislative authority’ 
though the power remains with Member States of the IMO.998 In June 2017, the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) of the IMO agreed to initiate a regulatory scoping exercise ‘to determine how the 
safe, secure and environmentally sound operation of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) 
may be introduced in IMO instruments’.999 The Facilitation Committee and Legal Committee 
subsequently decided to do the same for legal instruments under their purview.1000 Notably, UNCLOS 
is not being analysed by the IMO in this process.1001 The consensus to use the term MASS going 
forward created a common language and limited the scope of the exercise by the IMO on surface 
ships.1002 However, there is no obvious reason to conclude that the results would be inapplicable to 
submersibles insofar as the relevant legal instrument applies to submersibles also. The results of the 
regulatory scope exercise are expected by mid-2020.1003 The possible outcomes are: ‘Equivalences 
as provided for by the instruments or developing interpretations; and/or Amending existing 
instruments; and/or Developing new instruments; or None of the above as a result of the 
analysis.’1004 Should the conclusion be that regulations need to be amended to account for 
autonomous vessels, this work would then begin, and it is hoped that a regulatory framework would 
be devised by 2028.1005 
In June 2019, the MSC approved interim guidelines on the testing of MASS.1006 The interim guidelines 
state that ‘trials should be conducted in a manner that provides at least the same degree of safety, 
security and protection of the environment as provided by the relevant instruments’.1007 The 
objectives the trialling party should consider are: ‘Risk management’, ‘Compliance with mandatory 
instruments’, ‘Manning and qualifications of personnel involved in MASS trials’, ‘Human element 
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(including monitoring infrastructure and human-system interface)’, ‘Infrastructure for safe conduct 
of trials’, ‘Trial awareness’, ‘Communications and data exchange’, ‘Reporting requirements and 
information sharing’, ‘Scope and objective for each individual trial’, ‘Cyber risk management’.1008 The 
testing is subject to all relevant conventions and the approval of the relevant flag state agency, 
though ‘authorization should also be obtained from the coastal State and/or port State Authority 
where the trial will be conducted’.1009 
Besides the IMO, the Comité Maritime International (CMI) has also been active in analysing the legal 
issues raised by the development of autonomous vessels. CMI is an organisation founded in 1897 
with the aim of codifying international maritime law.1010 Its membership includes over 50 national 
maritime law organisations, and it has consultative status with the IMO and the UN.1011 CMI formed 
the Working Group on Maritime Law for Unmanned Crafts to study the issue of autonomous ships. It 
released a position paper on unmanned ships and subsequently surveyed its member national 
maritime law associations on the current status of autonomous vessels under their respective 
national laws.1012 It also analysed IMO legal instruments to determine their compatibility with 
autonomous ships.1013 The results of both were submitted to the MSC in February 2018.1014 
On the private front, in addition to the CMI, the International Network for Autonomous Ships (INAS) 
has also been formed in 2017 to facilitate collaboration amongst national and regional organisations. 
It serves ‘as a repository for information of common interest and as a central node for distribution of 
information between member organisations’, which hail from the UK, Finland, Norway, Germany, 
Korea, the US, Canada, Singapore, Denmark, Japan, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Estonia, 
China, and Australia.1015 The Satellite for 5G initiative of the European Space Agency and the 
European Maritime Safety Agency are also participants.1016 
 
2.3.1.2 National Laws 
As discussed in the previous section, whether unmanned vessels constitute vessels as defined by law 
depends on the particular treaty in international law, and the situation is similar for domestic laws 
governing ships where it is dependent on the jurisdiction. Domestic law is important in this realm 
because UNCLOS stipulates that ‘*e+very State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’.1017 It is the domestic law of 
where the ship is registered that has jurisdiction over the vessel, so whether the domestic law can 
accommodate autonomous vessels would be highly influential to the technological development and 
industry acceptance. It is also noteworthy that whether or not an unmanned vessel is likely to be 
categorised as a ‘ship’ varies between Member States. This is particularly important with respect to 
the issues of limiting liability which will be discussed later. The rest of this section discusses this 
variance across a sample of EU Member States.  
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 Belgium 
In Belgium, a ship is defined to mean: 
[A]ny floating craft, self-propelled or not, with or without any water displacement, used or fit to be 
used as a means of locomotion, in, above or under the water, including the installations not 
permanently attached to the shore or to the soil; a ship under construction is considered to be a ship 
as soon as the building contract has been signed.1018 
This suggests that unmanned vessels which operate both on the surface and underwater are very 
likely to be classified as ships. The specific reference to operating ‘above or under the water’ is 
particularly relevant here. 
The Belgian authorities have released a Smart Shipping Code of Practice for testing in Flanders for 
testing autonomous vessel trialling in inland waterways.1019 It sets the minimum standards for testing 
and ‘additional conditions may be imposed for specific applications which may vary according to the 
waterway and the kind of vessel covered by the application’.1020 The testing organisation must 
perform a risk management analysis and devise risk mitigation strategies prior to the testing.1021 The 
Code requires insurance cover and for the testers to be sufficiently trained and certified for the type 
of vessel being trialled even if it is operating on autonomous mode.1022 While testing, the vessel must 
collect the following data if they are relevant to the type of vessel being trialled: 
• whether the vessel is operating in classic or automated mode; 
• the speed of the vessel;  
• steering commands and activation; 
• braking commands and activation;  
• activation of the vessel’s audible warning system;  
• the location of the vessel (on the waterway);  
• the operation of the vessel’s lights and indicators;  
• sensor data concerning the presence of other waterway users or objects in the vicinity 
of the vessel;  
• remote commands that (may) influence the vessel’s movements (where applicable)1023 
 
Belgium has not released regulations or guidelines to regulate unmanned ships, but it has been 




Denmark has been one of the international leaders in studying the feasibility of autonomous vessels. 
Under the Danish Merchant Shipping Law, ships are defined negatively: ‘floating docks, cable drums, 
                                                          
1018
 The Belgian Ship Registration Act of 21 December 1990, Section 1(1). 
1019











[GA 824990] RIMA -- Robotics for Inspection and Maintenance Page 138/151 
floating containers and other similar equipment are not considered ships’.1025 As this provision is 
silent on whether the vessel is crewed, autonomous vessels would likely be considered ships under 
domestic law. 
In December 2017, the Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) released a report ‘to identify, systematise 
and present recommendations for how to handle the regulatory barriers to the development of 
autonomous ships’.1026 The report recommends, inter alia, that the IMO is able to regulate 
autonomous vessels on as wide a basis as possible to ensure international harmonisation and that 
the EU should wait for the IMO to take action before devising regulatory measures to fill the gaps.1027 
It also recommends that states should remain flexible and address trialling of autonomous vessels on 
a case-by-case basis instead of relying on general rules.1028 For the Danish government specifically, 
the report recommends the areas of national law that need to be addressed: 
The first intermediate goal in terms of preparing national regulation could be to adapt the definition 
of the concept of the “master” and to lay down new definitions of the concepts “autonomous ships” 
and “remote operator” and to clarify which rights/obligations should rest with a “remote operator”. 
In addition, it would be important to amend national regulation requiring ships always to be manned 




In France, it appears that the key consideration when assessing whether an unmanned vessel would 
be classified as a ship is whether or not it would be manned. While it is outlined that maritime 
navigation may include both surface and submarine navigation,1030 the evident requirement is that a 
crew must operate on board in order for a vessel to be considered a ship.1031 Clearly this could be 
problematic with respect to unmanned vessels. This is particularly important when considering the 
potential for limiting liability,1032 as under French law, this is applicable only to ships.1033 
 Greece 
In Greece, a ship is defined as ‘any vessel which can move or be moved on the water for 
transportation of persons or goods, towage, salvage, fishing, pleasure, scientific research or any 
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other purpose’.1034 As a result of this broad definition, it appears that unmanned vessel could well be 
considered to be a ‘ship’ under the Greek law. 
 Netherlands  
The Civil Code of the Netherlands defines ships as ‘all things “that are not an aircraft, which pursuant 
to their construction are intended for flotation and which float or have floated”’.1035 Further, a 
‘seagoing ship’ is defined to mean ‘ships registered as ‘sea-going ship*s+’ in the public registers 
referred to in Section 3.1.2, and ships not registered in those public registers that, according to their 
construction, are intended exclusively or principally for floating on the sea’.1036 This suggests that 
unmanned surface vessels would be considered ships, though whether submersibles would be is not 
as clear. Though submersibles are meant to go underwater, they nonetheless could still be ‘intended 
for flotation’ when operating on the surface (at the beginning or end of missions for example). This 
suggests that under Dutch law, it may still be ambiguous as to whether laws that reference ship 
would apply to submersibles. 
In 2017, the Joint Industry Project (JIP), a Dutch project with over 20 partners, was launched and 
focused on the technical aspects of autonomous shipping.1037 It conducted trials in the North Sea in 
March 2019 and ‘took part in several nautical scenarios to determine how the vessel would interact 
with seagoing traffic’.1038 The initial project ended in November 2019, but further joint projects are 
planned, including those working on autonomous shipping in inland waterways.1039 However, to 
date, no regulatory guidelines on autonomous shipping have been released by the government or 
industry. 
 Poland 
In Poland, a ‘sea-going vessel’ is defined to mean ‘any floating structure appropriated or employed in 
navigation at sea’.1040 This is a particularly broad definition which does not appear to limit the ability 
for an unmanned vessel to be classified as a ship. 
 Spain 
In Spain, the definition of a vessel extends to ‘not only craft intended for coastal or high seas 
navigation, but also ... floating docks, pontoons, dredges, hopper barges or any other floating devices 
destined or capable of being used in maritime or inland transport for industrial or commercial 
purposes’.1041 Additionally, this extends to ‘all vessels, craft and maritime apparatus irrespective or 
their origin, tonnage or activity’.1042 As a result, it appears possible that unmanned vessels could 
well be registered as ‘ships’ in Spain. 
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 Sweden 
In Sweden, a ship is defined as a vessel that is at least twelve meters in length with a breadth of at 
least four meters.1043 The result is that a vessel that are smaller than these specifications are 
categorised as boats. However, the potential application of either definition to unmanned vessels is 
currently unclear. 
 UK 
Under Merchant Shipping Act 1995, a ship ‘includes every description of vessel used in 
navigation’.1044 Though the legislation defines ‘ship’ using ‘vessel’ without defining vessel, it appears 
that this purposefully vague definition is likely to extend to unmanned ships, including both surface 
vessels and submersibles. Further, none of the relevant case law on the subject has directed 
otherwise.1045 
In September 2014, the Marine Autonomous Systems Regulatory Working Group (MASRWG) was 
established by the United Kingdom Marine Industries Alliance. Its aim is to ‘identify the regulatory 
voids that exist for USVs within IMO legislation and has also developed The Maritime Autonomous 
Systems Surface Industry Code of Practice’.1046 The initial version of the Code of Practice was 
released in November 2017 and focused on design and construction.1047 An updated version, which 
added guidance on the operation of the vessel, was released in November 2018.1048 Neither version 
have the force of law and are for guidance for vessels under 24 metres operating in UK waters, both 
at sea and in inland waterways.1049 Both of these reports followed the Working Group’s first report 
titled The Maritime Autonomous Systems Surface, MAS(S) Industry Code of Conduct that raised the 
issues preliminarily and foreshadowed the two upcoming reports.1050 Notably, 2017 marked the first 
time an unmanned ship was registered in the UK Register.1051 
The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has been active on the technological development 
of autonomous ships by partnering with industry and also designating a testing location to facilitate 
data sharing.1052 The designated site is also the location of the Maritime Autonomy Regulatory Lab 
(MAR Lab) which is meant to ‘provide an environment to discuss regulatory proposals and vessel 
testing with stakeholders, identifying regulatory gaps and legislative barriers to further the 
development of autonomous vessels in UK waters’.1053 Thus far, the UK government has not 
published any regulatory guidance on unmanned ships but the MCA has reviewed the Code of 
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Practice.1054 The government also pledged to work with the IMO on its regulatory scoping 
exercise.1055 
2.3.1.3 Liability Issues 
 
It is clear that operators of autonomous vessels and submersibles should be concerned with the 
potential liability that could arise through their use.1056 The suggestion is that issues could extend 
beyond product liability type claims,1057 to situations where third-parties seek compensation should 
an algorithm lead to a collision which causes damage, injury, or even death.1058 This would be 
particularly problematic as there appears to be no prospect for parties to protect themselves by 
limiting liability for such incidents, as would be the case in usual commercial shipping cases.1059 
In the context of commercial shipping the ability for parties to limit their liability, subject to certain 
conditions, is well established.1060 Briefly, this allows ‘shipowners (as well as certain other parties 
concerned with the ship’s operation) the right to limit their liability for one particular incident 
against all potential claimants’. 1061 This approach was established  ‘well before submarines were 
developed and its purpose was to promote the development of commercial shipping’.1062 However, it 
is suggested that because submarines do not constitute a ‘paradigm of a ship, the application of 
limitation of liability to them is well outside the purpose of the regime’.1063 With this in mind, it has 
been noted that uncertainty regarding the way that liability rules will be applied will be reflected in 
the increased premiums that insurers will inevitably charge. This would in turn increase the 
operational costs attached to using this technology which could have a prohibitive impact on its 
commercial viability.1064 
In January 2015, a team at the University of Southampton delivered a comprehensive report titled 
Liability for operations in Unmanned Maritime Vehicles with Differing Levels of Autonomy as part of 
a project with the European Defence Agency. The report concluded that while existing liability 
regimes in national jurisdictions can be applied to autonomous vessels and submersibles, it urged 
that ‘*t+he development of a coherent, international legal framework must be a priority for the UMV 
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sector’.1065 Like other fault-based claims, it would be important to determine the standard of care, 
which is the prudent seaman for vessels, but this standard may be difficult to determine with 
autonomous vessels and submersibles.1066 Also, the ‘status of UMVs as “ships” is a question of 
fundamental importance’1067 on the basis that this has a significant impact on the regulations to 
which it would be subject.1068  
Furthermore, it is noted that ‘it would be very difficult if not impossible for certain UMVs to be 
considered as ships, even with significant broadening of the scope of the IMO Conventions’.1069 This 
is important on the basis that: 
For UMVs which are not ships, extant shipping regulations applicable to “ships” will not apply and 
any inability to comply therewith does not itself present difficulty. In such a case, UMV operations 
will not exist in a legal vacuum. Instead, in civil jurisdictions a broader legal code will apply to 
prescribe liability and in common law jurisdictions a duty of care is owed between sea-users vis-à-vis 
each other. For the operation of such UMVs in areas beyond the jurisdiction of a state, it will be the 
responsibility of the deploying state to ensure safety of navigation and protection of the rights of 
other users of the sea. Therefore, the standards applicable with respect to the regulation of safety 
will be those of the flag/deploying state. However, where such a UMV collides in an area beyond 
national jurisdiction with another object or a ship deployed by other states, significant issues 
regarding the applicable law and the standards for safe navigation will arise.1070  
 
Additionally, through reviewing various international conventions, it was concluded that most, 
including the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Convention, would not 
be applicable to autonomous vessels or submersibles, but that compliance would aid in finding 
absence of liability or fault if an accident were to occur.1071 Also, in the event that the good 
seamanship standards set out in these conventions are not met, the collision could be determined to 
have been caused by negligence.1072 
 
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Seas (SOLAS) 
On the subject of whether SOLAS would bind autonomous vessels and submersibles, the report 
found that while Chapter V applies to all ships, ‘the other parts of SOLAS are generally only 
applicable to ships larger than 500 grt’.1073 Chapter V deals with the safety of navigation, Regulation 
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14 of which requires that ships be adequately manned at all times. It is, however, suggested that 
autonomous vessels may still meet the requirement for ‘adequate manning for the purpose of safety 
of life at sea’,1074 should a State ‘consider manning requirements to be significantly reduced, non-
existent or replaced by shore-based controllers’.1075 However, there is a risk that the requirement for 
manual control in certain circumstances could be compromised where a remote crew is responsible 
for operating the ship. This is because in situations where a delay or interruption occurs, ‘switching 
between automated and manual navigation would not be immediate’.1076  
Ultimately, it appears that non-compliance with SOLAS could lead to accusations that the standard of 
care was not met, which could in turn lead to liability. In particular, ‘operators of UMVs have no 
certification benchmark to guard them against civil liability resulting from shortcomings in UMV 
design…*and the] lack of an analogue certification regime also means that the coastal or port state 
may impose its own idiosyncratic standards on UMVs if it so wishes’.1077 
 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 
(COLREGs) 
Autonomous vessels, like currently available ships, must comply with COLREGs, rules designed ‘to 
make navigation safer by establishing common navigational behavioral patterns and standardizing 
certain equipment found on vessels’.1078 Previously this had been unclear, though compliance with 
COLREGs was advised.1079 COLREGs ‘harmonises the national systems and makes the establishment 
of fault the basis of liability for collision between ships’ and non-compliance with its rules for good 
seamanship could result in liability.1080 Consequently, they are not merely guidelines but must be 
strictly complied when navigating the seas.1081 
While not explicitly stated, COLREGs appears only to apply to vessels operating at the surface, and 
not to submersibles.1082 Some scholars have suggested that in its current form, COLREGs privileges 
the navigation rights of autonomous vessels over manned vessels.1083 This is because the former may 
not be ‘under command’ or is ‘restricted in her ability to manoeuvre’, meaning that they are to be 
given the right of way under COLREGs.1084 COLREGs applies when accidents are the fault of the pilot. 
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With this in mind, it is suggested that for unmanned vessels where there are onshore pilots, ‘nothing 
will change regarding liability’.1085  
It may be argued that COLREGs does not apply to I&M autonomous vessels on the basis that ‘crafts 
which are not capable of conveyance of persons or things do not come within the scope of 
COLREGS’.1086 This is because these autonomous vessels are used for maintenance and inspection. As 
a result, it would be up for interpretation as to whether the incidental conveyance of things for the 
purpose of maintenance would mean that COLREGs would be applicable. Even if the COLREGs are 
not applicable, all ships, including autonomous ones, would still be required to maintain a standard 
of good seamanship in their operation.1087  
An additional problem that could arise regarding COLREGs and the use of autonomous vessels is that 
‘unwritten, long-standing navigational customs may also have the force of law, so long as they do not 
conflict with the rules of navigation’.1088 The issue concerns whether or not computer technology 
would be able to make determinations regarding these customs in the same way that an 
experienced human operator would. This would depend on the algorithms used for machine 
learning, which would have a substantial impact on their ability to interpret relevant rules. In fact, 
some existing models of autonomous ships have shown that they have been unable to abide by the 
rules to avoid collisions in a timely manner.1089 An obvious issue in this case is that ‘*w+hen rules by 
their very nature are vague or unwritten, collision liability becomes a precarious thing’.1090 To 
accommodate autonomous vessels and make clear where liability lies, this uncertainty may have to 
be corrected in the future.1091  
In a carriage contract, the shipowner or carrier of the autonomous vessel may face questions of 
whether the vessel is seaworthy. Article III of the Hague-Visby Rules states that:  
 
The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: 
(a) Make the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship1092 
 
Failure to meet the principles of the ISM Code, even if the code may not directly apply as discussed 
above, ‘could be argued to render the vessel unseaworthy’.1093 The question is whether autonomous 
vessels would be considered seaworthy and properly manned, and also what would amount to due 
diligence in this context. Under current laws, ‘it is vague whether an unmanned ship can be 
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considered seaworthy in the strict legal sense’.1094 Given that a case-by-case analysis carries 
requirements regarding seaworthiness, this question may have to be solved by case law after 
autonomous vessels are deployed and subsequently encounter this issue. In the alternative, the 
charterparty, the contract between the shipowner and the charterer, could also include explicit 
definitions of what makes the autonomous vessel seaworthy.1095 Seaworthiness is connected to the 
issue of the insurance cover of the vessel on the basis that the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which is 
applicable to the vast majority of international insurance contracts, requires that all ships be 
warranted to be seaworthy, meaning they are ‘reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the 
ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured’.1096 
When collisions occur, preservation of evidence is important. Fortunately, with the advances in 
autonomous vessel technology, data surrounding the accident would become more abundant due to 
the need for such information to operate properly.1097 In national jurisdictions, the shipowner’s 
liability is generally fault-based.1098 In addition, the shipowner may also be vicariously liable for the 
actions of the master or crew.1099 Causation must exist between the breach of the duty and the 
loss.1100 However, if the vessel is fully autonomous, a fault-based approach may not make sense: 
[T]here is reason to presume that it makes no sense to talk about liability based on fault to the 
extent that navigation and decisions of importance to the ship’s course and speed are taken by an 
autonomous system without human interference. It must be presumed that this could, in the longer 
term, change the liability norm, at least in connection with collisions, to the shipowner’s strict 
liability.1101 
Ringbom notes that:  
[T]he most important point, in terms of authorising autonomous operations, but also 
with respect to assessing responsibility and liability, is the moment at which “monitored 
autonomy” turns into “constrained autonomy.” It is at this point that the system is 
partially authorized to act on its own, without human supervision, and its role shifts 
from offering assistance to being in charge.1102 
Ultimately, as autonomous vessel technology becomes more sophisticated, bringing with it an 
increase in their level of autonomy, the liability regime may shift toward one of strict liability. For the 
time being, though, it appears that under current rules, apportionment of liability for accidents 
involving autonomous vessels will remain be fault-based. With this in mind, there are practical steps 
for the development of a liability regime as proposed by Soyer: 
 
i) to introduce a liability regime for autonomous ships, ideally through an international 
convention;  
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ii) to impose a strict liability regime when such vessels operate in an autonomous 
fashion;  
iii) to channel liability to the registered shipowner, not the manufacturer;  
iv) to leave the risk caused by cyber-attacks or losing connection with an autonomous 
ship on the shoulders of the shipowner; and  
v) to enable shipowners to have a recourse action against those responsible in the 
manufacture of an autonomous vessel.1103 
3. Guidelines in RIMA Domains 
 Oil and Gas Industry 
There are no European laws or regulations specifically addressing the use of robotics in the oil and 
gas industry. In June 2013, the European Commission passed the Directive 2013/30/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
and amending Directive 2004/35/EC.1104 While this directive does not explicitly address the issue of 
the use of robots in the oil and gas industry, it does contain provisions operators must consider. 
Owners or operators must submit documents before engaging in offshore oil and gas operations, 
which include accident prevention policies, reports on major hazards, internal emergency response 
plans, and other documents.1105 For robot operators, these documents should be prepared with the 
use of robotics technology in mind so risk assessments and responses could take into account its use. 
In the UK, Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 governs the design, construction, and maintenance of 
pipelines, including those for oil and gas.1106 Section 13 states that ‘*t+he operator shall ensure that a 
pipeline is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair’.1107 Nothing 
in the regulations specifies that the maintenance must be performed by humans, so the use of 
robots to ensure the integrity of the pipes would be lawful under existing regulations. 
Oil & Gas UK, a trade association, released the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operations 
Management Standards and Guidelines in January 2017 for drones used in the oil and gas sector. In 
addition to meeting the basic requirements of operating drones, there is additional guidance on 
operating specifically in the oil and gas domain.1108 The risk assessment must take into consideration 
the special nature of the operations on the oil and gas installations.1109 The emergency response plan 
must also be tailored to the industry and should include, for example, procedures for ‘containment 
of damaged batteries and specific handling instructions and equipment...for some composite 
materials’.1110 
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The operator must have in place a safety management system.1111 The pilot must have specific oil 
and gas training and certification to deal with the specific conditions of the industry.1112 The training 
must include ‘*f+urther systems training’. ‘*h+azard awareness and risk management in complex 
industrial environments’, ‘*o+perations in magnetic interference areas’, ‘*o+perations in congested 
areas’, ‘*o+perations in potentially explosive environments’, and ‘*m+anual flight skills assessments in 
confined areas and close to structures’.1113 Competence in these areas allows for further training on 
advanced systems, dangerous goods, hazard awareness and risk management in complex offshore 
environments, and advanced flight training.1114 The aerial robot itself ‘should ideally be capable of 
being operated safely in wind speeds of up to 25 knots in order to offer a practical operational 
envelope’ due to the likely offshore conditions.1115 
RenewableUK, a trade association, has also provided high level guidelines on incorporating the use of 
drones for projects on the UK Continental Shelf.1116 The factors that need to be considered are: 
‘Safety Management System’, ‘Operating Requirements and Procedures’, ‘Operating Safety Case’, 
‘Training, Assessment and Currency’, ‘Aircraft Systems’, ‘Task Specific Risk Assessment’, and 
‘Emergency Procedures’.1117 
Gómez and Green propose a number of factors that need to be assessed when choosing drones to 
be used in monitoring in the oil and gas industry. Most importantly, the type of information needed, 
terrain conditions, flight distance, and the type of offshore platform are considerations that must be 
taken into account.1118 
 Nuclear 
Similarly, there are currently no laws or regulations governing the use of robots in the nuclear sector 
in the EU1119 However, there are efforts of drafting guidelines and standards. The ERNCIP Thematic 
Group Radiological & Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure, in a report entitled Impact of Novel 
Technologies on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness, notes that ‘standards play an 
important role in enabling interoperability between these systems’ hardware and software’, 
referring to radiation detection.1120 Specifically, the data format needs to be standardised: 
Low-level data format standards such as IEC 63047 improve the interoperability between hardware 
and software. While this is expected to be a bliss for system integrators and developers of software 
systems for data analysis, the success of the standard will depend on the willingness of 
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manufacturers who offer complete systems to implement the standard as an alternative to the 
proprietary data format that they use between the hardware and software component.1121 
The group has compiled a ‘set of potential standards for unmanned systems in *radiological and 
nuclear+ measurement scenarios’:1122 
A widely accepted standard collection of frameworks for robot software development is 
the Robot Operating System (ROS). Further important standards concerning 
communication with robots and control of unmanned systems are the Battle 
Management Language (BML), InterOperability Profile (IOP) and Joint Architecture for 
Unmanned Systems (JAUS). Furthermore, there are efforts for standardisation in the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) regarding international standards for 
[radiological and nuclear] measurements with unmanned systems.1123 
There are currently very few standards or guidance for robotics technologies used in specific RIMA 
domains, including in the oil and gas and nuclear industries. Due to the heightened levels of risk 
associated with working in these domains and the increasing use of robots, regulations, either 
through law or industry guidelines, are likely to be needed to ensure safety standards are met by 
designers, manufacturers, and operators. This will ensure that the maintenance and inspection are 
done safely and efficiently. 
 
Conclusion  
This report has surveyed the existing safety standards and regulations machinery in general and on 
various types of specific robotics technology, namely those that travel in air, in or on water, and on 
land. Safety standards from the technological perspective and laws regulating the use of these 
robots and those relevant to the allocation of liabilities in case of accidents were discussed. Much of 
the existing standards and regulations are not specific to robots for I&M. Indeed, because of the 
novelty of the technology and the relatively recent interest from the legal realm in such 
technologies, the laws and regulations are by and large technology-specific rather than industry-
specific. As a result, laws and regulations that could apply to robots for I&M are on a general level 
and do not address the particular issues facing robots operating in RIMA domains. Nonetheless, the 
Machinery Directive by and large applies to current industrial robots used for infrastructure 
inspection and maintenance, at least for the terrestrial setting. 
As the report has shown, the regulatory measures for the different types of technology are in 
different stages of development. While there is an EU-wide regulation for aerial drones, the laws for 
autonomous vehicles have been more nationally-based and although there appears to be 
communication between the governments of the Member States, there are no harmonised 
standards. Meanwhile, for vessels and submersibles, the focus has been more internationally 
focused due to the nature of maritime matters. This difference may be partly attributed to the fact 
that aerial drones are a reality, whereas autonomous vehicles and seafaring robots are not as 
developed as technologies. 
The lack of harmonisation means that businesses that operate in more than one Member State 
would have to abide by multiple rules governing the same conduct, resulting in confusion and higher 
costs. This lack of consistency may lead to burdensome transactional costs to achieve compliance in 
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multiple jurisdictions and possibly hinder the wider adoption of the use of robots in infrastructure 
inspection and maintenance. However, with the rapid pace of development of technologies, 
stakeholders must soon contemplate whether a similar-EU wide regulation would be feasible for the 
latter technologies, and if so, how to best proceed. The experience of devising a harmonising 
instrument for aerial drones may offer guidance on how the EU may want to proceed with regard to 
regulating other types of robots.  
Toward that end, this findings of this report facilitates working with national, regional, and 
international standardisation organisations to devise standards to fill the regulatory gaps and 
collaborating with other interested stakeholders that are also examining similar issues to ensure that 
clear, harmonised regulations can be implemented in the EU and internationally. Insofar as existing 
regulations may differ from Member State to Member State, this report has shown that the 
variations are not significant, though some Member States have been more proactive than others. It 
is imperative that a formal process be conducted for autonomous vehicles, though Member States 
may not be incentivised to do so until technology develops further. As for autonomous vessels, this 
process has already begun through the Member States working with the IMO and should continue at 
the international level due to the nature of the maritime sector. 
Furthermore, this report has also shown that there are very few legal regulations specific to 
submersibles and robots operating in RIMA domains. While submersibles operate under water, they 
may have more in common with aerial drones than autonomous vessels given the types of 
operations and sizes of the robots. Consequently, the aerial drone regulatory framework of different 
measures for different types of risk categories may be a possible regime that can be explored for 
submersibles. Regulations specific to RIMA technologies must build on the existing frameworks for 
the different types of robots and consider what additional regulations are necessary depending on 
the additional risk factors in the respective domains. To develop a comprehensive regime for robots 
in the RIMA domains, it would be necessary to transition from viewing robots by the method they 
operate to the environment in which they operate. Nonetheless, categorisations based on risk could 
also be a workable and possibly ideal approach to exploring the framework to regulate RIMA 
technologies. 
Next Steps  
This report has summarised in a single place the best practices for the safety of robots and the legal 
and regulatory measures governing robots across the EU, with a particular emphasis on issues 
important for robots used for I &M. In the period after submitting this report, Task 7.3 will develop 
this further: 
● We will improve the coverage of the current report by incorporating other kinds of robots 
which are not included in this report.  
● In parallel, we will hold two workshops to bring together people for industry and application 
environment together with academics to share knowledge and extract new insight. The 
workshop is primarily for review and improvement of the interim report content 
● We will also start collecting data from industry and from lawyers and legal scholars on 
regulatory measures and liability regimes concerning robots in the form of surveys.  
The results of the previous tasks will be the next (and final) deliverable from the task, which will have 
two parts: 
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● Online access to a section of the AAIP Body of Knowledge1124 specifically oriented to the 
RIMA network’s concerns. This will incorporate key material both from this report and from 
the further activities listed above and will be integrated with the rest of the Body of 
Knowledge so that the RIMA network benefits from the wider information contained 
therein. 
● A short report (formal RIMA deliverable D7.5) which will summarise how all the above 





                                                          
1124
 This is being developed by the Assuring Autonomy International Programme (AAIP) with the ambition “to 
become the definitive reference source on assurance and regulation of robotics and autonomous systems”. 
There is more information, including a description of the planned structure, at 
https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/body-of-knowledge/  
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